Mauritanian Elections: 5 Days Out

Mauritania’s first post-coup presidential elections will take place this Saturday, July 18. What follows is a brief run-down of the four most-discussed candidates in the election.

I haven’t been following Mauritanian politics very long, but around the world incumbents win re-election quite often, with or without tampering. In Mauritania, moreover, the incumbent has exercised some real influence over this electoral transition, seems to have started campaigning before many of his opponents, and possesses significant military support. Therefore if I had to predict the outcome, I would favor the sitting executive, General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz.

Incumbents frequently win, in my view, partly because they represent and ally with elites. However, for the same reason, candidates who represent another section of the elite also stand a real chance. In Mauritania, one figure who might mobilize an alternative or dissident elite constituency is Colonel Ely Vall, the man who ruled Mauritania from 2005 to 2007.

Will a contest between Vall and Abdelaziz split important elite constituencies, throwing victory up for grabs? Or will the presence of two military rulers alienate voters from both, opening opportunities for other opposition candidates? Or, finally, will Vall prove irrelevant to the outcome? For example, Kal argues that Vall wields economic power but lacks military or popular support.

Turning to major opposition candidates, much coverage focuses on two: Ahmed Ould Daddah, who finished in second place after deposed President Abdallahi in the last elections and whose party currently holds the most seats in parliament, and Messaoud Boulkheir, a former government minister who many see as the representative of Mauritania’s half million present and former slaves. Boulkheir won around 5% of the vote in 2003 and nearly 10% in 2007 but, according to Kal, was the kingmaker in 2007.

However, Kal goes on to say that Boulkheir’s chances of winning are nil. Perhaps Boulkheir could have some influence on the outcome – he and Daddah have each signed an agreement (Arabic) promising to support the other if he makes it to the second round – but that influence could be unpredictable, as apparently Boulkheir signed a similar agreement in 2007 but then switched sides in the final hour.

Talk of the second round brings us full circle to the theme of incumbent power. Does the two-round system favor the incumbent? Assuming Abdelaziz was one of the choices in the second round, would his ability to exercise power and distribute favors lead other candidates to throw their support to him? Or, worse, would the fear of a united opposition toppling him in the second round lead Abdelaziz to commit suppression of intimidation of voters during the first round? Or does Mauritania’s need for international legitimacy mean this election will be clean, and that we should be prepared for a victory by Daddah, Vall, or someone else?

A lot of questions. I’ll be following events as they take shape this week. Let me know what you hear, either in the comments or by email at alexseminal at gmail.com.