The rebellion is a sequel of sorts to earlier conflicts in Mali in the 1990s and from 2007-2009. Causes include longstanding feelings of marginalization among the Tuareg, but the current conflict also reflects the political changes that have shaken the Sahel in the past year, especially the fall of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, who had deep ties to Tuareg communities and helped broker the ceasefire of 2009. The NMLA reportedly includes fighters who were part of Qadhafi’s security forces.

Two recent news reports provide further insights into the politics of the rebellion.

Magharebia reports on Algeria’s role in the crisis:

Algeria withdrew military advisors from northern Mali last week in an effort to force a political solution to the Touareg revolt.

[...]

Algeria’s decision to freeze military support to Mali came after the country halted counter-terror operations in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu and redirected troops towards areas now in rebellion. The decision was reportedly taken to prevent Mali from using Algeria’s military support against the Azaouad rebel movement. Algeria also froze delivery of military equipment pending an end to the fighting.

Algerian sources said that the decision was temporary and did not apply to long-term Algerian-Malian military agreements, adding that the move was aimed at forcing the two sides to reach a political solution.

Jeune Afrique (French), meanwhile, has obtained a document that details the proposals a Malian government representative made to Tuareg leaders in early January in an effort to prevent rebellion from breaking out. These proposals included offers to create new administrative arrangements and establish new political and religious posts for tribal representatives.

These reports, and the calls from Mali’s government for political solutions, suggest that the government of Mali believes a negotiated political resolution was and is still possible. The government of Algeria, for its part, appears unwilling to become implicated in violence against the Tuareg, perhaps for fear of rebellion or instability spreading into its own territory.

Seen in one light, the rebellion could appear to be less a genuine bid to establish an independent Tuareg state in northern Mali than a tactic that the Tuareg are using to force greater concessions from the Malian state. If this reading is correct, the possibility of a negotiated settlement is real, but the government’s offer  to the Tuareg as represented in the document obtained by Jeune Afrique would have to be substantially increased before the NMLA would lay down its arms.

A key question in the present circumstances, though, is whether the absence of a regional power willing to act as mediator, as Qadhafi did in 2009 and as Algeria appears hesitant or unwilling to do now, will mean that the present conflict gains momentum without any outside force acting to stop it.

A final factor to consider is the presidential election scheduled for April. The rebellion could well last beyond that date, meaning that Mali’s next president will inherit a serious political and security crisis in the north, along with tough choices about what strategy to follow in dealing (or negotiating) with the rebels.

Wade’s candidacy has also drawn negative reactions from abroad, notably from Washington. Yesterday, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns spoke to journalists in Addis Ababa, and cast doubt on the wisdom of Wade’s current path:

We are concerned that the decision by President Wade to seek a third term … could jeopardise the decades-long record that Senegal has built up on the continent for democracy, democratic development and political stability…We hope very much that the political process will be a peaceful one and it will allow for the free active participation of all Senegalese.

Burns’ comments were matched by those of Victoria Nuland, a State Department spokeswoman, at a press briefing yesterday:

QUESTION: Do you have any reaction about the Senegal situation, about Wade running for a third bid for presidential?

MS. NULAND: Well, as you know, the Senegalese constitutional court has now confirmed the validity of 14 candidates running for president, including President Wade. Our own view, while we respect the process, the political and legal process in Senegal, the fact that he’s now been cleared to run, our message to him remains the same: that the statesmanly-like thing to do would be to cede to the next generation, and we think that would be better.

And with regard to the reference to Museveni last week, Matt, I am reliably told that we did also suggest to him that he allow the next generation to –

QUESTION: Yes. And he didn’t, and now he’s your best friend.

MS. NULAND: Well, we work –

QUESTION: So what’s wrong with – now what’s wrong with it in Senegal?

MS. NULAND: We work with the government the people elect. But again, our view is that Senegalese democracy is strong enough to move to the next generation.

European countries’ statements have not been as strong as Washington’s, but it is clear that the European Union and former colonial power France are also concerned about the situation. The former has questioned the constitutional court’s decision to bar singer Youssou N’dour from running in the elections:

Thijs Berman, the head of the EU election observer mission, urged the council, which meets on Sunday to hear appeals, to release the reasons for its decisions, both for candidates whose bids have been accepted and for those who have been rejected.

“A candidate such as Youssou N’Dour, who had thousands of signatures backing his bid rejected, should have access to the files in order to look closely at why they were rejected, that is important,” Berman said, speaking on French public radio RFI.

