Humanitarian agencies are warning of a mass food crisis in the Sahel. Several factors are causing the crisis, the LA Times writes:

A recent survey by UNICEF forecast 1 million cases of severe malnutrition, with between 25% and 60% of those people likely to die without emergency assistance. The agency has plans to feed 1 million people in the Sahel — most of them in the hardest-hit country, Niger — but so far has raised funds to feed only half of them.

The failure of rains triggered a rise in food prices, so families in crisis cannot afford to buy. Meanwhile the fragile agricultural system, stressed by overgrazing, struggles to feed the rapidly growing populations in a region that has some of the highest birthrates on Earth.

Thousands of migrant workers who fled Libya and returned home because of persecution after last year’s revolution in the North African nation have added to the pressure as families struggle to survive without the money that workers had sent home. Locust plagues in some areas complicated the crisis further.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi held a press conference yesterday where he addressed the issue of his country’s military presence in neighboring Somalia:

Meles Zenawi said Friday he would pull troops out of Somalia “as soon as feasible,” admitting for the first time that forces had crossed into the war-torn neighbouring country.

“The decision has all along been to help the TFG and we will withdraw our troops as soon as feasible,” Meles told reporters in the Ethiopian capital, referring to Somalia’s transitional government.

“We are not going to create a vacuum, we expect the AMISOM troops to be able to fill in the gaps before we withdraw,” he added.

Columns of Ethiopian soldiers rolled into Somalia in November to fight al-Qaeda linked Islamist rebels, but Addis Ababa had previously denied their presence.

Sudan and South Sudan continue to disagree over oil transit fees. South Sudan has shut down oil production in protest at alleged Sudanese theft.

The AFP covers a new United Nations report that assesses the post-Qadhafi Sahelian security environment. The report casts Nigeria’s Boko Haram as a growing regional threat. Read a summary of a Security Council briefing on the report here.

Let’s look more closely at the geography of the uprising. The rebels call themselves “National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad.” But what is Azawad? The AP explains:

The group was formed in October and seeks self-determination of the north of Mali, an area it refers to as the Azawad. Azawad can also refer to the Tuareg-speaking zone covering northern Mali, northern Niger and southern Algeria where many of the blue-turbaned nomads live, but NMLA leaders say their demands relate only to the area within Mali.

Wikipedia has more on (the geographically broader interpretation of) Azawad:

Azaouad, Azawad, or Azawagh is the collective non-officially recognized name for the main Tamashek-speaking parts of northern Mali, northern Niger, and part of southern Algeria. Azawad is mainly made up of Sahelian and Saharan vast flat lands inhabited by Tuareg nomads. It does not correspond to any single administrative region of Mali, Niger, or Algeria, but it includes portions of the Kidal Region of Mali and theTahoua Region and Agadez Region of Niger, and large portions of southern Algeria. Azawad has a strong and distinctive Tuareg character, different from the official identities and characters of the central governments of Mali, Niger, and Algeria. Azawad emerged recently as a geopolitical issue due to the recent separatist movement, the Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MPLA), that aspires to establish an independent Azawad republic with a Tuareg idenitity.

This provides some introductory context for the map I’ve put together. Google Maps occasionally distorts the locations of some towns, but this map will hopefully give at least some idea of where the hotspots of fighting have been so far.

It is not everyday that Senegal’s octogenarian president Abdoulaye Wade lets the television cameras into his bedroom.

But Wade, seeking a new term in next month’s election, was quick to usher them in when his visitor was Serigne Abo Mbacke, a leader of the 129-year-old Mouride order of Islam which counts millions of devotees in his West African country.

The ensuing images of two men demurely perched next to each other on a king-size divan may not have made great television. But the photo opportunity was not lost to voters as proof of the intimate link between Senegal’s Islamic “Brotherhoods” and the body politic of this Muslim but staunchly secular state.

“I have never hidden that I am a Mouride – anyone who votes for me knows they are voting for a Mouride,” Wade told Reuters after this month’s meeting at a plush residence in Touba, the central town that is the Mourides’ spiritual home.

