Sudan: A Cross-Amputation in Political Context

Q 5:33 is rendered, in Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s translation, “The punishment of those who wage war against God and His Apostle, and strive with might and main for mischief throughout the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land. That is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter.”

On February 14, Sudanese authorities carried out a “cross-amputation” against an accused highway robber named Adam al Muthna. According to Human Rights Watch, “Muthna was convicted of armed robbery (Haraba) under article 167 of the 1991 Sudanese Penal Code in relation to an armed attack on a truck carrying passengers between North Kordofan and East Darfur in March 2006.” HRW adds,

Article 168(b) of the Sudanese Penal Code provides cross amputation as a penalty for armed robbery when it results in grievous injury or involves the robbery of property equivalent to an amount decreed by the judiciary, currently set at 1500 Sudanese Pounds (approximately US$ 340).

Amputation as a form of corporal punishment was incorporated into Sudanese law in 1983 when then-President Gaffar Nimeiry introduced Islamic reforms known as the “September laws.” Although sentences imposing amputations have been handed down under those laws, there are no known cases since 2001 in which such sentences have been carried out. Human rights groups had hoped this signaled a de facto moratorium on the practice.

[...]

Sudanese authorities have imposed stoning sentences and routinely order flogging penalties. Both penalties are forms of corporal punishment justified as Sharia (Islamic law). In 2012, two sentences of death by stoning for adultery were imposed on women but were overturned following an international outcry.

Reuters discusses some of the political context that helps explain why the “de facto moratorium” has ended. Some argue that the cross-amputation represents a move to claim religious legitimacy amid domestic dissent. (Diverse forms of dissent in recent years have included armed rebellion in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, an alleged coup attempt, street protests motivated by economic and political grievances, etc.) Reuters also points out that the government has consistently pledged deeper Islamization of society, government, and law since the run-up to South Sudan’s secession.

[The cross-amputation] followed a pledge by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir to implement a “100%” Islamic constitution as a result of the secession in 2011 of the mainly non-Muslim south of Sudan.

Let’s flash back to December 2010:

Sudan’s president said the country would adopt an Islamic constitution if the south split away in a referendum due next month, in a speech on [19 December 2010] in which he also defended police filmed flogging a woman.

“If south Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution and at that time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity,” President Omar Hassan al-Bashir told supporters at a rally in the eastern city of Gedaref.

“Sharia (Islamic law) and Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official language,” he said.

And to July 2012:

“We want to present a constitution that serves as a template to those around us. And our template is clear, a 100 percent Islamic constitution, without communism or secularism or Western (influences),” said Bashir [in a speech in Khartoum on 7 July 2012].

“And we tell non-Muslims, nothing will preserve your rights except for Islamic sharia because it is just,” he said.

Bashir, facing small-scale protests calling for him to step down, said a committee made up of “all parties, religious sects and Sufis” would be set up to draft a constitution.

That appeared to be a move to assuage resentment by other opposition parties – many of which are still dominated by Islamist figures – over Bashir’s reluctance to loosen the grip of the ruling National Congress Party.

He did not give a date for the new constitution.

As of last month, momentum toward a new constitution seemed to be growing.

I think the cross-amputation is a sign that the Bashir government’s statements and plans concerning deeper Islamization deserve to be taken seriously. It seems likely that there will be continued efforts by his government to design and carry out legislation based on the government’s reading of shari’a.

A few relevant resources:

Women, Motorbikes, and Shari’a in Nigeria and Indonesia

This Winter Quarter at Northwestern I’ll be teaching a course on Islam and politics in the contemporary world. Much of the course will focus on three cases: Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria. As I prepare for the course I’ve been paying much closer attention to news out of Indonesia. Nigeria and Indonesia are very different countries, and existing regional shari’a projects in the two countries are also different, but this:

A city in the Indonesian province of Aceh which follows Sharia has ordered female passengers not to straddle motorbikes behind male drivers.

Suaidi Yahya, mayor of Lhokseumawe, says it aims to save people’s “morals and behaviours”.

