Continued Rejection of the ICC in West and East Africa

It is not new to read of African governments ignoring or rejecting the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s claims to jurisdictional authority. But two stories this week reinforce the idea that many key players on the continent are willing to cross the Court.

First is Sudanese President Omar al Bashir’s attendance at an African Union summit in Abuja, Nigeria. The ICC issued a warrant for Bashir’s arrest in March 2009, in connection with war crimes in Darfur. His travel itinerary since then charts a map of ICC rejection across Africa and beyond. While Nigeria is the first West African nation to host Bashir, it joins a trend that includes several other countries and the African Union itself. From the BBC:

Mr Bashir has visited numerous African countries since the arrest warrant was issued – including Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.

Only Botswana and Malawi have threatened to arrest him.

In May, the AU called on the ICC to drop war crimes charges against Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta after accusing it of “hunting” Africans because of their race.

Mention of Kenya brings us to the second news item from this week: Yesterday, the ICC rejected another request from Kenyan Vice President William Ruto, who like Kenyatta faces charges at the Court, to hold his trial in Africa.

The election, in March of this year, of Kenyatta and Ruto seemed a rebuke to the Court. Both men have been under indictment since March 2011 in connection with election/post-election violence in 2007-2008. David Bosco, writing shortly before Kenya’s most recent election, spelled out some potential consequences that a Kenyatta victory might have for the Court. One of these is particularly noteworthy in light of the Court’s decision on Ruto’s request for a trial location change:

That a freshly elected African head of state will bear the burden of ICC indictment would likely worsen already poor relations between the court and African officialdom. Many African leaders have argued that the ICC, which to this point has indicted only Africans, systematically ignores crimes committed in other parts of the world. At various points, African leaders have discussed withdrawing en masse from the treaty that created the court or, more likely, empowering a regional court to investigate atrocities, thereby displacing the ICC.

The ICC’s decision to keep Ruto’s trial in The Hague may strengthen such sentiments among some African leaders.

From both Nigeria and Kenya, then, I see fresh examples of the difficulty the Court is having in achieving legitimacy and recognition in Africa.

Sudan: A Cross-Amputation in Political Context

Q 5:33 is rendered, in Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s translation, “The punishment of those who wage war against God and His Apostle, and strive with might and main for mischief throughout the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter.”

On February 14, Sudanese authorities carried out a “cross-amputation” against an accused highway robber named Adam al Muthna. According to Human Rights Watch, “Muthna was convicted of armed robbery (Haraba) under article 167 of the 1991 Sudanese Penal Code in relation to an armed attack on a truck carrying passengers between North Kordofan and East Darfur in March 2006.” HRW adds,

Article 168(b) of the Sudanese Penal Code provides cross amputation as a penalty for armed robbery when it results in grievous injury or involves the robbery of property equivalent to an amount decreed by the judiciary, currently set at 1500 Sudanese Pounds (approximately US$ 340).

Amputation as a form of corporal punishment was incorporated into Sudanese law in 1983 when then-President Gaffar Nimeiry introduced Islamic reforms known as the “September laws.” Although sentences imposing amputations have been handed down under those laws, there are no known cases since 2001 in which such sentences have been carried out. Human rights groups had hoped this signaled a de facto moratorium on the practice.

[...]

Sudanese authorities have imposed stoning sentences and routinely order flogging penalties. Both penalties are forms of corporal punishment justified as Sharia (Islamic law). In 2012, two sentences of death by stoning for adultery were imposed on women but were overturned following an international outcry.

Reuters discusses some of the political context that helps explain why the “de facto moratorium” has ended. Some argue that the cross-amputation represents a move to claim religious legitimacy amid domestic dissent. (Diverse forms of dissent in recent years have included armed rebellion in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, an alleged coup attempt, street protests motivated by economic and political grievances, etc.) Reuters also points out that the government has consistently pledged deeper Islamization of society, government, and law since the run-up to South Sudan’s secession.

[The cross-amputation] followed a pledge by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir to implement a “100%” Islamic constitution as a result of the secession in 2011 of the mainly non-Muslim south of Sudan.