Wade’s affiliation with the Mouridiyya is definitely salient for many Mourides, including youth. When I was in Senegal in 2006-2007 I heard several young Mourides repeat with pride a prophecy that Senegal’s first president would be Christian (this was Leopold Senghor), the second Muslim but not Mouride (this was Abdou Diouf), the third Muslim and Mouride (they saw Wade as the fulfillment of this part of the prophecy), and all of the rest Mouride.

This feeling was not, however, universal. Even before the 2007 elections, many young Mourides were already dissatisfied with Wade’s performance, particularly with regard to the economy, and a shared religious affiliation did not seem to dilute their opposition to the president.

Another wrinkle in the relationship between Wade and the Mouridiyya is the growing complexity of the marabout “field” in Senegal. The key lines for me in the Reuters article were these:

A heavily-set figure in a pristine white robe and with an earpiece connected to his Apple iPhone, Cheikh Abdoul Ahad Mbacke Gainde Fatma has seen more Dakar politicians in the last 24 hours than most Senegalese will see in a lifetime.

Ahad Mbacke is the great-grandson of revered Mouride founder Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacke and heads the organizing committee for the “Grand Magal,” the annual Mouride festival which draws millions to Touba for a week of praying, eating and revelry.

Why did I bold “great-grandson”? Let’s do a little math. Sheikh Amadou Bamba died in 1927. The Sheikh had a number of sons. In Senegalese Sufi brotherhoods the system of hereditary succession works laterally – ie, leadership typically passes from one brother to another inside the same generation before passing to the next generation. In polygamous families, the number of descendants can multiply rapidly, to the point where there can be dozens of potential male heirs. As political scientist Dr. Leonardo Villalon wrote in 1995 with regard to Senegal (see his Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, p. 137),

Marabouts each face the thorny problem of legitimating their influence and maintaining the cohesion of the saintly lineages in the face of a large and ever-growing number of heirs…In the first generation, that of the founder’s sons, it has frequently been possible to achieve such legitimation. Every indication, however, points to the potential for fragmentation in the next generation.

Such fragmentation spills over into the political realm. One way that young marabouts, disgruntled about having to wait for their “turn” as brotherhood leader (or doubting that their turn will ever come), can make a name for themselves is by entering politics. A few have flirted with running for office, and some have become prominent public backers of candidates and politicians. This fragmented arena also includes rising religious stars who don’t come from the families of the founders; rising stars who build mass youth followings can become serious political actors.

All of these developments threaten the centralization of political influence in the person of the brotherhood leader or khalifa – a process that has been going on for decades now. Politicians must therefore navigate a more complicated field than before when they are trying to court support from the brotherhoods. In the 1960s, Senghor built a strong relationship with the Mouride khalifa Sheikh Fallou Mbacke (a son of Sheikh Amadou Bamba – see a photograph of Senghor and Mbacke here) and his successors, and therefore enjoyed a considerable degree of political support from Mourides throughout much of his twenty years in office. In 2012, Wade, and everyone else, will have to court a larger number of religious leaders.

• Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, former prime minister and former president of the National Assembly, as well as runner-up in the 2007 presidential elections, attended secondary school and university in France, specializing in history, political science, and international relations.
• Soumaila Cisse, a former cabinet minister and runner-up in the 2002 presidential elections, studied software engineering in Montpelier.
• Dioncounda Traore, current president of the National Assembly, attended university in Nice as well as universities in the Soviet Union and Algeria.
• Mobidbo Sidibe (.pdf), former prime minister, has a doctorate in criminology from Aix-en-Provence.

There are other candidates, but it is fairly likely that Mali’s next president will be one of these men, and therefore also fairly likely that Mali’s next president will be French-educated. (For what it is worth, former President Alpha Konare studied not in France but in Poland, while outgoing President Amadou Toumani Toure completed military training courses in the Soviet Union and France).

