One thing worth thinking about, when it comes to the issue of terrorism in the Sahel, is that residents of countries like Mali and Mauritania have nuanced opinions about what measures are and are not worth taking in the service of counterterrorism.

I have no idea whether the following quote is representative of attitudes in Mali, but the eloquence of the speaker’s words struck me:

“We are not against the training of the Malian Army by the Americans,” says Fatoumata Maiga, a women’s rights activist in Mali’s capital, Bamako. “But we don’t want the American Army to be present here. We see that around the world, wherever the Americans are, there is a temptation for Al Qaeda to be there.”

Support for American-backed counterterrorism projects, in other words, has real limits in Mali. And Maiga is not the only observer who sees American efforts as a self-fulfilling prophecy – Al Jazeera English did a whole documentary on the subject.

Bamako, Mali

In Mauritania, meanwhile, domestic counterterrorism measures are provoking outcry. According to Afrique Avenir, opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah has denounced proposed changes to the anti-terror law (French), saying the new version “contains articles contradictory to the shari’a, to morality, and to Islamic values as well as principles of democracy and liberty.” The law would extend the state’s powers to search private places, tap phones, and revive old cases.

As US policymakers contemplate counterterrorism measures in West Africa, they should bear in mind the potential for strong domestic opposition both to a US presence and to initiatives in the “War on Terror” that local governments undertake. This domestic opposition could become outright anti-Americanism, or impede legitimate efforts to counteract kidnapping and terrorism.

Incidents with potentially serious political ramifications recently occurred in at least two places in the Horn of Africa: Eritrea and Somalia.

Eritrea vs. Ethiopia?

The rival governments in Asmara and Addis Ababa are trading accusations of violence:

Eritrea’s government has said its troops killed 10 Ethiopian soldiers after they attacked Eritrean positions on New Year’s day, something Addis Ababa has denied.

[...]Bereket Simon, the Ethiopian government’s head of information, accused the Eritrean government of trying to cover up an attack by Eritrean rebels in which 25 Eritrean government soldiers were killed.

“This new allegation that it killed Ethiopian soldiers is an attempt by the regime in Asmara to deflect its internal crisis by implicating Ethiopia,” he told Reuters.

AFP has more quotes from the Ethiopian government:

“There was never an incursion from our side. It’s a diversionary tactic by the Eritrean regime to deflect attention from its domestic problems,” spokesman Shimelis Kemal told AFP.

An Eritrean rebel group earlier this week claimed they carried out raids against government positions, while another movement said it was “prepared to launch attacks” after the United Nations imposed an arms embargo and other tough sanctions on Asmara.

“The (Eritrean) government has become internationally outlawed and is bankrupt. The rebel claims indicate growing discontent from within the country,” Shimelis added.

Without much information to go on, it’s hard to read the significance of this incident. At its worst, it presages mounting tensions that could lead to another border war like the one the two countries fought from 1998 to 2000. Or it could be a minor disturbance, quickly forgotten. Or, if Addis Ababa’s assessment that domestic problems provoked these allegations from Eritrea is correct, we may see more erratic behavior from the government in Asmara.

If you have any insights or predictions, feel free to share them in the comments.

Somalia

Major fighting in central Somalia this weekend pitted Islamist rebels al Shabab against the pro-government Ahlu Sunna movement. Dozens have died, but Ahlu Sunna claims to has maintained control of Dusamareb, “the capital of the central region of Galgadud, coveted by al Shabaab, who would like to extend their area of control between Mogadishu and the pro-government northeast region of Puntland.” Ahlu Sunna originally pushed al Shabab from the town in 2008.

The attack on Dusamareb fits with Dr. Michael Weinstein’s observations about “Al Shabab’s Encirclement Strategy,” in which the Islamists hope to gain control of areas around Mogadishu before taking the capital itself. Here Weinstein explains the significance of the battle over Dusamareb, using the acronym “H.S.M.” for al Shabab, “A.S.W.J.” for Ahlu Sunna, “T.F.G.” for Transitional Federal Government, and “H.I.” for al Shabab’s rival Islamist group Hizbul Islam:

Should H.S.M. succeed in capturing Dhusamareb and then extend its sway to strategic towns in Galgadud, such as Guri-el, Abudwaq, and Balanbal, which remain A.S.W.J. strongholds, the balance of power between H.S.M. and the variegated coalition resisting it in the central regions and in southern and central Somalia in general will be decisively altered. Although A.S.W.J. is only partially aligned with the T.F.G., the former’s control over Galgadud – a buffer region between the Hiraan region to the west, in which the nationalist Islamist Hizbul Islam movement (H.I.) and H.S.M. are dominant and dispute and collaborate; and the Middle Shabelle region to the east, in which H.S.M. predominates – has been one of the most important pillars of the anti-H.S.M. coalition’s aim of rolling back H.S.M., which is currently dominant in most of southern and central Somalia; the noose around the T.F.G. will tighten, which is the aim of the encirclement strategy. At the least, Galgadud has been thrown into contention and A.S.W.J.’s credibility as a resistance force against H.S.M. has been thrown into question.

