Ignoring Somalia?

Two pieces this week suggest that the crisis in Somalia demands more outside intervention. I’m not convinced.

UN Headquarters, New York

At Reuters, Barry Malone asks, “Why is the world ignoring Somalia?” Blogging at the AU summit in Addis Ababa, he noted the strong rhetoric but limited commitments given by Spanish Prime Minister Jose Zapatero and UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon. Malone concludes,

Why the inaction? Why the focus on Afpak and Yemen only? Does the United Nations think it could never succeed in such a complex country? Are African breeding grounds for militancy not considered as immediate a threat as others? Does nobody want to prop up a government that was never elected by its people? How should the world react? Is it just that it really doesn’t have a clue how to?

Over at the Brookings Institution, meanwhile, Mwangi Kimenyi details the problems in Somalia and lays out an agenda for fixing them:

The United States and other developed countries should lead an international effort aimed at the reconstitution of the Somali state. After the unsuccessful Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. literally withdrew from direct engagement, preferring to act through surrogate front-line states such as Kenya and Ethiopia, and giving token support to A.U. peace keepers. The humanitarian dimension was sub-contracted to civil society such as CARE and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), among others. These approaches have limited success and will not work because they only treat symptoms. Thus far, efforts by African nations including the African Union have not yielded fruit. In fact, hardly any militarily strong African country has contributed forces and equipment to support the peace mission.

In tandem with destroying terror networks, a prudent approach must focus on a long-term solution that not only leads to peaceful co-existence of the Somalis, but also improves the quality of life and creates opportunities to engage in productive activities. At the core of such a strategy must be the progressive weakening of the factions’ capacity to engage in violence and to undertake illicit activities. Achieving these objectives require a strong military presence and for an extended period of time. Sources of illicit wealth must be curtailed especially the trade in guns, drugs and piracy. In this respect, the United Nations must take an expanded role and should have the mandate to occupy the country until factions are sufficiently weakened and willing to negotiate peace. In essence, the monopoly on violence must be consolidated in an international body such as the U.N. probably together with the A.U. The outcome of negotiated peace is likely to be a new state, with different structures of governance. It is also conceivable that the outcome could be more than one state.

Finally, the strategy must involve a broad development agenda. As already noted, statelessness has many concentrated benefits, which motivates factions to invest heavily so to retain the economic rents derived under statelessness. The military agenda must therefore be complemented with an internationally coordinated development agenda including investment in productive activities, building infrastructure and the provision of social services, especially investment in human capital-education and health. Today, investments in human capital are extremely low because alternative investment in illicit activities has much higher returns.

That’s a call for US-led, armed nation-building. Perhaps Malone is implicitly making the same call. If so, I would like to hear more details: How many troops would it take? What will their strategy be? How long will the operations last? How much will it cost the US and other countries who sign on?

I do not believe the troops, funds, and political will exist for such ventures, which renders moot all larger discussions of whether such an operation could succeed. That leads us back to where Malone began – ignoring Somalia. But is Somalia being ignored? The US conducts missile strikes there. Ethiopian forces intervene regularly. Kenya keeps a close eye on its neighbor. The AU has peacekeepers there. Eritrea supports rebel factions. And were it not for outside intervention – specifically the 2006 invasion by Ethiopia – Somalia might be in better shape today. Yes, the UN could send in 5,000 peacekeepers – but if 200,000 would be needed to establish real peace, then what would be the point of a smaller number?

I do not deny the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia, nor do I deny the threat its radicals could pose to its neighbors or to the United States. But calls to “do something” need to be fleshed out with concrete details that will either prove or refute their viability, and outside powers need to think carefully about the potentially huge drawbacks of greater invention in the Horn.