“For now we have the decisions but we don’t have the motivations. I think that not only each of the candidates but also every citizen of Senegal has a right to know,” Berman said. “It is only by understanding the reasons of the Constitutional Council that the decision could be accepted.”

France, for its part (see statement in French here), has so far merely stated that it is following the process closely and that it hopes “all opinions, in their diversity, can be expressed on the occasion of this presidential election.” The French government also affirmed its commitment to democratic principles, including the riot of peaceful assembly.

Washington, Brussels, and Paris are obviously worried about what the next month, and the outcome of the elections themselves, will bring for Senegal.

On a final note, the exchange between Ms. Nuland and the journalist above – the reference to Museveni in particular – is interesting, although the conversation did not play out in full. What do you think? Does the example of Museveni give Wade comfort that even if foreign powers wish he would step aside, they will continue to work with him even if he does not?

Looked at in a grim way, my time in Kano was bracketed by two terrorist attacks launched by Boko Haram: the August 26 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, which occurred a few days before I left the US for Nigeria, and the series of coordinated bombings that occurred in Kano on January 20, a few days before I left. The first of these attacks gave me a lasting sense of wariness about my safety in Kano, and I followed the advice of an older researcher not to blog about Nigeria, and especially not about Boko Haram, while I was overseas. The blackout on Nigeria coverage on the blog aimed both to avoid attracting any unwanted attention and to avoid confusing any interviewees or others in Kano about the nature of my project and my intentions; I have never blogged about my research in detail, and certainly have never written about the content of interviews, private conversations, or other encounters I’ve had with people in Kano. I am not a journalist, or a spy, even though I was occasionally suspected of being the latter. I plan now to go back to blogging frequently about events in Nigeria, but I want people in Kano to understand that I will not be quoting them, or identifying them, except in the dissertation itself.

The second attack, the bombing in Kano, has unfortunately forced an end to my fieldwork (I had originally planned to stay until June) and brought me home (my family essentially commanded me to return, and the kidnapping of a German engineer in Kano last Thursday has dispelled whatever doubts I had about my decision). I hope to go back to Nigeria and to Kano at some point, but for the medium-term I will be in the US.

Looked at in a more positive light, everything between those two attacks was incredible. I met tremendous personal as well as intellectual hospitality in Kano; not only did people welcome me as a friend and a guest, they also proved astonishingly open – even in cases where they weren’t quite sure what to make of me and my research topic – to sit for interviews, to help me find rare books and tapes, and to put me in contact with others who could help me. All of that has meant that I’ve collected enough material to write the dissertation, though of course I have a long road ahead of me and a number of holes to fill by one means or another.

I also found my time in Kano personally moving and enriching. I miss my friends there terribly, and I miss the city itself. No one should forget that, even though Northern Nigeria often makes headlines now because of violence, the land is home to millions of people who live, work, and worship peacefully. I never felt that anyone was targeting or threatening me; on the contrary, although many people disagreed with Washington’s foreign policies, the same people were often eager to learn about the United States, about its culture and its people, and about me as an American. One of my most keenly felt sorrows now is that these micro-level cultural exchanges have to be put on hold. There are not many Americans in Kano, nor many Kanawa in America, and it’s important for us to get to know one another better.

I don’t have much to say in this post about Boko Haram, or about the attacks of January 20th. I heard some of the bombs but was nowhere near the epicenters of violence, and during the days that followed I was mostly at home, especially when the city was under curfew. The attack shocked the people of Kano, a city that had previously lain outside the range of Boko Haram’s attacks. Afterwards everyone I talked to was terribly upset, not only over the loss of life but also because their sense of security had been taken from them. Everyone prays that Boko Haram will not attack again, but the movement announced its presence in Kano in a big way, and minor attacks have occurred since. Boko Haram’s demands, their sources of funding and power, and their plans seem murkier than ever, but their presence has become a reality for a vast swath of Northern Nigeria, and a threat to the rest.

On the day before I left, a Nigerian friend urged me to make an effort to point out the good aspects of Nigeria whenever possible. I hope I’ve done some of that in this post, and I intend to keep trying in the future. No matter how bad the news is coming out of that country, or how many articles we see titled “Nigeria on the Brink” or some such thing, it’s worth keeping in mind the tremendous vibrancy of Nigeria, which is one the most exciting places I’ve ever been.

The trouble with their map is that while it claims to show players by country of origin (an elastic category), in fact it shows them according to national affiliation, and this is why it feels like these numbers don’t quite do justice to African involvement.