Leaflets have been sent out to government offices and residents to inform them about the regulation.

Aceh is the only Indonesian province that follows Sharia.

Under the new regulation, the mayor says that women passengers are only allowed to sit “side-saddle” because straddling the bike seat violates Islamic values.

reminded me a little of this (2005):

Motorbike taxi riders and religious marshals have clashed in the northern Nigerian state of Kano over a ban that stops women travelling on the bikes.
In accordance with Sharia law, men and women are not allowed to travel together on public transport.

Women have ignored the ban, being implemented this week, saying there are not enough transport alternatives.

A few scholars have mentioned to me their view that the “shari’a project” in northern Nigeria is/was aimed partly or even primarily at controlling women’s bodies in public space. I think there is much more to movements for shari’a implementation or re-implementation, but I do see why those scholars think that way. And I do not think these motorbike laws should be seen as the product of isolated officials’ eccentric thinking. The question of proper gender roles in public transportation is an issue that has provoked real debate in parts of northern Nigeria, and it seems in Aceh too. In that context, it’s interesting to think about the various things motorbikes can symbolize.

“When you see a woman straddle, she looks like a man. But if she sits side-saddle, she looks like a woman,” Suaidi said.

Finally, I think these laws and debates point to how broad the scope of shari’a implementation projects can be. Sometimes the international media gives us an image of shari’a as wholly concerned with cutting off thieves’ hands and stoning adulteresses. But on a day-to-day level in modern states that are working to practice a form of shari’a, the concerns are often quite different, and sometimes surprisingly mundane.

Vice President Biden’s Africa Trip

One big story I couldn’t cover while traveling last week was Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. Biden traveled partly as Obama’s surrogate at the World Cup and other events, and partly to deliver messages urging reform and stability in different African countries, including not only Kenya but also its neighbors, particularly Sudan.

Biden traveled first to Egypt and met with President Hosni Mubarak. They discussed Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situation in Sudan, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and next year’s elections in Egypt.

The Vice President spent the next two days in Kenya, where he gave a speech linking political reform with increased American investment. Biden also focused on Kenya’s role in East Africa. While in Kenya he met with Southern Sudanese officials and attended a discussion about Somalia.

Kenya’s East African sees regional worries trumping US concerns about Kenya’s internal politics.

US Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Kenya can be seen as signaling a shift in the Obama administration’s approach to East Africa.

Comments by Mr Biden, coupled with reports of an expanding US “secret war” against Al Qaeda, suggest that Washington is now focusing more on Kenya’s strategic sub-regional role than on concerns about corruption and human rights abuses within the country.

The coalition government’s agreement on constitutional reforms represents a major reason for the marked change in Washington’s tone. But growing US trepidation over instability in the region – particularly in Somalia – has also contributed to the decision to cultivate a more co-operative relationship with Kenya.

NTV Kenya goes so far as to say that Biden “endorsed” the new Kenyan constitution, which has sparked controversy in Kenya because of provisions relating to shari’a courts.

On Thursday Biden traveled to South Africa to attend the World Cup. The South African leg of his visit, where Biden met with his counterpart Kgalema Motlanthe, seems to have focused less on substantive political discussions than on the political symbolism of an American presence at the World Cup, but in South African Biden talked Sudan, as he did elsewhere.

Biden’s trip to Africa is a clear sequel to Secretary Clinton’s seven-country journey to the continent last summer, which also included stops in Kenya and South Africa. Whereas Clinton’s approach sometimes seemed stern, Biden’s style has been called “cheerful.” But the same political issues and challenges remain in play, especially with regard to Kenya, where Washington wants to push for reforms but also preserve an alliance with a regional power. Kenya’s perceived importance to Washington has increased even more since last year, it seems, because of continued instability in Somalia but also because of the potential for serious disruption connected with the January 2011 referendum in Sudan.