I would not go so far as to say that this trend represents a pernicious form of neo-colonialism, but I do think it’s notable that the formation of super-elites in Mali (and elsewhere in Francophone Africa) remains so closely tied to the former metropole.

But on other political fronts, seeds of a backlash are being sown.

For one thing, there is the question of radicalization inside Kenya. A wave of minor attacks have occurred in Kenya this winter, and Britain warned earlier this month that more attacks are on the way. Yesterday, the Associated Press reported that a Kenyan Muslim organization now says it is officially representing al Shabab in Kenya:

The statement by the Kenya-based Muslim Youth Center came amid a flurry of warnings from embassies about planned terror attacks in Kenya. The Somali militant group al-Shabab has promised to attack Kenya for its decision to send troops to Somalia in October.

The Muslim Youth Center was named in a United Nations report last year for recruiting, fundraising, and running training and orientation events for al-Shabab. An official al-Shabab spokesman did not answer questions about whether the center now represents al-Shabab in Kenya, but a statement published on the center’s blog on Wednesday was unequivocal.

“There can be no doubt that Amiir Ahmad Iman Ali’s elevation to become the supreme Amiir of Kenya for al Shabaab is recognition from our Somali brothers who have fought tirelessly against the kuffar on the importance of the Kenyan mujahideen in Somalia,” the statement said.

The UN Monitoring Group report that the AP mentions can be found here.

Announcements of open support for al Shabab in Kenya not only increase fears of upcoming attacks, they also threaten to increase political tensions in Kenya. The large Somali community in Kenya has become a target of violence and repression by other groups and by authorities in the past. In a year when Kenya will hold a potentially quite tense election, where ethnic hatreds could flare up, increased religious tension will only make the situation more precarious.

Another potential area of fallout stemming from Kenya’s operations in Somalia concerns the quality of life in northern Kenya. This region has long suffered from crippling drought and poverty, and is home to hundreds of thousands of refugees from Somalia. Human Rights Watch reported this month on the abuse of civilians by security forces currently going on in parts of the region:

The Kenyan police and military have been responsible for a growing number of serious abuses against civilians since the Kenya Defence Forces entered southern Somalia in October, with the stated aim of eliminating al-Shabaab, an Islamist militia. The same month, suspected al-Shabaab sympathizers initiated a series of attacks against police, military, and civilian targets in Kenya.

In response, members of the security forces have been responsible for rape, beatings, looting, and arbitrary arrests of civilians. The crackdown has largely targeted Somali refugees and Kenyan ethnic Somalis, but residents of other ethnic backgrounds in North Eastern province have also been victimized.

This kind of treatment of civilians could leave bitter memories among civilians, memories that outlast Kenya’s mission in Somalia. Those memories could further weaken the legitimacy of the Kenyan government in the north.

Let me be clear: I am not saying that Somali communities in Kenya are inherently a security threat. Far from it; almost all of these people are simply struggling to survive and to build normal lives. What concerns me more is the possibility of greater political division in Kenya, and greater regional fragmentation within the country. As Kenya attempts to pacify its neighbor, the risk grows that core issues of poverty and security will go unaddressed back home.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), an organization I very much respect, has put out a thoughtful report sounding a note of caution about the case and its potential impact. Three key sentences from the report read,

These cases have enormous political consequences for both the 2012 elections and the country’s stability. During the course of the year, rulings and procedures will inevitably either lower or increase com­munal tensions. If the ICC process is to contribute to the deterrence of future political violence in Kenya, the court and its friends must explain its work and limitations better to the public.

I would recommend reading the briefing in full. Given the political reality that the case is likely to go forward, ICG takes the practical approach of giving suggestions to both the ICC and the Kenyan government for how to minimize the potentially incendiary effects of the case. In my view the recommendations are sound.

I am glad to see this kind of direct and pragmatic discussion of the ICC’s political role. The conversation about the politics of the ICC’s actions is not new – Alex de Waal and Julie Flint, in particular, began making incisive critiques of the ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir several years ago – but ICG’s contribution is timely and will likely make new audiences consider these important issues.