So Kevin Prince-Boateng (b. Berlin) shows up as Ghanaian, but his brother Jerome, who plays for Germany, doesn’t. Mario Balotelli and Danny Wellbeck, strikers on either half of Manchester, were both born to Ghanaian parents before opting to represent Italy and England respectively. Are these players African?

DR Congo is shown as contributing only a single player to the top leagues (which must be nonsense even by the methods applied), but a player like Vincent Kompany, the current captain of Belgium and Manche$ter City, could easily have represented the DRC instead, as could Chelsea’s Romelu Lukaku.

A more interesting map might look at how players representing European national teams have roots all over the world.

Amb. David Shinn flags two new reports, one on the Sudans and their neighbors, one on conflict in the Horn of Africa.

G. Paschal Zachary asks, “Should the World Help Break Up Nigeria in Order to Save it?” Daniel Solomon says no. “Zachary’s partition,” he writes, “does little to address the present state of Nigerian political development.”

Nigerians will also get a say in what happens to their country, I hope.

Asch Harwood, Ken Opalo, Voice of America, and The Nairobi Star on the International Criminal Court’s recent decision to pursue charges against four of Kenya’s “Ocampo Six.”

The Economist‘s Baobab writes,

Acceleration is the word for Africa in 2012. The continent is moving forward at speed. No matter whether it is in control or veering out of control, Africa stands in marked contrast to slowing down and decomposition in the West. The acceleration is especially true in Ethiopia which is in the first stages of industrialisation.

Last but not least, an interesting read on Zanzibar and Andalus (h/t zunguzungu).

What are you reading today?

Humanitarian agencies are warning of a mass food crisis in the Sahel. Several factors are causing the crisis, the LA Times writes:

A recent survey by UNICEF forecast 1 million cases of severe malnutrition, with between 25% and 60% of those people likely to die without emergency assistance. The agency has plans to feed 1 million people in the Sahel — most of them in the hardest-hit country, Niger — but so far has raised funds to feed only half of them.

The failure of rains triggered a rise in food prices, so families in crisis cannot afford to buy. Meanwhile the fragile agricultural system, stressed by overgrazing, struggles to feed the rapidly growing populations in a region that has some of the highest birthrates on Earth.

Thousands of migrant workers who fled Libya and returned home because of persecution after last year’s revolution in the North African nation have added to the pressure as families struggle to survive without the money that workers had sent home. Locust plagues in some areas complicated the crisis further.

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi held a press conference yesterday where he addressed the issue of his country’s military presence in neighboring Somalia:

Meles Zenawi said Friday he would pull troops out of Somalia “as soon as feasible,” admitting for the first time that forces had crossed into the war-torn neighbouring country.

“The decision has all along been to help the TFG and we will withdraw our troops as soon as feasible,” Meles told reporters in the Ethiopian capital, referring to Somalia’s transitional government.

“We are not going to create a vacuum, we expect the AMISOM troops to be able to fill in the gaps before we withdraw,” he added.

Columns of Ethiopian soldiers rolled into Somalia in November to fight al-Qaeda linked Islamist rebels, but Addis Ababa had previously denied their presence.

Sudan and South Sudan continue to disagree over oil transit fees. South Sudan has shut down oil production in protest at alleged Sudanese theft.

The AFP covers a new United Nations report that assesses the post-Qadhafi Sahelian security environment. The report casts Nigeria’s Boko Haram as a growing regional threat. Read a summary of a Security Council briefing on the report here.

Let’s look more closely at the geography of the uprising. The rebels call themselves “National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad.” But what is Azawad? The AP explains:

The group was formed in October and seeks self-determination of the north of Mali, an area it refers to as the Azawad. Azawad can also refer to the Tuareg-speaking zone covering northern Mali, northern Niger and southern Algeria where many of the blue-turbaned nomads live, but NMLA leaders say their demands relate only to the area within Mali.

Wikipedia has more on (the geographically broader interpretation of) Azawad:

Azaouad, Azawad, or Azawagh is the collective non-officially recognized name for the main Tamashek-speaking parts of northern Mali, northern Niger, and part of southern Algeria. Azawad is mainly made up of Sahelian and Saharan vast flat lands inhabited by Tuareg nomads. It does not correspond to any single administrative region of Mali, Niger, or Algeria, but it includes portions of the Kidal Region of Mali and theTahoua Region and Agadez Region of Niger, and large portions of southern Algeria. Azawad has a strong and distinctive Tuareg character, different from the official identities and characters of the central governments of Mali, Niger, and Algeria. Azawad emerged recently as a geopolitical issue due to the recent separatist movement, the Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MPLA), that aspires to establish an independent Azawad republic with a Tuareg idenitity.