At Foreign Policy, in fact, Josh Rogin writes that the trip was “all about Sudan.” Rogin says that Biden’s meetings with South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and with other African leaders show that concern about Sudan is moving up the hierarchy in the Obama administration. Apparently choosing whom to send to the inauguration ceremonies in Khartoum split Obama’s Africa/foreign policy team last month. Biden’s efforts on Sudan coincided with other US diplomatic moves, including a separate meeting between Scott Gration and Egyptian officials and a stronger strain of criticism toward Sudan coming from the State Department. The absence of Nigeria and Angola from Biden’s itinerary, countries Clinton visited last summer, also suggests that the trip was primarily focused on political stability in East Africa and not on broader US economic interests on the continent.

The Brookings Institution offered a number of perspectives on the trip as it started last week. Check them out and see what you agree or disagree with. Diplomatically, it seems to me that the trip was a success in terms of its stated and presumed aims. But I still feel that Washington’s approach to Africa is narrowly focused on attempts to engineer political outcomes, a strategy that often backfires and also distracts from other kinds of engagement, particularly economic partnership (the language is there, but is always tied to reform, and always overshadowed by politics) and cultural dialogue. In any case, Biden seems to have been a hit, though of course many African leaders are hoping for a visit by the Big Man himself.

Kenya’s Constitutional Controversy Turns Violent

Just returned from my trip, so I’m easing back into blogging today.

Provisions regarding shari’a courts in Kenya’s proposed new constitution have created legal controversy for weeks, but now they are also causing violence:

At least five people have died and dozens been injured in a stampede at a rally in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi.

The stampede followed two explosions, the cause of which is unknown.

The rally was organised by Christian groups opposed to a draft constitution because it retains recognition of existing Islamic courts and includes a clause on abortion.

Kenyans are due to vote on the new constitution in a referendum in August.

This is a real tragedy, and also a real reason to worry: people feel strongly about the issue, and August is still a ways off.

Kenya Islamic Courts Update

The controversy over the inclusion of Islamic courts in Kenya‘s proposed constitution continues to fascinate me. It brings into play so many issues about Christian-Muslim relations, constitutionalism, and Islamic law in Africa. One hell of a dissertation topic too, for anyone looking to do research on Kenya.

Matt Brown has an analysis of the controversy in The National and Eunice Machuhi and Jillo Kadida of The Daily Nation write, if I understand them correctly, that an earlier court ruling against shari’a courts will have no effect on the relevant provisions in the constitution:

On Monday, Law Society of Kenya chairman Kenneth Akide said the High Court ruling in Mombasa had clearly shown that the Judiciary has no powers to declare any section of the Constitution to be unconstitutional.

“The High Court ruling has recognised the fact that courts cannot interfere in constitution-making and emphasised the fact that this process is the preserve of Parliament,” he said.

“The Ruling puts the review process back on track and lays down the correct jurisprudence of constitution-making process in the country,” he said.

Mr Akide said the ruling had made it clear that the process of constitution-making was a preserve of the people and not courts.

NTV Kenya reports on poll results showing that 63% of Kenyans say they will vote for the constitution in the coming referendum, with voters fairly evenly divided around the shari’a courts issue. That suggests the shari’a courts will stay in the constitution. That means an end to the current round of controversy, perhaps, but maybe not an end to the issue in the long run.

Quick Thoughts: Kenya’s Islamic Courts, Arab Approval of US Leadership, Brain Gain

A few quick items:

  • The Christian Science Monitor looks at Kenya’s Islamic Courts controversy. Also at stake as Kenya moves toward approving a new constitution are issues related to abortion and land reform. Background here.
  • Gallup reports that Arab approval of US leadership is slipping. Especially sharp drops occurred in Egypt and Algeria.
  • The BBC reports on Africa’s “Brain Gain”: “Any number of Africans seek to cross the ocean and make their fortunes, never to be seen again. But when our team travelled around Africa recently to film a new TV documentary series, we found a different story. Many of the Africans I met had worked or been educated in the West and come back. Across nine African countries and a journey of 7,000 miles from Mali to South Africa, from Ghana to Ethiopia, the story was often the same. Africans were returning from working or studying abroad either for patriotic reasons or because of the growing opportunities back home.”

Feel free to treat this as an open thread for Africa news.