Weinstein goes on to discuss Ethiopia’s involvement with Ahlu Sunna and how al Shabab’s attack has likely caught everyone by surprise, give the Islamists a great degree of momentum.

For its part, the TFG is preparing an assault on al Shabab in Mogadishu. Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke predicts Somali government troops will drive al Shabab out of the capital by the end of January. Unlike al Shabab’s attacks to the north, however, the government lacks the advantage of surprise; al Shabab has apparently been preparing for weeks for the coming fight.

The weeks ahead may see some key battles, then, as al Shabab tries to encircle the capital and the government tries to expel them from it.

It’s from a week ago, but Steve Coll’s look at Umar Abdulmutallab’s biography is worth reading:

Abdulmutallab appears cut from the now-familiar cloth of transnational Islamic violence: As the analyst Marc Sageman once formulated it, the biography is one of dislocation and radicalization that often seems to involve a young man who is raised in country A, becomes radicalized in country B, and then decides to attack country C, with “C” often (but not always) being the United States. Here we also have the elements of economic privilege and globe-crossing travel familiar from the biographies of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s two senior leaders, who by now have reached that state of advanced middle-age in which they can no longer be expected to remember their period of teenage radicalization and early violence very accurately.

Reuters says, “There is no doubt that 2010 is going to be a big year for Africa.The question is whether in a year’s time we’ll be looking back and saying it was big in the right ways.”

US Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration writes of Sudan in 2010, “The road ahead will be tough and beset by numerous and seemingly insurmountable challenges. But in the face of these trials, we will work with steadfast determination with the parties to reach positive agreements followed up by verifiable implementation.”

For his part, Alex de Waal explores the meaning of Sudan’s fifty-fourth anniversary of its independence.

Owen Barder mocks “universal cynics” in the aid field.

Kal assesses the Obama administration’s rhetoric and reception in the field of human rights.

Two new blogs on my radar: Kal points readers to Dekhnstan (on Mauritania), and Chris Blattman introduces readers to Loomnie, written by Olumide Abimbola, a Nigerian anthropologist.

Last but not least, check out this piece on a film school in Kenya, complete with some short films.

This morning I went on San Francisco’s KGO Radio to discuss Yemen and Somalia with host Patricia Thurston (no relation). If you’d like to listen, the segment is available here, and will be up for the next week. Click on Saturday in the archives, then download the 4 AM to 5 AM segment. If you do listen, stop back by and tell me what you think.

Al Shabab says it will send fighters to Yemen:

In a military ceremony here, where the rebels publicly showed off hundreds of new recruits, Sheik Muktar Robow, a senior rebel official, said the group would “send fighters to Yemen to assist our brothers.”

He said that the fighters had been trained to fight the African Union peacekeeping force and the transitional federal government in Somalia but that Yemen was just across the Gulf of Aden and that “our brothers must be ready for our welcome.”

While it was not clear when or whether the rebels could carry out their threat, the avowed goals signaled a shift in strategy from an Islamist insurgency that has drawn foreign fighters here to one that aims to provide them to insurgencies abroad.

The Shabab have increased their ties with Al Qaeda, which has recently been fighting the American-backed military in Yemen.

The Economist discusses Ghana’s oil:

As Ghana prepares to pump oil in the second half of 2010, hopes are rising, both among hard-pressed market traders at home and in the far-flung diaspora, where Ghanaians are quitting jobs in American banks to head back to an optimistic homeland. Oil was found off Ghana’s coast in 2007 and, even without further discoveries, is now expected to earn an average of $1.2 billion in annual state revenues for almost two decades. For a country with 23m people and a GDP of $16 billion, it could be a big boost—or a crippling blight.