The two pieces raise similar concerns, though The Guardian is decidedly more pessimistic.

CSM:

With more and more African Union countries sending peacekeeping troops to Somalia, and with the militant group Al Shabab clearly on the retreat, it might appear that Somalia’s future is finally starting to look bright.

Bright is too strong a word, of course. Much of Somalia remains in the grip of a famine. Its coastline is a haven for pirates, smugglers, and criminal gangs. Military incursions by Kenya and Ethiopia will almost inevitably take a heavy toll among civilians as they fight groups like Al Shabab. And the Somali government, responsible for creating a stable, workable society after the militant groups are defeated, seems barely able to carry on a conversation with itself without getting into a fistfight.

Yet after years of neglect, Somalia is finally getting international attention, and the flurry of diplomatic and military activities does provide some hope that Somalia may finally pull itself out of a 20-year period of civil war, anarchy, and dysfunction.

The Guardian:

Even if al-Shabaab is defeated by the posse of armies hunting it, the TFG is in no position to unite a country shattered by war and famine. It is riven with clan rivalries. Far from supporting reconciliation, President Sharif and Sharif Hassan have undermined it. An estimated $2bn, one-third of the country’s GDP, comes in through hawala or small money transfers, and yet $100m in remittances from the US are imperilledbecause of government rules blocking the funding of terrorist groups. Around 250,000 Somalis are still affected by the famine, but the money cannot get through. This is the quintessential failed state, whose failure foreign armies, militant fighters and venal politicians appear hellbent on continuing.

Both pieces are well worth reading in full.

For a look at how the war in Somalia is affecting the region, I would recommend this piece by The East African, which reports that “the war in Somalia has led to closer intelligence collaboration between Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda that is thought to have thwarted plans by the Al Shabaab militia to launch terror attacks in the region over Christmas and New Year holidays.” Even if the military situation in southern Somalia settles back into stalemate, or the TFG proves incapable of governing, the current conflict could strengthen military and intelligence partnerships in East Africa as a whole. It will be interesting to see whether tighter linkages in this domain bring the countries of the region closer together in other areas as well.

The protests and the fuel subsidy controversy have generated a number of analyses. CNN, the BBC, and Think Africa Press have nice overviews of the situation.

The analysis that caught my eye though, was by Ethan Zuckerman, who directs the Center for Civic Media at MIT and is a renowned blogger. Although I have great respect for Zuckerman’s writing, in his piece on Nigeria he makes two arguments that I disagree with.

The first is that removing the fuel subsidy was a good decision. Zuckerman argues that the expense of the subsidy is a crippling burden on the government’s budget, and that the money would be better spent on building infrastructure. Zuckerman is, however, aware of some arguments against removal. He notes,

Given the history of corruption in the Nigerian government, it’s not hard to understand why many Nigerians are skeptical that the monies released from the subsidy will go anywhere other than in politicians’ pockets,

but he also says,

It’s possible to imagine a Nigeria where imported petroleum products were less necessary, if the country had functioning rail systems, a reliable power grid minimizing the need for generators, and refineries that could produce diesel and gasoline locally.

Zuckerman’s second argument is that the demands of the Nigerian protesters are out of sync with the broader global “Occupy” movement. Zuckerman writes:

I’m interested to see Nigerian take on some of the rhetoric and tactics of the Occupy movement, including the occupation of a public square in Kano. I’ll be intrigued to see whether any of the global energy over Occupy goes to support the Nigerian protesters. The irony, I fear, is that while the global occupy movement seeks to equalize income disparities and fight government corruption, the Nigerian movement [by this I think Zuckerman means the Jonathan administration - Alex] is currently pursuing radical and important reforms, and the Occupy Nigeria protesters are fighting against that change. Read one way, Occupy Nigeria is a conservative movement fighting to keep a dysfunctional status quo in place, which seems at odds with other branches of the movement.