More on Kenya’s Islamic Courts

Yesterday I flagged this story about how Kenya’s Islamic courts are facing a legal challenge. Now there’s more: Kenya’s attorney general is contesting the lower court decision that ruled the courts illegal.

The country’s Attorney General Amos Wako said the judgement itself was unconstitutional and sets a bad precedent.

The Kenyan government – including Mr Wako – supports a draft of the constitution which includes Kadhi courts.

A group of lawyers from the International Commission of Jurists – Kenya, the Law Society of Kenya, and the Federation of Women Lawyers also weighed in, accusing the judges in the case of harboring their own political motives regarding the upcoming constitutional referendum:

“The timing is not a coincidence as the Judiciary is once more joining forces that do not want a new Constitution, which will require them to undergo vetting. If there was any doubt as to the necessity for vetting the Judiciary this has been removed by the actions of the court,” said LSK’s Lucy Kambuni.

LSK, ICJ and Fida also added that the matter pointed to infringement on the rights of one particular section of society.

“Equality of persons does not mean a commonality in values and practice. What the judges have clearly implied are that the rights of non Muslims are superior to those of the Muslim faithful and in essence proceeded to discriminate against the Muslims to have their disputes resolved according to their personal law,” Fida’s deputy executive director Claris Ogangah said.

The lawyers said that the judges were making a deliberate attempt to stall the process that would see the judicial reforms that the country has been seeking fail.

NTV Kenya has more from the attorney general:

A Blow for Kenya’s Islamic Courts

The BBC:

Kenya’s Islamic courts are illegal and discriminatory, a panel of judges has ruled.

[...]

The issue of Islamic courts has been a contentious point in the country’s new proposed constitution.

It is due to go to a referendum in August.

The Kadhi courts – set up under British colonial rule – mainly deal with matters of marriage and inheritance for Kenya’s Muslim minority.

The Christian church in Kenya brought the case to court six years ago.

I am no expert on Kenya, but it’s noteworthy that as in Nigeria the “compromises” constructed by the British colonialists are still unraveling and causing problems fifty years after independence. I know, I know, you can’t blame all of Africa’s problems on colonialism. But you also can’t ignore history, whose shadow seems to loom particularly large in disputes over law and religion.

Saturday Links: Shari’a in Sudan, Somali Pirates, Sahelian Famine, Ethiopian Elections

The BBC on alcohol brewers and shari’a law in Sudan:

It is believed many in the police have been happy to allow the brewing to continue as they profit from fines and confiscated alcohol.

And following the 2005 peace deal between the mainly Muslim north and the south where the majority is Christian or follow traditional religions, Sharia law is not supposed to be applied to non-Muslims living in the capital.

Meanwhile many Muslim Sudanese object to a zero-tolerance towards alcohol, saying it is not against their Sufi culture to drink.

“I know people who are Muslim – they drink,” says Maysara, a regular customer who acts as my translator.

“My father, my uncles – they do their prayers and they drink,” he says, adding that he knows some alcohol-brewers from Darfur who drink locally-brewed wine and beer.

“They do Ramadan and they sell alcohol,” he says.

Speaking of Sudan, a mutiny inspired by political tensions recently claimed at least eight lives.

The Somali pirates are scaring oil tankers into changing their routes. Also in Somalia, battles earlier this week killed more than a dozen people.

A few pieces on the food crisis in the Sahel: IRIN looks at Niger, ReliefWeb discusses the situation in Mauritania, and People’s Daily passes on the inspiring story of one Sahelian nation – Burkina Faso – helping another, Niger.

International Crisis Group urges a rethinking of the “LRA problem.”

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has become a regional problem that requires a regional solution. Operation Lightning Thunder, launched in December 2008, is the Ugandan army’s latest attempt to crush militarily the one-time northern Ugandan rebel group. It has been a failure. After the initial attack, small groups of LRA fighters dispersed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR), where they survive by preying on civilians. National security forces are too weak to protect their own people, while the Ugandan army, with U.S. support, is focused on hunting Joseph Kony, the group’s leader. The Ugandans have eroded the LRA’s numbers and made its communications more difficult. But LRA fighters, though disorganised, remain a terrible danger to civilians in this mostly ungoverned frontier zone. National armies, the UN and civilians themselves need to pool intelligence and coordinate their efforts in new ways if they are to end the LRA once and for all.