Perky economic growth, a decent human-rights record and two consecutive changes of government by the ballot box have made Ghana one of the past decade’s success stories in Africa. In 2009 it won the accolade of being sub-Saharan Africa’s only country to be visited by Barack Obama as president. Yet some people worry that it could slip back into its corrupt and violent ways once the oil begins to flow: witness other countries in the region, such as huge Nigeria and tiny Equatorial Guinea, where cliques of “big men” have stolen stacks of bounteous oil money while most of the people have been left to live in poverty. This is the curse of black gold.

Reuters reports on the many voices inside and outside Guinea who say the country must solve its leadership crisis if it is to move forward.

With backing from oil companies, the Nigerian government is fighting pollution in the Niger Delta.

A Saudi Arabian man attacked by gunmen in Niger tells his story. Niger has arrested several suspects over the incident.

Chad’s President Idrissa Deby asks rebels to disarm.

Finally, in the wake of an SPLA soldier’s shooting of three Kenyans, NTV Kenya presents a report on the two countries’ relations.

As we head into a new year, here are ten of the most important stories to watch in Africa.

1. Elections

I debated whether to organize this list by country or by theme, and ultimately went with the latter. But if I had organized it by country, I would have begun with Sudan, where elections in April 2010 represent a critical juncture for the country and for the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Will the government crack down violently on opposition supporters, a trend foreshadowed by some tense demonstrations this fall? Will the elections restart the renewed civil war between North and South Sudan, or pave the way for a peaceful referendum on Southern independence in 2011?

Also, the elections in Sudan aren’t the only ones on the continent – Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Central African Republic and others will hold key elections in 2010, and Nigeria will prepare for presidential elections in 2011.

2. Chinese Influence

The conclusion of another Afro-Chinese summit in Egypt in November 2009, accompanied by major loan agreements, reaffirmed China’s substantial economic and political role in Africa. With African leaders like Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi making strongly pro-Chinese statements last year, one can argue that China’s stock is rising on the continent despite political backlash in places like Namibia. In 2010 we’ll see which way the wind blows – will there be more trade and aid deals? more attacks on Chinese citizens and workers? more international pressure for China to stop dealing with countries like Guinea and Sudan? – but I’m betting that China’s power in Africa will, on the whole, increase this year.

3. Environmental Problems

2009 saw major droughts and devastating floods, along with high temperatures and widening desertification. 2010 will likely see more of the same, with resource conflicts straining national unity in places like Kenya and exacerbating intercommunal and international tensions across the continent. Some innovative solutions are circulating – like a “Great Green Wall…stretch[ing] from Senegal to Djibouti” – but the challenges are daunting.

4. Energy and Mineral Deals with Foreign Powers

China isn’t America’s only competitor in Africa. A high-profile tour in the summer of 2009 by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev to major African energy producers like Nigeria and Angola signaled the increasing interest of foreign actors in Africa’s fuels and minerals. South American powers like Brazil and Venezuela, and Asian powers like India, also want a piece of the action. Expect more deals in 2010, with repercussions for local African politics and US influence.

5. Kidnapping and Terrorism

We enter 2010 with a number of foreigners held in Africa, especially in the Sahel, including at least six Westerners kidnapped by AQIM. 2009 also saw major concern about rising kidnappings (of foreigners and locals) in Kenya and Nigeria. If the peace process in the Niger Delta region stays on track, we will hopefully see fewer kidnappings there in 2010, but expect the trend to continue elsewhere. Regarding the Sahel, an increase in terrorism (including kidnapping) could evoke strong military responses against AQIM by local governments.

6. Piracy

Piracy off the coast of Somalia made headlines throughout 2009, and pirate attacks have nearly tripled from 2008. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is also a trend to watch. If piracy increases in 2010, expect more debate about how to address the problem, with strong pressure placed on NATO, and increasing concern about pirates’ capacity to disrupt oil shipments.

7. Separatism, Intercommunal Violence and Rebellion

People in a number of African communities are demanding self-determination: South Sudan, Western Sahara, and Somaliland and Puntland for starters. Some separatists act primarily through political, rather than military, channels, but politics can quickly spill over into violence.

Meanwhile, violent rebellions continue in a number of countries. Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army remains a thorn in the side of its home country and a serious problem for Uganda’s neighbors, including South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rebellions in Chad and the Central African Republic may flare up again, and of course the conflict in Darfur is far from over. Civil war rages in Somalia. Rebels in Senegal’s Casamance region are again taking up arms. 2010 could see the resolution of some of these conflicts, but certainly not all.