This provides some introductory context for the map I’ve put together. Google Maps occasionally distorts the locations of some towns, but this map will hopefully give at least some idea of where the hotspots of fighting have been so far.

It is not everyday that Senegal’s octogenarian president Abdoulaye Wade lets the television cameras into his bedroom.

But Wade, seeking a new term in next month’s election, was quick to usher them in when his visitor was Serigne Abo Mbacke, a leader of the 129-year-old Mouride order of Islam which counts millions of devotees in his West African country.

The ensuing images of two men demurely perched next to each other on a king-size divan may not have made great television. But the photo opportunity was not lost to voters as proof of the intimate link between Senegal’s Islamic “Brotherhoods” and the body politic of this Muslim but staunchly secular state.

“I have never hidden that I am a Mouride – anyone who votes for me knows they are voting for a Mouride,” Wade told Reuters after this month’s meeting at a plush residence in Touba, the central town that is the Mourides’ spiritual home.

Wade’s affiliation with the Mouridiyya is definitely salient for many Mourides, including youth. When I was in Senegal in 2006-2007 I heard several young Mourides repeat with pride a prophecy that Senegal’s first president would be Christian (this was Leopold Senghor), the second Muslim but not Mouride (this was Abdou Diouf), the third Muslim and Mouride (they saw Wade as the fulfillment of this part of the prophecy), and all of the rest Mouride.

This feeling was not, however, universal. Even before the 2007 elections, many young Mourides were already dissatisfied with Wade’s performance, particularly with regard to the economy, and a shared religious affiliation did not seem to dilute their opposition to the president.

Another wrinkle in the relationship between Wade and the Mouridiyya is the growing complexity of the marabout “field” in Senegal. The key lines for me in the Reuters article were these:

A heavily-set figure in a pristine white robe and with an earpiece connected to his Apple iPhone, Cheikh Abdoul Ahad Mbacke Gainde Fatma has seen more Dakar politicians in the last 24 hours than most Senegalese will see in a lifetime.

Ahad Mbacke is the great-grandson of revered Mouride founder Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacke and heads the organizing committee for the “Grand Magal,” the annual Mouride festival which draws millions to Touba for a week of praying, eating and revelry.

Why did I bold “great-grandson”? Let’s do a little math. Sheikh Amadou Bamba died in 1927. The Sheikh had a number of sons. In Senegalese Sufi brotherhoods the system of hereditary succession works laterally – ie, leadership typically passes from one brother to another inside the same generation before passing to the next generation. In polygamous families, the number of descendants can multiply rapidly, to the point where there can be dozens of potential male heirs. As political scientist Dr. Leonardo Villalon wrote in 1995 with regard to Senegal (see his Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, p. 137),

Marabouts each face the thorny problem of legitimating their influence and maintaining the cohesion of the saintly lineages in the face of a large and ever-growing number of heirs…In the first generation, that of the founder’s sons, it has frequently been possible to achieve such legitimation. Every indication, however, points to the potential for fragmentation in the next generation.

Such fragmentation spills over into the political realm. One way that young marabouts, disgruntled about having to wait for their “turn” as brotherhood leader (or doubting that their turn will ever come), can make a name for themselves is by entering politics. A few have flirted with running for office, and some have become prominent public backers of candidates and politicians. This fragmented arena also includes rising religious stars who don’t come from the families of the founders; rising stars who build mass youth followings can become serious political actors.

All of these developments threaten the centralization of political influence in the person of the brotherhood leader or khalifa – a process that has been going on for decades now. Politicians must therefore navigate a more complicated field than before when they are trying to court support from the brotherhoods. In the 1960s, Senghor built a strong relationship with the Mouride khalifa Sheikh Fallou Mbacke (a son of Sheikh Amadou Bamba – see a photograph of Senghor and Mbacke here) and his successors, and therefore enjoyed a considerable degree of political support from Mourides throughout much of his twenty years in office. In 2012, Wade, and everyone else, will have to court a larger number of religious leaders.

• Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, former prime minister and former president of the National Assembly, as well as runner-up in the 2007 presidential elections, attended secondary school and university in France, specializing in history, political science, and international relations.
• Soumaila Cisse, a former cabinet minister and runner-up in the 2002 presidential elections, studied software engineering in Montpelier.
• Dioncounda Traore, current president of the National Assembly, attended university in Nice as well as universities in the Soviet Union and Algeria.
• Mobidbo Sidibe (.pdf), former prime minister, has a doctorate in criminology from Aix-en-Provence.