[...]To remove this twenty-year-old cancer, a new strategy is required that prioritises civilian protection; unity of effort among military and civilian actors within and across national boundaries; and national ownership. The LRA’s need for fresh recruits and the ability of civilians to provide the most accurate information on its activities makes protecting them both a moral imperative and a tactical necessity. Only by pooling intelligence and coordinating activities across the entire affected region can the Ugandan army, its national partners, the UN and civilians hope to rid themselves of the LRA. The Ugandan operation and UN missions, however, offer only temporary support to LRA-affected states. The latter need to put structures in place now to ensure they can cope with what is left of the organisation and its fighters when foreign militaries leave.

Moreover, even complete victory over the LRA would not guarantee an end to insecurity in northern Uganda. To do that, the Kampala government must treat the root causes of trouble in that area from which the LRA sprang, namely northern perceptions of economic and political marginalisation, and ensure the social rehabilitation of the north.

ICG goes on to make a number of recommendations.

Electoral conflicts in the run-up to the Ethiopian elections aren’t just between the regime and the opposition – the opposition is fighting itself too.

eTurboNews has a well-written piece on Senegal and sex tourism.

EU says no trade sanctions against African states.

What are you reading today?

Mali Family Code Redux

Last August, Muslim associations lead massive protests against a proposed family law code in Mali. When we left the story, pressure from these Muslim groups had persuaded President Amadou Toumani Toure to table the code, an outcome that left many Muslim groups content and many parliamentarians relieved.

Djenne, Mali

Now the family code is back:

[Mali's top Islamic] council is proposing amending articles on inheritance, marriage, adoption and family responsibilities…

Parliament is treading more carefully this time in trying to pass a new family law…Two lawmakers, one of whom is a religious leader, are to reconcile the proposed amendments, the code under draft and the existing law, which they will present to parliament for approval in April.

Political analyst and University of Bamako professor, Badra Alou Macalou, told IRIN that lawmakers were hoping to reach a consensus on the contested articles. “The president of the assembly… was clear in saying that the legislators will never adopt a code that will affect again the social climate. I think that in April if the code is not voted [on] and adopted unanimously, it will simply be shelved.”

IRIN also obtained quotes from Malians concerned about the amendments or, alternatively, skeptical that any code would do much to affect the lives of ordinary people.

Struggles over family law have a history in West Africa: Nigeria faced stormy debates on the constitutional status of shari’a law in 1960 and 1977-8 before twelve Northern states ultimately imposed broad shari’a law in 1999-2001. In any country, debates over law and religion can call secularism into question. But in Francophone countries like Senegal and Mali where postcolonial states embraced French-style laïcité, a stricter secularism than the Anglo-American model, the challenge takes on a different character.

For Senegal, Islamic leaders’ (ultimately unsuccessful) opposition to a 1972 family code caused one of the first major confrontations between religious communities and the secular state. Renewed debate over the place of Islam in Senegalese law in 2003 called laïcité into question to the extent that President Abdoulaye Wade had to state publicly that he would not revise the 1972 code because incorporating Islamic courts into the system might damage Senegal’s democracy (Gellar, Democracy in Senegal, 164).

With this background in mind, I am very curious to watch how the debate unfolds in Mali. Since Mali’s democratic transition in 1991-2, Muslim associations have been a major part of civil society in Mali, but this debate around the law seems to be their largest political mobilization to date. The Muslim associations protesting the law won the battle the first time around, and in my view did so within the confines of fair-and-square democratic mobilization. If they win again, and the code is either amended or tabled, will that represent a maintainance of the status quo, or a foreshadowing of greater Muslim involvement in politics? And if they lose, and a code is passed over their objections, will that represent a triumphant laïcité?