Let’s flash back to December 2010:

Sudan’s president said the country would adopt an Islamic constitution if the south split away in a referendum due next month, in a speech on [19 December 2010] in which he also defended police filmed flogging a woman.

“If south Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity,” President Omar Hassan al-Bashir told supporters at a rally in the eastern city of Gedaref.

“Sharia (Islamic law) and Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language,” he said.

And to July 2012:

“We want to present a constitution that serves as a template to those around us. And our template is clear, a 100 percent Islamic constitution, without communism or secularism or Western (influences),” said Bashir [in a speech in Khartoum on 7 July 2012].

“And we tell non-Muslims, nothing will preserve your rights except for Islamic sharia because it is just,” he said.

Bashir, facing small-scale protests calling for him to step down, said a committee made up of “all parties, religious sects and Sufis” would be set up to draft a constitution.

That appeared to be a move to assuage resentment by other opposition parties – many of which are still dominated by Islamist figures – over Bashir’s reluctance to loosen the grip of the ruling National Congress Party.

He did not give a date for the new constitution.

As of last month, momentum toward a new constitution seemed to be growing.

I think the cross-amputation is a sign that the Bashir government’s statements and plans concerning deeper Islamization deserve to be taken seriously. It seems likely that there will be continued efforts by his government to design and carry out legislation based on the government’s reading of shari’a.

A few relevant resources:

A Sudanese Reaction to OSJI’s Torture Report

The Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI) recently released a report (.pdf) entitled, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition.” The report includes sections on numerous countries whose governments reportedly participated in detention and rendition. Readers of this blog may be interested to look at the sections on Algeria (p. 65), Djibouti (pp. 73-74), Ethiopia (pp. 75-76), Gambia (p. 77), Kenya (p. 88), Libya (pp. 88-90), Mauritania (p. 96), Morocco (pp. 97-98), and Somalia (pp. 106-107). At the Washington Post, Max Fisher has created what he calls “a staggering map of the 54 countries that reportedly participated in the CIA’s rendition program.”

The report has no stand-alone section on Sudan, but the report refers to Sudan several times as a site where people were transferred.

I have been interested for some time in the issue of what “leverage” the United States government has over the Sudanese government, and whether Khartoum has grown pessimistic about its chances of normalizing relations with Washington. In light of this concern, I was interested to read the Sudan Tribune‘s article on the OSJI report. The Paris-based Sudan Tribune is not a government-run publication and sometimes takes an oppositional tone toward the government, but I would not be surprised if some officials in Khartoum share the paper’s sense of what it calls the “irony” of Sudan’s cooperation on renditions:

“It is true that there was a period of time, as in 2002, 2003 and 2004, when intelligence cooperation with NISS went up but that has to be put in context … It is relative as it [counterterrorism ties] went from nothing to something,” [a US] official told Sudan Tribune last month.

He said that the US intelligence cooperation with Sudan is nowhere near the one that exists with Jordan, for example.

Ironically Sudan has been on the US blacklist of states sponsoring terrorism since 1993 over allegations it harboured Islamist militants.

Sudan has also been subject to comprehensive economic sanctions since 1997 over terrorism charges as well as human right abuses. Further sanctions, particularly on weapons, were imposed in 2003 following the outbreak of violence in the western Darfur region.

Have you read any other reactions to the OSJI report from around the region?

Update on New Leadership for Sudan’s Islamic Movement

Back in November, Sudan’s Islamic Movement – historically a key pillar of support for President Omar al Bashir and the ruling National Congress Party – held its eighth general conference. The conference attracted attention and speculation as observers watched to see how divided the Movement would appear. Some observers also say that the succession to the post of secretary-general may hold clues as to the future succession battle over the Sudanese presidency itself. The outgoing Secretary-General (due to term limits) and current First Vice President of Sudan is Ali Osman Mohammad Taha (bio here).

It’s now possible to give a few updates. At its conference the Movement elected Zubair Mohamed Hassan as its new secretary-general, and Dr. Mahdi Ibrahim (a former Sudanese ambassador to the US, I believe) as president of its 300-member Shura (Arabic: Consultation) Council (more on how the elections unfolded here, in Arabic). The Council subsequently selected several new deputies: Bakri Hassan Salah, Hassabo Mohamed Abdel-Rahman, Raja Hassan Khalifa, and Hamid Sidiq. The Sudan Tribune attaches special significance to Bakri’s appointment.