There are other candidates, but it is fairly likely that Mali’s next president will be one of these men, and therefore also fairly likely that Mali’s next president will be French-educated. (For what it is worth, former President Alpha Konare studied not in France but in Poland, while outgoing President Amadou Toumani Toure completed military training courses in the Soviet Union and France).

I would not go so far as to say that this trend represents a pernicious form of neo-colonialism, but I do think it’s notable that the formation of super-elites in Mali (and elsewhere in Francophone Africa) remains so closely tied to the former metropole.

But on other political fronts, seeds of a backlash are being sown.

For one thing, there is the question of radicalization inside Kenya. A wave of minor attacks have occurred in Kenya this winter, and Britain warned earlier this month that more attacks are on the way. Yesterday, the Associated Press reported that a Kenyan Muslim organization now says it is officially representing al Shabab in Kenya:

The statement by the Kenya-based Muslim Youth Center came amid a flurry of warnings from embassies about planned terror attacks in Kenya. The Somali militant group al-Shabab has promised to attack Kenya for its decision to send troops to Somalia in October.

The Muslim Youth Center was named in a United Nations report last year for recruiting, fundraising, and running training and orientation events for al-Shabab. An official al-Shabab spokesman did not answer questions about whether the center now represents al-Shabab in Kenya, but a statement published on the center’s blog on Wednesday was unequivocal.

“There can be no doubt that Amiir Ahmad Iman Ali’s elevation to become the supreme Amiir of Kenya for al Shabaab is recognition from our Somali brothers who have fought tirelessly against the kuffar on the importance of the Kenyan mujahideen in Somalia,” the statement said.

The UN Monitoring Group report that the AP mentions can be found here.

Announcements of open support for al Shabab in Kenya not only increase fears of upcoming attacks, they also threaten to increase political tensions in Kenya. The large Somali community in Kenya has become a target of violence and repression by other groups and by authorities in the past. In a year when Kenya will hold a potentially quite tense election, where ethnic hatreds could flare up, increased religious tension will only make the situation more precarious.

Another potential area of fallout stemming from Kenya’s operations in Somalia concerns the quality of life in northern Kenya. This region has long suffered from crippling drought and poverty, and is home to hundreds of thousands of refugees from Somalia. Human Rights Watch reported this month on the abuse of civilians by security forces currently going on in parts of the region:

The Kenyan police and military have been responsible for a growing number of serious abuses against civilians since the Kenya Defence Forces entered southern Somalia in October, with the stated aim of eliminating al-Shabaab, an Islamist militia. The same month, suspected al-Shabaab sympathizers initiated a series of attacks against police, military, and civilian targets in Kenya.

In response, members of the security forces have been responsible for rape, beatings, looting, and arbitrary arrests of civilians. The crackdown has largely targeted Somali refugees and Kenyan ethnic Somalis, but residents of other ethnic backgrounds in North Eastern province have also been victimized.

This kind of treatment of civilians could leave bitter memories among civilians, memories that outlast Kenya’s mission in Somalia. Those memories could further weaken the legitimacy of the Kenyan government in the north.

Let me be clear: I am not saying that Somali communities in Kenya are inherently a security threat. Far from it; almost all of these people are simply struggling to survive and to build normal lives. What concerns me more is the possibility of greater political division in Kenya, and greater regional fragmentation within the country. As Kenya attempts to pacify its neighbor, the risk grows that core issues of poverty and security will go unaddressed back home.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), an organization I very much respect, has put out a thoughtful report sounding a note of caution about the case and its potential impact. Three key sentences from the report read,

These cases have enormous political consequences for both the 2012 elections and the country’s stability. During the course of the year, rulings and procedures will inevitably either lower or increase com­munal tensions. If the ICC process is to contribute to the deterrence of future political violence in Kenya, the court and its friends must explain its work and limitations better to the public.

I would recommend reading the briefing in full. Given the political reality that the case is likely to go forward, ICG takes the practical approach of giving suggestions to both the ICC and the Kenyan government for how to minimize the potentially incendiary effects of the case. In my view the recommendations are sound.

I am glad to see this kind of direct and pragmatic discussion of the ICC’s political role. The conversation about the politics of the ICC’s actions is not new – Alex de Waal and Julie Flint, in particular, began making incisive critiques of the ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir several years ago – but ICG’s contribution is timely and will likely make new audiences consider these important issues.