8. Aid Debates

A fierce debate raged last year over the effectiveness of aid and the form it should take, with scholars like William Easterly, Jeffrey Sachs, Peter Singer, Chris Blattman, and others making important arguments. We can tie the aid debate to other debates about who can best solve Africans’ problems (see Mahmood Mamdani and John Prendergast’s debate about Darfur). These debates could potentially change the way the US (and other foreign actors) relate to Africa.

9. US Military Activity

From what I can tell, the Obama administration has budgeted slightly less for AFRICOM in 2010 than the funding AFRICOM received in 2009. That does not mean, however, that US military activity in Africa is winding down. Counterterrorism partnerships in the Sahel continue – the US recently conducted military training in Mali, for example – and the Obama administration may conduct more missile strikes in Somalia this year. The biggest story of all would be if AFRICOM moved their headquarters from Germany to, say, Liberia, but that appears unlikely to happen in the near-term.

10. Death of a Major African Leader

I have placed this one last because it concerns contingencies, but it could easily top the list if those contingencies occur. No one can foresee the future, but a real possibility exists that one of Africa’s aging leaders will die in 2010, leaving successors scrambling to attain power and stabilize their rule. The death of any leader would have major consequences – it was the death of Lansana Conte in Guinea that put the current military junta in power, for example – but the passage of either Robert Mugabe (turns 86 in February) or Hosni Mubarak (turns 82 in May) would have especially far-reaching effects.

Coda:

This list is organized according to my own subjective sense of what’s noteworthy, and you may disagree – in fact, I hope some readers will. What have I left off? Should I have given more space to issues of genocide, or to women’s issues, or trends in education? Something else? Have I missed important elements in the trends I do mention? If so, I hope you’ll give your take in the comments. Happy New Year!

I plan to finish my own “Africa 2010″ piece soon, but in the meantime here’s one from the Christian Science Monitor. They argue that Africa is poised to become “the world’s next breadbasket”. Foreign investment is apparently the key to this process:

Over the past year, dozens of private investors and foreign governments, including those of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea, and China, have snatched up hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland in Africa. Though their goals vary, many involved with the acquisitions say they want to secure farmable land to protect their home countries against what they see as inevitable future food shortages.

And when it comes to open, arable land – and governments willing to make a deal – Africa is the world leader. Saudi Arabian investors, for instance, have poured hundreds of millions of dollars into farmland in Ethiopia, according to groups like GRAIN, a nonprofit that supports small farmers and has been tracking these international land acquisitions.

China has invested $800 million in rice production in Mozambique, and Jordan has secured tens of thousands of hectares for livestock and crops in Sudan. In September, the South Korean government announced that it will develop 100,000 hectares of farmland in Tanzania, at least half of which will go to South Korean businesses raising grains and producing processed food such as cooking oil and starch.

Corporate investors are also getting involved. London and Wall Street firms have shown new interest in farmland investment vehicles. Given the state of the global financial market – and the 2008 food crisis during which wheat and other food staple prices soared to record highs – food and land seem safe long-term investments, says Devlin Kuyek, a researcher with GRAIN.

Proponents of the land deals say this spate of investment is a global win-win. Land-scarce countries in the Gulf, Asia, and elsewhere have a new way to protect themselves from food shortages, and Africa gets much-needed capital and expertise to turn its rich agricultural potential into actual food. And recently the UN and the Washington D.C.-based International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) have given lukewarm backing to the land acquisitions, as long as both sides follow codes of conduct.

The whole article is worth reading, and it raises an important question: if this move toward a “breadbasket” status bears fruit, do you think it would prove to be a beneficial form of development or a damaging form of exploitation?

The Christmas Day terrorist attempt by a Nigerian national who claims to have received training from Al Qaeda in Yemen has produced cries that the US must “do something about Yemen.” But the more we “do” in Yemen, the stronger the chances that we will become more deeply embroiled in the affairs of Somalia. The possibility of US military intervention in Yemen and Somalia may excite some Americans, but a multi-front war in Yemen and the Horn of Africa is unlikely to defeat Al Qaeda or provide a measurable return (in increased safety) on US investments of blood and treasure.

Sana'a, Yemen

The New York Times urges greater intervention in Yemen, editorializing that “the United States and its allies are going to have to devise a broader strategy that also addresses Yemen’s desperate economic, political and social problems ” because “the Christmas Day plot is a warning — we hope in time — of why it’s so important to head off full chaos in Yemen. The last thing the world needs is another haven for Al Qaeda.” That sounds like a nation-building agenda, especially when the Times groups Yemen with Afghanistan and Pakistan as a project that the “weary” American public must take on.