Bakri who is among those army officers who implemented the Islamist coup d’état of June 1989, occupied important positions in the different governments including director of national security service, defence and interior minister.

He is also known as influential among the Sudanese armed forces. But he remained far from the Islamic Movement and the organs of the National Congress Party.

His name circulated recently in Khartoum among those who might probably succeed to President Omer Al-Bashir who remains strongly attached to the military institution more than the party.

Observers say Bakri has the support of Bashir and the army. At different crises high ranking officers in the Sudan Armed Forces prefer to deal directly with him about their concerns instead of their minister Abdel-Rahim Hussein.

I have only been able to find limited information on the other appointees. According to this article (Arabic), new Secretary-General Zubair Hassan is “among the major economic personalities in the country,” and is “head of the financial sector in the ruling party.” He previously held posts as financial minister and oil minister, among others. Sudan Tribune has a brief note on Hassabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, who “was appointed to lead the National Congress Party’s political relations bureau on 23 February 2012.” Raja Hassan Khalifa was, as of early 2012, an adviser to Bashir and a university professor. In this article, Sudan Tribune identifies Hamid Sidiq as the NCP’s communications secretary.

Sudan: Khartoum’s Pessimism on Normalizing Relations with the United States

Since 1993, the US State Department has listed Sudan as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” Since 1997, Sudan has faced a set of economic and political sanctions from the US. President Barack Obama renewed those sanctions in November, as he did in November 2011. Both times, unsurprisingly, the government in Khartoum objected to the decision, charging that Washington wants the sanctions to hurt Sudan’s economy. This year, the Sudanese government suggested that it had fulfilled the conditions necessary for Washington to lift the sanctions:

“The American administration has acknowledged more than once that Sudan has honored its commitments but the American administration, time and again, has withdrawn from its promises … to lift the sanctions,” the foreign ministry said.

Implied in the statement is that by allowing the secession of South Sudan, Khartoum did what Washington wanted it to do.

The State Department suggested that sanctions would remain in place as a means of pressuring Khartoum to make peace with South Sudan and in the new border zones such as South Kordofan, where the Sudanese government is at war with rebels:

In recent years, Sudan has made progress in resolving a number of outstanding issues with South Sudan, which contributes significantly to the prospects for peace between the two countries. However, the ongoing conflict in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Darfur continue to threaten regional stability, and the human rights and humanitarian crises there – including the lack of humanitarian access – are very serious. Outstanding issues with South Sudan, such as the final status of Abyei, also pose such a threat. Addressing these concerns is necessary for a peaceful Sudan and would enable the United States and Sudan to move towards a normalized relationship.

The issue of sanctions revives a conversation that took place at different points last year among Africa watchers about whether the US has real leverage over Khartoum. A brief conversation that occurred last summer on Twitter between Sudanese blogger Amir Ahmad Nasr and Sudan analyst Bec Hamilton has stuck with me, and I am reminded of it now. Nasr wrote, “There’s leverage. Sudan badly wants relations normalized with US.” Hamilton responded, “Right, but that’s no longer leverage since Khartoum doesn’t believe it will ever happen (and they are probably right).”

Why am I writing about this now, when the sanctions were renewed well over a month ago? Because of a statement on December 16 by the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson Al-Obaid Adam Marawih:

Marawih told the pro-government daily Akhbar Al-Yawm* that Sudan’s position on normalizing ties with the U.S. remain clear and unchanged. He elaborated that as long as this issue remains in the hands of lobby groups in the U.S. Congress, Sudan can never hope for any positive results.

“We reiterated this position when we congratulated the U.S. President [Barack Obama] on his re-election for the second term” Marawih said. He added that therefore the issue is “not a priority” for Khartoum in the time being.

Regardless of whether one agrees with Marawih’s idea of the causes for the continued sanctions, his pessimism regarding prospects for normalization – and, assuming he speaks for the government, a broader pessimism in Khartoum regarding this issue – is clear.

*I tried to find the Arabic article but the link to the paper is broken for me.