I disagree with both arguments and I find their pairing strange. I also reject the premise of the second argument. I do not believe that just because some Nigerian activists “take on the rhetoric and tactics of the Occupy movement,” that makes the current protests a “branch” of the movement. The protest organizers and the controversy itself predate Occupy. Nor do I believe the politics of the fuel subsidy protests should be judged according to how they measure against goals of protesters in the United States and Europe. Nor, finally, do I believe that the fuel subsidy protests are “reactionary” or “conservative.”

In any case, is protesting the removal of a fuel subsidy really out of line with Occupy’s goals? I am not a member of the Occupy movement, but I thought one of its underlying values was to support the welfare of the “99%” over interests and policies that favor the “1%.” Yet the voices Zuckerman cites in support of fuel subsidy removal are those of the International Monetary Fund and some of the most powerful ministers in the Federal Government of Nigeria – these are voices more likely to speak for the 1% than the 99%, no? Contrast this with the voices speaking out against subsidy removal: labor unions, civil society organizations like the Nigerian Bar Association, students’ organizations, etc. These are more likely to represent the 99%, yes?

One could of course make the argument that the 99% don’t recognize their own true interests, and that the short-term pain they feel now is necessary for their long-term prosperity. But that sounds suspiciously like the arguments for austerity that have been invoked by the 1% around the world to justify slashing pensions, firing government employees, and other measures that always seem to add up to a lot of pain, but never seem to bring that promised shared prosperity for the 99%.

So will the removal of the fuel subsidy help or hurt the 99% in Nigeria? So far, the answer is that it is hurting them. The price of fuel has more than doubled, and has already begun to push the prices of other goods, especially food, upwards. People are struggling to get to work, to buy food, to put fuel in their generators at home and in their shops. The political uncertainty generated by removal, moreover, adds to an existing climate of tension and insecurity given ongoing religious violence in various parts of the country. If next week’s strike turns violent, it will most likely be members of the 99% who are injured or killed. Fuel subsidy removal has so far made life more costly, and less secure, for ordinary Nigerians.

Now, what about the future? What about the promised benefits of removing the subsidy? I agree with Zuckerman that the money could be invested into infrastructure and a broader transformation of Nigeria. But Zuckerman has no answer for Nigerians’ pessimism that the money will go to public goods instead of private enrichment. Zuckerman notes that there is corruption involved with the subsidy – but removing the subsidy is not guaranteed to end corruption, and could simply shift it elsewhere.

Nigerians’ pessimism seems justified to me. If we trace the latest round of the fuel subsidy debate back to last year, it really got going around the time that the Federal Government began insisting that state governments begin paying a newly passed minimum wage. Governors protested to the Federal Government that they could not afford to pay the new wage, and the idea of removing the fuel subsidy (re) surfaced, as a proposal to free up money (a related proposal was to increase the share of oil revenues that states received, in order to help them pay the minimum wage). Now it’s a new year, and the subsidy is gone, but some states are still being accused of dragging their feet on paying the minimum wage. If the promises of the past have not come true, how can ordinary Nigerians be expected to have faith that the money saved by removing the subsidy will benefit them? Moreover, if removing the fuel subsidy is a good and/or necessary step, why could it not be done gradually, so as to minimize the shock to people’s wallets and to the overall economy?

The fuel subsidy debate in Nigeria touches on core issues of government’s relationship with the people and of ordinary people’s struggles to survive in one of the world’s most politically turbulent countries. Political struggles over the subsidy predate the Occupy movement by decades, and even if the current protests are partly influenced by Occupy, or by the Arab revolutions, that does not mean that Nigeria’s protests have become merely one “branch” of a global phenomenon. Rather they are deeply rooted in histories and politics that are particular to Nigeria. The merits of removing the subsidy deserve to be judged according to how the decision affects the Nigerian people, not according to a supposedly universal political spectrum designed by activists elsewhere. And if there is a universal set of values to be invoked concerning the interests of the world’s 99%, the 99% in Nigeria seem to be speaking solidly in favor of keeping the subsidy.