The US is, as the Times‘ editorial board acknowledges, already involved in Yemen. Counterterrorism support to Yemen has vastly expanded since 2006. CIA agents, top military officials, and millions in aid are now making their way into the country. In December, the US carried out missile strikes on Al Qaeda targets there. But as concerns about Al Qaeda draw the US more deeply into Yemen, the American military will, more and more, cross paths with Somalis – ordinary people, fighters, and hardline would-be terrorists.

Events in Yemen and Somalia are increasingly intertwined. In 2009, a record number of refugees fled from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, including many Somalis. These refugees contribute to social tensions and political turmoil. Even more alarmingly, Yemeni rebels have pressed Somali refugees into military service. The bottom line is, the more people the US military kills in Yemen, the greater the likelihood we will kill some Somalis there. That could have serious consequences. Whether through a chain of unanticipated events or through the conscious choice to treat the Gulf of Aden as a cohesive, “Afpak”-style front, stepping up our involvement in Yemen could lead to a greater military presence in the entire region. But the US cannot control politics in these two poor and unstable countries, and open intervention there could create more enemies than it eliminates.

That’s not to say we should ignore Somalia. Any day now, Somali hardliners could perpetrate an act of terrorism outside Somalia’s borders, near or far. Nigerian writers worry about a “September 11-like attack” on the continent of Africa. Al Shabab rebels have threatened to attack Uganda and Kenya. In November, a Somali man attempted to smuggle explosives onto an airplane bound for Djibouti and Dubai. And for months, American officials and journalists have worried that the “steady stream of young Somali-American men” recruited to fight in Somalia might, upon their return, conduct attacks inside the US.

In short, any serious discussion of Al Qaeda and/or international terrorism must include Somalia, but developing a more effective US counterterrorism policy does not require US military intervention in Somalia. Even those who call for such an intervention have not specified what it should look like or what its military objective would be, beyond “aggressively” countering terrorist groups. Yes, in many ways Somalia fragments further each day, setting the stage for solidified al Shabab control in southern Somalia. But foreigners just make the violence worse; a number of Somali civilians were killed in fighting this year, but those numbers pale in comparison to the figures of Somali dead from the period of Ethiopia’s US-backed occupation of Somalia. Somalis may not be close to solving their problems, but if foreign powers try to force political outcomes there, the streets will again run red.

The potential costs and unpredictable consequences of increased US military involvement in Yemen suggest that a limited counterterrorism strategy is our wisest course there. The risk of a widening war that comes to include both Yemen and Somalia further strengthens the case against US military commitments in the Gulf of Aden. So before the US pours more CIA operatives, money, and military personnel into Yemen, we should ponder the high risks – and low returns – of aggressive intervention.

Politicians and clan elders met in southern Somalia last weekend to “to find a way to establish a semi-autonomous state encompassing six regions – Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower and Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle.” The meeting took place in Dolow (see map below).

With Puntland and Somaliland effectively outside the Transitional Federal Government’s control, the creation of a new regional polity would further weaken the TFG’s legitimacy.

Observers say if the conference attracted as many delegates as claimed, it underscores the growing sense of frustration among various clan-based communities in southern Somalia.  They say some Somalis may be viewing regionalism as a solution to Somalia’s problems because they are not convinced the weak U.N.-backed central government in Mogadishu can be counted on to curb radicalism, restore stability in the country, and share resources equitably.

Al Shabab rejects the idea of southern autonomy for pro-government forces, insisting on its own right to establish a state.

If non-Shabab southern leaders can tap into strong local support, they could threaten al Shabab, but I find it more likely that fragmentation among non-Shabab leaders will play to the Islamists’ advantage. Rumors are circulating that al Shabab itself has split into multiple factions, and conflicts with rival Islamists Hizbul Islam have given al Shabab a major headache, but they still seem to be the strongest military and political force in southern Somalia. If fragmentation among their enemies outpaces fragmentation within their own ranks, they could come out on top.

Furthermore, if the TFG finds itself completely isolated in Mogadishu, that makes them it even easier for al Shabab to wipe them out. However, if al Shabab appears close to conquering southern Somalia, I imagine other powers will intervene. So maybe there are no winners here, just smaller and smaller political groups wrestling for control.