Another Round of Protests in Sudan

Sudan experienced protests in January-February 2011, November-December 2011, and June-July 2012. The protests have responded to a diverse set of grievances, including economic stagnation, austerity policies, and political dissatisfaction with the regime of President Omar al Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup. The protests, particularly those in early 2011, can be understood as part of the “Arab Spring,” but they should not be reduced to some parochial echo of a regional roar; the protests were and are grounded in Sudanese politics. Students have played a major role in organizing the demonstrations.

Sudan is now experiencing a fourth protest wave (Sudan has experienced protests in the past, notably in 1964, but I am grouping the protest waves of 2011-2012 together for the sake of analysis). This wave is connected to Darfur, which was the site of significant protests during the summer. The December 7 discovery of Darfuri student protester corpses in Gezira has touched off student protests in Khartoum. Protests reportedly occurred on Sunday and Monday, drawing crowds in the hundreds. Police gassed, beat, and arrested protesters on Sunday.

The Sudanese protests have not been large, rarely reaching four-digit numbers for crowds. But this round of demonstrations comes at a bad time for the regime, which recently put down an alleged coup attempt. A recent New York Times article discusses the “open secret” of “discontent within [the] ranks” of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party. During the past two years, the regime has been able to put down protests again and again, and I doubt this time will be different. But the multiple challenges the regime faces, internal and external, are serious and suggest a long-term crisis of legitimacy.

After Latest Sudan-South Sudan Agreement, Southern Oil Exports May Resume Soon

Sudan and South Sudan have suffered economic pain in the last two years – Sudan, due to the loss of the South and its oil in 2011; and the South, due to the shutdown of oil production it began in late January of this year as a protest measure against Khartoum’s demands regarding oil transit fees. The shutdown in the South has, of course, also affected the north, and the economic picture I’m painting here is extremely simplified – more economic information about Sudan is available here and here, and more information about South Sudan is available here.

Economic pain has continued in part because of political conflict. Since South Sudan’s independence, the two countries have disputed issues including border demarcation, security, and oil revenue sharing. In August of this year, Sudan and South Sudan came to a tentative agreement on oil, and signed a deal covering oil and border security on September 26. Yet security issues remained unresolved, and the South did not restart its oil production on November 15 as it had planned.

On December 1, Pagan Amum, the South’s chief negotiator, met with Sudanese officials in Khartoum. The meeting had two important outcomes. First, the South Sudanese now plan to resume oil exports through Sudan within a few weeks (although returning production to pre-shutdown levels could take up to one year). Second, the two sides have agreed to stop supporting rebel movements within each other’s territory; the north is particularly concerned about the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement North or SPLM-N, who have fought government forces in the Sudanese states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, along the new border between Sudan and South Sudan. AFP has more on the new agreement and the background to it.

The success of these agreements, of course, will depend on their implementation. Meanwhile, other contentious issues remain, including determining when and whether the territory of Abyei will hold a referendum about joining the South or the north.

For Arabic readers, summaries of the remarks of Pagan Amum and Sudanese presidential assistant Nafi Ali Nafi are available, respectively, here and here.

Who Was Involved in the Alleged Coup Against Sudan’s President Omar al Bashir?

Sudan appeared to suffer an attempted coup d’etat last week, possibly motivated by what some observers say is the failing health and increasing political isolation of President Omar al Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup. What follows is a list of key personalities involved and the biographical information known about them, as presented in international and local media. The list includes some very senior figures. The reported involvement of both top military commanders and Islamists – two major components of the coalition that originally brought Bashir to power – is bad news for the regime. That does not necessarily mean that Bashir’s fall is imminent, but it does point to a steady erosion of the regime’s cohesion.

Reported Military Involvement

VOA writes that “a number of military and intelligence officers [are] suspected of involvement in the purported plot.” At the center of the coverage is Salah Abdallah “Gosh,” who was arrested along with twelve other persons on November 22. According to AP,

Gosh was Sudan’s intelligence chief for 10 years before being promoted to security adviser in 2009. Once a member of the president’s inner circle, Gosh was sacked as adviser in April 2011 for becoming critical of the regime.