But does he have a chance at the presidency?

Ndour likely expects that several features of the race will play to his advantage. First is the strong and highly visible opposition to incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade. Wade’s perceived failures on the economic front and his perceived political greed – his current electoral bid, for what could be his third term, is seen as unconstitutional by some – sparked mass protests in the capital Dakar and elsewhere early in 2011. By the summer, the youth protest movement was making a strong political impact; a June 23 protest forced Wade to withdraw proposed changes to the electoral code that would have eased the path to his re-election. The youth protest movement M23 (named for the date of the June protest) has been led in part by the rappers’ collective Y En A Marre (“Fed Up”), which highlights a second feature of the political scene that may help Ndour: the weakness and division of traditional opposition politicians, who have mostly been followers, not leaders, in the protest wave. With cultural figures already developing a strong influence over this election, Ndour may feel that he can take the emerging model of the musician-politician to a new level. Ndour can also highlight other aspects of his career – his role as a businessman, his investments in Senegal, and his media holdings – as qualifications for the presidency.

At the same time, Ndour faces a number of obstacles. One is that at 52, he is of a different generation than the youth whose votes he would need to win. Ndour certainly has pan-generational popularity, but part of Y En A Marre’s success at mobilizing youth seems to have come from a spirit of youth solidarity that leaves out older opposition politicians and could leave out Ndour as well. Another obstacle is that many Senegalese voters – including many youth – may feel that Ndour lacks the political experience necessary to be president. The BBC’s interviews in the streets of Dakar found that several young men felt this way:

Djibril Tal, 29, a taxi driver, argues that “music and politics are two different realities”.

“Of course we love him as a singer, but it’s a bit pretentious of him to think he can rule this country,” he says.

Abou Soumare, who intends to vote for the first time next month, gives me the same sort of comment as he makes his way to a local dusty field for evening football training.

“He clearly doesn’t have the political maturity and experience to be a president,” the 19 year old says.

Finally, there is the question of how the numbers will stack up. Given the divided field, the opposition’s best hope is to bring Wade’s numbers under 50% in the first round and thereby force a second round, in which it would be possible to unite around one opposition candidate and defeat the incumbent. Ndour will likely not take many votes away from Wade, but will rather divide the opposition’s portion of the electoral “pie” into even more slices. Ndour could end up placing second, but as just one of four or five major opposition candidates he could just as easily place lower. Indeed, the other contestants have advantages he does not, including long-standing networks of patronage and support on the ground that will help turn out the vote in ways that mere popularity cannot. The ultimate outcome of the first round will also depend partly on the integrity of the vote, of course; some fear that a rigged or partly rigged election will give Wade over 50% in the first round, rendering moot the question of how well the various opposition candidates perform.

Ndour’s candidacy has attracted a lot of international media attention (which is possibly another advantage for his campaign). You can read Drew Hinshaw’s solid profile of the singer here, and Elizabeth Flock has an interesting comparative look at other musician-politicians here.

What are your impressions of Ndour’s candidacy? Do you see it as a game-changer?

1. Struggles over Democracy in West Africa

Two important elections this year in Africa will be those in Senegal (first round February 26) and Mali (first round April 29). The two contests will be quite different: in Senegal, a two-term octogenarian incumbent will face off against a divided but passionate opposition. Should current President Abdoulaye Wade win, especially if major violence or fraud occurs, pessimism about Senegalese democracy will likely grow internationally, and tensions could linger for some time to come, especially as the country nervously wonders whether Wade will attempt to engineer the succession of his son Karim. In Mali, meanwhile, the open elections could either symbolize the continued consolidation of Malian democracy or bring to light the country’s underdevelopment and showcase the security challenges it faces. What these two elections have in common is their significant for the future of West African democracy in general: both countries have been touted as models of democratic progress in the region, and both will be tested in the coming months.