View Larger Map

The recent attempt by a Nigerian national, Umar Abdulmutallab, to detonate a bomb on US-bound flight has elicited some commentary about where such would-be African terrorists become radicalized.

The Christian Science Monitor turns a lens on London, Mutallab’s home from 2005 to 2008, and asks whether the fact that “his four formative years in London coincided with public anger over the Iraq war and the London subway and bus bombing by Islamists in July 2005″ played a role in his terrorist aspirations.

At Foreign Policy, Elizabeth Dickinson makes a related observation:

If the suspect does indeed come from a family of means, as his residence in London suggests (forgive a generalization, but anyone who is anyone in Nigeria has got a house in London), it says much about where the real terror “threat” is (and is not) coming from in Nigeria. Security analysts have been worrying about Nigeria since the Sept 11. attacks — fearing that this about half-Muslim country of 140 million people would be a potential host to extremists. But at the end of the day, something that I’ve learned about Nigeria is that it takes money and connections to get things done. Just think back to the violence earlier this summer by the Boko Haram sect. The mostly-impoverished members of the group raised hell in the local context … but that was it. Taking “jihad” international from Nigeria is still a long ways and a lot of financing off (if it is on the way at all).

Which brings me to one more point about extremism in Nigeria. Much of the religious violence that the country has seen in recent years has been less about religion and more about a country rife with corruption and wanting for institutions. When sharia law was introduced in the North earlier this decade, most analysts believe that it had more to do with a desire for the law — any law — to function. Since the secular government had failed for years, many sought refuge in the laws of religious fundamentalism.

And that brings us back to the alleged terrorist in questioning today. His grievances are different from these, one might imagine, since the lack of rule of law often works in favor of (rather than against) the elite. In short, what I’m trying to say is that there are two different phenomena going on here: mass dissatisfaction among many impoverished in the country’s Muslim North, and the different brand of extremism that would incite a well-off 23-year-old to blow up a plane in Detroit.

Perhaps Abdulmutallab’s case, then, tells us less about radicalization in Nigeria than it does about radicalization in Europe or the Middle East.

My aim here is actually not to weigh in on the case of Abdulmutallab, but rather to use his situation as a jumping-off point to pursue some questions about whether radicalization is or is not occurring in Sahelian Muslim communities, and if so what form it’s taking. Dickinson’s points merit discussion, but before I come back to them I want to draw attention to some real limits of international actors’ abilities to operate in the Sahel. If Abdulmutallab was a product of international terrorist networks, many of his fellow Sahelian Muslims are not.

The story that caught my eye yesterday, more than the media frenzy around Mutallab, was an incident where three Saudi Arabian nationals were attacked in Niger. Speculation has fingered AQIM jihadists or Tuareg rebels as potential culprits, but Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Khaled bin Saud said, “It appears to us so far that it was a robbery.”

We often hear that Saudi Arabian militants influence Sahelian jihadists, but it is striking to me that Arabs can fall victim to violence in the Sahel just as Westerners can. The world’s “ungoverned spaces” (lists of which often prominently features Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel) are supposedly the ideal “breeding ground” for Al Qaeda. But in the most lawless parts of the Sahel, outsiders of any flavor can meet a hostile response. These Saudi Arabians could have been terrorist recruiters or tourists, but whatever the case someone made clear that they were not welcome. Ken Menkhaus has made a similar argument about Somalia – a would-be Arab Al Qaeda mastermind arriving in Somalia would stick out immediately, risking kidnapping or death. One incident does not mean that no Arab radicals can forge connections in Mali, Niger, or other Sahelian countries, but I do wonder whether Sahelian radicalism, and for that matter Somali, Afghan, and Yemeni radicalism, are primarily local phenomena.

That brings us back to Dickinson’s distinction about mass discontent in Northern Nigerian versus individual cases of elite radicalization. Her two categories are broad, but useful. The recent clashes in Bauchi state between police forces and the followers of Kalo Kato, an Islamic sect that claims to be an extension of the Maitatsine group that sparked bloody riots in Northern cities in the 1980s, provide another example of local radicals motivated by local grievances and politics more than by international terrorist agendas.

The availability of more information about Abdulmutallab will clarify his personal trajectory, perhaps allowing analysts to parse out what influences his experiences in Nigeria, London, Yemen, and elsewhere had on his thinking. But policymakers would be wise to pause before generalizing one African radical’s career to entire communities, where the political realities on the ground  – even when they involve political Islam and bloodshed – may have nothing to do with Al Qaeda and its aims.