AP names two other individuals:

  • Maj. Gen. Adil Al-Tayeb “of military intelligence”
  • Brig. Gen. Mohammed Ibrahim, “a field commander with the Sudanese Armed Forces [SAF].”

The Sudan Tribune, which says that the entire story is “steeped in confusion,” adds a few other (possible) names of the arrested:

  • Major General Kamal Abdel-Ma’Rouf, “the army commander who led the ‘liberation’ of Heglig oil area after it was briefly occupied by South Sudan in April this year.” An SAF commander also reportedly denied that Abdel-Ma’rouf was among the arrested.
  • Lieutenant General Mohammed Ibrahim Abdel Galil, “a veteran SAF officer who served in the war against South Sudan for 12 years…He used to be close to President Al-Bashir and served as head of his security for six years.” Note: This is likely the same General Mohammed Ibrahim that AP mentions.
  • Brigadier General Awad Mohamed Ahmed Ibn Ouf.
  • “Well placed sources later told Sudan Tribune that former presidential adviser and head of NCP bloc in parliament Ghazi Salah al-Deen Al-Attabani was summoned for questioning by [the National Intelligence and Security Services, NISS] on his possible role in the plot but was later released.”
  • The Sudan Tribune writes that there have even been denials of Gosh’s involvement.

A separate Sudan Tribune article names two other military commanders:

Other uncorroborated reports named Brigadier General Fath Al-Raheem Abdulla who headed the joint Sudanese-Chadian border forces and former head of Sudan’s armoured corps Brigadier General Sideeg Fadl.

Reported Islamist Involvement

Islamists were reportedly connected to the coup in two ways: first, through dissent that surfaced at the recent conference of the Islamic Movement; and second, through arrests of members of an Islamist sect comprising regime-allied fighters but now in a position of dissent. Time calls the conference, and the way dissenters found their path to reform blocked there, the “catalyst” for the coup.

On the militia, the Sudan Tribune writes:

Multiple security and military sources told Sudan Tribune that the NISS arrested around 100 pro-government Islamist elements who belong to a group widely known as “Al-Sae’ohoon” who formed the core of special forces fighting South Sudan rebels during the civil war since Bashir came to power in [1989] in a bloodless military coup backed by the National Islamist Front (NIF).

Al-Sae’ohoon has been vocal recently over reform demands and expressed bitterness that the NCP leadership has softened stance on Islamic principles and gave too many concessions to South Sudan in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), while allowing for army to suffer military setbacks.

“Al Sa’ihun” would be a cleaner transcription from the Arabic. “The wanderers/travelers in the cause of Allah” may be a provisional translation (see Q 9:112). Al Jazeera (Arabic) reports on the movement’s relationship to the regime, writing of “deep disagreements” that appeared at the Islamic Movement’s conference between al Sa’ihun and the Movement’s leadership. Al Jazeera quotes from a letter al Sa’ihun sent to Bashir asking for the release of their imprisoned comrades, stressing how these men have served “the Revolution…from its beginning until Heglig.” The letter affirms loyalty to Bashir while criticizing his defense minister Abd al Rahman Muhammad Hussein.

As Time says, “Those detained overnight on Thursday were not only obvious foes of Bashir.” The pattern of arrests indicates that some core supporters of the regime have broken with it, or are threatening to do so. The combination of military defections and Islamist dissent (and of course there is overlap between military and Islamist ranks) poses a major problem for a regime that has relied on these constituencies as pillars of its support.

Sudan’s Islamic Movement Heads to Its General Conference

This week, the Islamic Movement of Sudan will hold its General Conference, which takes place every four years. Various sub-national conferences have already occurred in preparation for the main event. The national conference may give some insight into the trajectory of the Movement, its relationship with the regime of President Omar al Bashir, and the hopes of various leaders to succeed Bashir, perhaps as soon as 2015.

Founded in 1945 (read a history of the Movement here, .pdf, start p. 95) as a Sudanese counterpart to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Movement has participated under several names in many of the critical moments of Sudanese politics, including the popular uprising of 1964 and the 1989 coup that brought the National Islamic Front (NIF) to power. In 1999, the Movement split amid rivalry between President Bashir and Dr. Hassan al Turabi, the longtime leader of the Movement. The greater part of the Movement remained with Bashir and his National Congress Party (NCP), while Turabi’s group renamed itself the Popular Congress Party. The (remaining) Movement has been called one of three main components within the Bashir regime, the other two being the military and the leadership of the NPC itself. Read more background on the Movement here.

