I’ve put out a new report with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation entitled “Escalating Conflicts in Burkina Faso.” I look forward to any comments that readers here might have!
Over at George Mason University’s The Maydan, I have a post exploring the power struggle between the Emir of Kano, Muhammadu Sanusi II, and the state’s governor, Abdullahi Ganduje. The post also asks how hereditary or “traditional” Muslim authority is evolving.
At the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ website, Judd Devermont and I have written a post discussing the issue of whether and how the U.S. government should get involved in efforts to regulate religion in Nigeria. The post is a lot heavier on the don’ts than on the dos.
On 23 March, attackers killed over 130 people in the central Malian villages of Ogossagou and Welingara, inhabited by members of the Peul ethnic group. The attackers were reportedly dressed as, and were most likely actual members of, the Dogon hunters’ association/militia Dan Na Ambassagou – although the group’s formal leader has denied his fighters’ involvement.
The massacre has elicited a tremendous amount of commentary, some of which I’ve rounded up here.
ACLED gives wider context about violence in the Sahel, providing key figures on casualties and trends.
Gregory Mann, at Africa Is a Country, explains and laments how the logic of the violence continues to unfold and escalate:
This—the militias, the murders, the indiscriminate score-settling that will be (and has already been) dubbed “ethnic violence”—is exactly what observers feared the most, seven years ago. This form of violence—and the army’s obvious failure to prevent it and potential complicity in it—is exactly the genie that won’t go back in the box. Who will forget the murdered village? It won’t be the end of the story, only the beginning. There will be revenge, and revenge for the revenge. Who wouldn’t, under these circumstances, create a self-defense militia? Why wouldn’t Bamana, Dogon, Minianka, Bwa look to the hunters, the donso? Why wouldn’t the Peuhl arm themselves, as they have done, as will everyone else? Reciting the holy trinity of conflict resolution—disarmament, demobilization, reintegration—sounds like so much whistling in the wind.
Gilles Yabi, at WATHI (French), puts the massacres in the wider context of abuses by both the militaries and community-based militias in Mali and Burkina Faso.
Dougoukolo Alpha Oumar Ba-Konaré, at The Conversation (French), reflects on the longer history of Peul-Dogon relations in Mopti.
At Liberation (French), a good interview with Yvan Guichaoua.
To prevent further escalation of violence, [United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Adama] Dieng urged the Malian Government – with the support of the international community, and the UN peacekeeping mission in the country, MINUSMA – to immediately address the current grave upsurge of violence in central Mali and to provide, with no further delay, protection as well as assistance to vulnerable population.
“I call on the Malian government to urgently investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of the recent attacks as well as those responsible for serious violations and abuses of human rights.” he said, adding that the authorities and all Malians should “prevent and refrain from stigmatizing entire communities”.
MENASTREAM summarizes things bluntly:
As does Andrew Lebovich:
Aurelien Tobie reflects on the role of research and researchers before and after this tragedy:
Finally, it’s worth noting that protests have occurred over this incident – protests not just in Mali but also in the diaspora. For example, Malians demonstrated in front of the Malian embassy in Mauritania last week (Arabic).
[Part of faith is] that the best of generations is the generation who saw the Messenger of God (SAW) and believed in him, then those who followed them, then those who followed them. The best of the Companions are the Orthodox, Rightly Guided Caliphs: Abu Bakr, then ‘Umar, then ‘Uthman, then ‘Ali, may God be pleased with them all. None of the Companions of the Messenger should be mentioned except in the best way, refraining [from mentioning] the [quarrels] that broke out between them…
[And another part of faith is] obedience to the imams of the Muslims among the people in charge, and their scholars, and the followers of al-salaf al-salih (the pious predecessors), imitating their traces and seeking forgiveness for them, and leaving off quarrel and controversy in religion, and leaving all that the innovators have innovated.
Salafism, right? Not in the way I define it. This is quotation from the Risala (Epistle) of ‘Abd Allah Ibn Abdi Zayd al-Qayrawani (d. 996). The Risala is one of the foundational texts of the Maliki school of Islamic law. From Mauritania to Nigeria and likely further, almost any classically trained scholar you meet (and not a few of the Salafis, I should add) has read this book. It belongs, at least in its usual context, to a tradition that blends the Maliki school with Sufism – and let us recall that Salafis often consider Sufis to be dubious Muslims at best, heretics at worst, and that many Salafis say that they do not follow any legal school, instead depending solely on the Qur’an and the Sunna.
I bring all this up because far too many analysts are quick to define Salafism as an effort to return to original Islam. Two recent examples:
- A RAND analyst, discussing Libya: “Salafi-jihadis and traditionalist Madkhalis may share ultra-conservative views, such as strictly applying Shariՙa law in everyday life, morally policing the public sphere, and returning Islam to its purist [sic?] form, during and immediately following the life of the Muslim Prophet Muhammed.”
- CSIS’ big (and flawed) report on Salafi-jihadism (p. 4): “First, the group or individual emphasizes the importance of returning to a ‘pure’ Islam, that of the Salaf, the pious ancestors.” CSIS also counts the Taliban (Deobandi by orientation, rather than Salafis) as Salafis based on this minimal definition (p. 5): “Deobandism follows a Salafist model and seeks to emulate the life and times of the Prophet Muhammad It holds that a Muslim’s primary obligation and loyalty are to his religion, and loyalty to country is always secondary.”
Such analysts are way too quick to take Salafis’ claims at face value – and they also evidence little knowledge of how other kinds of Muslims talk about the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. Most Muslims are at least nominally committed to imitating the Prophet and his Companions and avoiding “blameworthy innovations” in the religion. The important question when defining Salafism is not whether Salafis are more committed to this project than are other Muslims, but rather how/what Salafis understand the early community to have been, and how that understanding furnishes a model for action in the present. Put differently, there are a lot of Sufi Malikis in northwest Africa today who “share ultra-conservative views, such as strictly applying Shariՙa law in everyday life, morally policing the public sphere, and returning Islam to its purist [again, sic?] form, during and immediately following the life of the Muslim Prophet Muhammed.”
Now, some Salafis today are keen to reach into the past and claim figures such as al-Qayrawani as a Salafi of sorts. The Nigerian Salafi/proto-Salafi Abubakar Gumi (1924-1992) said that the Risala was one of his favorite books. But even if you, the analyst, said, “The Risala is Salafism” (I think you would be wrong, but nevermind), you would still have to confront the sociological fact that thousands of non-Salafis read, study, even memorize this book, and take what it says very seriously.
So take a little more time when you define Salafism, so that you don’t sound like you’re implicitly labeling them the most authentic Muslims.
Last month I wrote about the reported death of Yahya Abu al-Hammam, a key field commander and senior official for al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and, at the time of his death, the number two in Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa-l-Muslimin (Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims, JNIM). I wanted to flag three other pieces (all in French) for readers who are particularly interested in this issue:
- RFI gives a readout of an audio message from Malian national and (ex-?) jihadist Sidan ag Hitta, wherein he says that Abu al-Hammam is indeed dead. A bit of background on ag Hitta can be found here, but the story has many twists and turns. Telling which jihadists are alive and which are dead is trickier than ever, as anyone following Amadou Kouffa’s saga knows.
- Kibaru, citing anonymous sources, gives interesting if difficult-to-confirm details about the end of Abu al-Hammam’s life. That article goes on to speculate a bit about the future of AQIM and JNIM, and also gives a good overview of Abu al-Hammam’s jihadist career in Mali and Mauritania.
- Libération puts Abu al-Hammam’s life and death in a wider context of politics, violence, and Mali’s overall trajectory.