In addition to the nightmarish physical dangers that wartime brings, there is a conceptual danger that arises for people watching Mali at this moment: the danger of being swept up in a triumphalist narrative of good versus evil. It is one thing to know, in theory, that an American or Western European military can take territory rapidly from rebel groups; it is another to see, even from a distance, a display of Western military might unfold. To be shocked and awed by French bombs and soldiers reconquering in some eighteen days what some observers had thought might take months to do. To see the French sweep Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal without even seeming to break a sweat. It is one thing to know, in theory, that the early phases of military interventions like these often prove popular with both domestic constituencies and liberated populations; it is another to see French flags waving in Bamako, and President Francois Hollande receive a rockstar reception. There is a danger in a moment like this of falling prey to some kind of intoxication, and pretending there is no hangover to follow.
To their credit, many voices in the international media are sounding quite sober. One hears a drumbeat of stories about ethic tensions and violence in reconquered territories, particularly Timbuktu. I included several of these in my roundup on Saturday but others can be found here and here. In report after report, one reads of Tuaregs and Arabs fleeing their homes and abandoning their shops, afraid that they will be treated as Islamist sympathizers and hurt. One reads of Tuaregs and Arabs, even less lucky, who were caught and assaulted. At the same time one finds recurring allegations that Malian government soldiers have tortured or summarily executed captured Islamist fighters. Laudably, politicians like Sadou Harouna Diallo (French), the official mayor of Gao, have promised security to Arabs and Tuaregs if they return – but evidence suggests that such promises might prove hard to keep.
My fear is that actions today are sowing the seeds of conflicts tomorrow. Historical memory – and northern Mali already has memories of ethnic violence – can play a central role in generating inter-communal violence and rebellion. What memories are being made now? If efforts at national reunification and reconstruction falter, bitterness among northern communities, combined with un-addressed grievances, could plunge Mali back into crisis a few years from now.
So I am afraid that a sense of triumphalism and a focus on preparing for elections will distract much-needed attention from the humanitarian needs of people affected by the conflict. My policy recommendations are simple to state, though I realize they would be less simple to carry out: focus on feeding people, resettling them, and keeping them from killing each other. I am thinking of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
I realize that many people, and for good reason, feel a sense of urgency concerning the question of what formal political arrangement Mali will establish now. What legitimacy the interim government of President Dioncounda Traore currently has will likely only diminish over time. And I realize that plans are already in motion for elections in July. But achieving a durable peace in Mali will take more than an election; it will require a durable solution to the economic and humanitarian problems of northern Mali. There is no better time to start working on those problems than the present. It is possible to address humanitarian concerns and prepare for elections at the same time; I am, moreover, recommending that those who make decisions and distribute money give priority to the former.
To give a numerical sense of the scale of humanitarian crisis in Mali, an estimated 380,000 people have already been displaced by the conflict. If I am reading this story correctly, the UN predicts that as many as 700,000 additional Malians could be displaced by the conflict. That would mean, for a country of around 16 million, that more than one in sixteen people would be displaced. The UN also says that “Over 4.6 million people in Mali are at risk of food insecurity as a result of climatic hazards and insecurity.” 4.6 million is approaching 1 in 3. This is a reminder that Mali would be in bad shape even if there had been no war. And the war, adding tragedy to tragedy, has compounded the food crisis.
As Peter Tinti has written, applying narrow counter-terrorism paradigms to the situation in Mali is a mistake. He warns, “Any intervention not delicately calibrated to local socio-political dynamics risks exacerbating the crisis, undermining the very goals policymakers aim to achieve.”
I agree with him. And what I have written here does not even begin to get at the question of what formal political arrangements might evolve in each locality. But I would submit that addressing the immediate needs of the victims of this conflict – their needs for food, shelter, and security – is one indispensable building block of any policy with a hope of success.
Tres Thomas makes an excellent point in the comments. In addition to humanitarian concerns, there is also a need for political reconciliation:
One thing that is not talked about [in the post] is the need for reconciliation between all communities–not just between Tuaregs and the Malian government. Locals are calling for it, but countries like Switzerland and France are basically pushing MNLA-Govt negotiations before anything else. I think this artificially inflates MNLA’s influence and further exacerbates relationships between communities. There are so many past and present factors that are inflaming tensions that any peace process that excludes all these key players will be tough to watch–given the prominent locals who WANT reconciliation but haven’t given a platform to speak with their counterparts in a open, safe forum.
I agree fully. Talk to everyone.
Good post. One thing that is not talked about is the need for reconciliation between all communities–not just between Tuaregs and the Malian government. Locals are calling for it, but countries like Switzerland and France are basically pushing MNLA-Govt negotiations before anything else. I think this artificially inflates MNLA’s influence and further exacerbates relationships between communities. There are so many past and present factors that are inflaming tensions that any peace process that excludes all these key players will be tough to watch–given the prominent locals who WANT reconciliation but haven’t given a platform to speak with their counterparts in a open, safe forum.
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The sad truth is that nobody is ready to commit the resources (political or material) to make this thing work.
Along with not killing each other:
Article in French on the French soldiers concerns over the quick way their combatants disappeared.
“Says a French officer. Now fear that the French military?
They are not fools. The ease with which they took Timbuktu continues to worry about the next steps. Jihadists fled to Mauritania, Algeria, Niger and northern Mali, in the massive Ifhogas. “In my opinion, a responsible analysis at the heart of the French in Timbuktu, they fled the battle because they knew they did not have the means to confront us. And they are betting on our withdrawal from the region in the near future. In light of what I know and what I’ve seen, they have the means to beat any African army. I fear they are waiting for our departure to fight again! “.
7our gave an estimate of up to 2500 fighters in the Ifhogas area.
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