The immediate background for this week’s meeting includes several points of tension:

  • memorandum, submitted by some Movement members to the regime, that called for various reforms, including a “veiled demand, namely the institution of the authority of the Islamic Movement proper over the ruling NCP.” Bashir appeared on television to reject the demands.
  • Internal divisions, possibly similar to those that drove a split in 1999. This article (Arabic) describes substantial opposition with the Movement to Bashir and the NCP.
  • An impending change of leadership for the Movement: “The IM’s secretary-general and Sudan’s first Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha will not be able to run as an incumbent because the current constitution does not allow more than two terms in the position. Taha was elected to the position during the last conference after facing strong competition with current presidential adviser Ghazi Salah Al-Din Al-Atabani. It is not clear whether Al-Atabani intends to run again but insiders say the man has recently stepped out of decision-making circles due to what they described as his unhappiness with the way the NCP has handled a number of sensitive issues lately.” More on the internal succession issue here (Arabic).
  • Jockeying for position as leaders ask who will eventually succeed Bashir. AFP writes, “Potential candidates to replace Bashir are jostling for influence within the Islamic Movement.”

Despite these tensions, some are expecting a relatively quiet conference:

While only about 12 percent of NCP members come from the Islamic Movement, most of the leadership belongs to the movement, said Amin Hassan Omer, from its ruling secretariat.

He predicted “nothing specific” about succession will emerge from the conference, and said does not see a real power struggle in the Movement.

Mahjoub Mohamed Salih, publisher of the independent Al-Ayaam newspaper, said the conference would highlight divisions between grassroots Islamists and NCP loyalists, though he does not see the movement fracturing.

We’ll find out later this week.

Roundup on Sudan, Israel, and the Yarmouk Weapons Factory

On October 23/24, explosions occurred at the Yarmouk weapons factory in Sudan. The Sudanese government has stated that an Israeli airstrike was responsible. The situation remains murky enough that I do not feel comfortable writing an analytical piece on the issue, but the incident has generated substantial media attention, so I thought I would round up some important stories.

International Press Reports

  • VOA: “The [US-based] Satellite Sentinel Project released images Tuesday that show six 16-meter-wide craters near the center of the explosion. The group said the holes are consistent with impact craters created by air-delivered munitions.”
  • NPR: “Israel Operates Inside Sudan, Israeli Official Says.”
  • AP: “In Sudan blast, signs of Iran and Israel’s rivalry.”
  • BBC (October 29): “An Iranian naval task force has docked in Sudan, carrying with it a ‘message of peace and security to neighbouring countries,’ Iranian state media report.” Reuters (October 31): “Iran Warships Leave Sudan after Four-Day Stay.”
  • Al Jazeera: “Sudan denies Iranian links to bombed factory.”
  • VOA: “Sudan’s Iran Alliance under Scrutiny.”

Speculative Commentary (International Media):

  • Time: “Did Israel Bomb a Sudanese Ammunition Depot?”
  • Reuters: “Sudan: A Front for Israel’s Proxy War on Sinai Jihadists?”
  • Washington Post/World Views: “Why Would Israel Bomb Sudan? Theories Cite Iran, Hamas, Even the US”

Sudanese, Egyptian, and Israeli Sources:

  • Sudan Tribune: “Sudanese Opposition Groups Condemn ‘Israeli Aggression,’ Criticize Government.”
  • Akhir Lahza (Arabic): “Explosions and Fire at the ‘Yarmouk’ Factory”
  • Ahram Online: “Egypt Military Dismisses Rumors of Israeli F-35 Overflights.”
  • Akhbar (Arabic): “The [Non-Governmental] Egyptian Delegation Returning from Sudan: The World Ignores Israel’s Crimes.”
  • YNet: “Egypt Denies Knowledge of Attack in Sudan.”
  • Jerusalem Post: “Sudan Strike – A Blow to Iran.”

What do you make of this whole affair?