2. Interreligious Conflict in Nigeria

The bomb attacks, armed raids, and targeted killings that the Muslim rebel group Boko Haram conducts in northeastern Nigeria have long been a major security concern for the Nigerian government. Given that Boko Haram’s violence has escalated and spread over 2011, however, a potentially even bigger issue looms: will the sect’s attacks touch off or intersect with broader waves of Muslim-Christian conflict in Africa’s most populous country? Boko Haram’s Christmas Day attacks on churches have prompted some Nigerian Christian groups to warn of retaliation, and Boko Haram’s rumored presence in Jos, a center of religious violence, could be a bad sign for the trajectory of community relations in that city and elsewhere in Nigeria’s “Middle Belt.” In 2012, then, Nigerian authorities will face the challenge not only of stamping out Boko Haram in the northeast, but also of preventing interreligious violence from escalating elsewhere in the country.

3. The Stability of the Sudans

The secession of South Sudan from Sudan in July 2011 did not result, as some had feared, in civil war, but that does not mean that the world’s newest country – or the remaining (North) Sudan – are out of the woods yet. At the level of bilateral relations, outstanding issues such as oil revenue sharing and border demarcation continue to cause tensions, while violence in the border areas threatens to draw the armies of the two countries into further conflict. Within each country there are also problems. South Sudan is plagued by rebel movements and ethnic conflict, along with persistent complaints about corruption and a lack of political freedom. (North) Sudan, meanwhile, is struggling to right its economy and find a new political equilibrium. Violence in the border areas, continued rebellion in Darfur, and protests in Khartoum and elsewhere are challenging the regime’s control. 2012, then, will test the stability of both Sudans, with potential repercussions for East Africa as a whole.

4. Political Stability in Somalia

With presidential elections scheduled for August, the legal footing of its Transitional Federal Government (TFG) increasingly shaky, Kenyan troops occupying a sizable portion of territory in the south, and Ethiopian troops present in the west, Somalia enters 2012 with its politics a mess. The rebel movement al Shabab took a number of hits in 2011 – it withdrew from Mogadishu and it lost substantial territory elsewhere to Kenyan forces, for starters – but it continues to control some areas, and is undoubtedly searching for a path to resurgence in the year ahead. For the TFG, its allies, and its opponents, sorting out who controls what, both de jure and de facto, will take time, and will create further opportunities for dysfunction at the local, national, and international levels. Perhaps this pessimism is exaggerated – but with so many contenders for power in Somalia and so little stability, it is hard for me to see how 2012 will bring a resolution to the country’s long-running civil war. As is usually the case, it seems Somali civilians will suffer the most.

5. Regional Politics and Security in the Western Sahel

Kidnappings of Europeans in Mali and Algeria in November and December offered a grim reminder at year’s end of the security challenges countries in the Western Sahel face. There is not only the problem of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other criminal and jjihadist organizations in the region, there is also the question of how the continued political fallout from Libya’s civil war – including the return of fighters from Libya to Sahelian countries, the effect of Qadhafi’s fall on Tuareg decisionmaking, and the issue of missing Libyan weapons – will affect the region. Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and other countries in the region have been working for years to develop cooperative military and political frameworks that will help increase security, but these efforts often seem to be hampered by political differences and lack of capacity. 2012 will undoubtedly bring more efforts at cooperation, but this year will also likely bring more attacks and kidnappings.

This list is far from exhaustive. Other stories worth watching include how new oil production will affect the economies and politics of countries like Niger, Ghana, and Uganda. Mali and Senegal are not the only African countries holding elections this year – a number of other countries will go to the polls, including heavyweights like Kenya and Zimbabwe. South Sudan and its northern neighbor are also not the only countries adjusting to new political realities – Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Democratic Republic of Congo are all worth watching to see how regimes new and old behave in a new year. Finally, there are the many stories that I, at least, cannot foresee. If 2012 is anything like 2011, it will be a bumpy ride.

What stories and trends are you watching in this new year? And is my list too negative? What positive things do you expect to happen in 2012?