I’m up at Global Observatory with a piece on Chad. Here’s an excerpt:
The Chadian government is also asking Western and African donors for more development funding. Chad will hold a roundtable in Paris in September to seek contributions for its newly adopted national development plan. Potential partners have already shown a willingness to participate: Deby recently hosted the vice president of the African Development Bank, which is financing projects in Chad’s electricity sector; the Bank confirmed that it will attend the Paris roundtable. The adoption of the development plan was one factor in the IMF’s decision to grant a new loan. The IMF did not make any allusion to Chad’s role in regional security, but other actors are clearly aware of the bargaining power that Chad has with donors because of its security role. Meeting the committee organizing the roundtable, France’s ambassador to Chad asked the Chadian government—according to the paraphrase of a Chadian news site—“to avoid playing the security card.” But the card has already been played, and with effect.
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In October, I wrote about how a Chadian court had ordered an oil consortium, headed by Exxon, to pay $74 billion in back taxes and fees. At the time, Bloomberg and other outlets suggested that that figure was merely one bid in negotiations between Chad and the oil companies. That prediction may have come true, although it’s hard to tell. Le Figaro/AFP reports (French) that the Chadian government and the consortium have signed an agreement that ends the suit against the consortium and grants the consortium a permit to operate until 2050 in the Doba basin (.pdf). However, the report adds that while the suit has been dropped, there are rumors that the consortium paid $200 million to the government. The government has denied those rumors.
More details, especially about the signing of the accord, here (French).
Earlier this month, I discussed the process whereby Chad’s Moussa Faki Mahamat was elected chair of the African Union Commission.
Over at the World Policy Institute, John Mukum Mbaku has a smart post on the challenges Mahamat and the AUC will face now. Mbaku identifies five: the Western Sahara issue (now that Morocco has been readmitted to the AU); the International Criminal Court; poverty; “sectarian conflicts”; and terrorism. Here is Mbaku’s conclusion:
During the last decade, the AU has failed to confront major issues threatening peace and security in various parts of the continent. There is hope that Faki, who has gained significant experience dealing with terrorism during his chairmanship of the council of ministers of the G5 Sahel, which has been quite active in the war against terror, can provide the leadership needed to move the AU in the right direction. Some observers believe that Faki’s close working relationship with the EU and the United States in the fight against religious extremism in the Sahel could help him, as AU Commission chairperson, to secure resources for the continent’s peace and security efforts. Although he is Francophone and will be viewed by those countries as representing their interests, he is fluent in English, French, and Arabic and will be able to reach out to virtually all of the continent’s stakeholders. This is critical because dealing with the continent’s multifarious problems would require significant levels of consultation with all relevant groups. Nevertheless, some critics question whether he has the political will to democratize the AU and the continent, especially given Chad’s increasing authoritarianism—Déby has ruled Chad with a strong hand since 1990 and was reelected in April 2016 to a fifth term as president in an election that was considered by many international observers as not fair, free, or credible. Nevertheless, Faki has promised to prioritize development and stability and to undertake necessary reforms to render the AU more responsive to continental crises.
The whole post is worth a read.
Recently, Chadian President Idriss Deby reshuffled his cabinet. Part of the reshuffle was prompted by the departure of Foreign Affairs Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, who is going (with Deby’s blessing) to become the new chair of the African Union Commission.
Another factor in the reshuffle, however, was the less amicable firing of Finance and Budget Minister Mbogo Ngabo Seli (French), who had only been in his post since August 2016. Seli, it seems, had been unable to maintain a good relationship with Deby’s inner circle and had been equally unable to manage a crisis resulting from the “non-payment of salaries” to civil servants and other key personnel. That “non-payment” is a core part of the budget/austerity crisis that has evoked recurring protests in Chad in recent months, an issue I discuss here (.pdf, p. 13).
In December, there was another firing: Mines Minister Gomdigué Baïdi Lomey (French). In that case, no reasons were given.
The new government promotes Hissein Brahim Taha, the Chadian ambassador to France and a veteran diplomat, to the post of Foreign Affairs Minister. Other new and key appointments include the promotion of three senior technocrats, Christian Georges Diguibaye, Ngueto Yambaye, and Ahmat Mahamat Hassan, to the posts of Finance Minister, Minister of the Economy, and Minister of Justice, respectively. The new government also includes the famous Chadian filmmaker Mahamat Saleh Haroun to the post of Minister of Touristic, Artisanal, and Cultural Development.
The reshuffle did not affect ministers in the security and defense sphere, suggesting that the move was more about dealing with the country’s economic crisis than anything else.
On January 30, Chadian Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat was elected the new chair of the African Union Commission (a position distinct from that of AU chair, which is always a head of state and is currently Guinean President Alpha Conde). Here are some key points about how and why he was elected:
- The election (French) initially involved five candidates: Senegal’s Abdoulaye Bathily, Botswana’s Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi, Equatorial Guinea’s Agapito Mba Moku, Kenya’s Amina Mohammed, and Mahamat. After four rounds of voting, the race narrowed to Mohammed and Mahamat. After Mahamat began to pass Mohammed in the sixth round (French), she withdrew and he was elected on the seventh ballot, 39 to 15 (the 15 being abstentions). The winner needed not just a simple majority, but a majority of two-thirds (i.e., at least 36).
- As I wrote last July (paywalled), the election of a the new AU Commission chair was meant to be decided then. But West Africa balked at the list of candidates available (which included some of the candidates from this time – Venson-Moitoi and Moku – but not the others), and was not able to insert a last-minute candidate of its own.
- In a formal sense, Chad is in Central Africa rather than West Africa, but West African (and particularly Sahelian) support was crucial in Mahamat’s ultimate victory. One report (French) says that Mahamat won in part because of fragmentation within regional blocs during the early rounds – even on the first round, West Africa’s Bathily only received 10 of West Africa’s 15 votes. West Africa’s support steadily shifted to Mahamat during subsequent rounds. The same report talks about an anti-Senegal sentiment among certain key countries, reflecting displeasure with President Macky Sall’s foreign policy as well as suspicions that Senegal is too pro-Morocco (Morocco was just readmitted to the AU after a long suspension, and some countries opposed its re-entry).
- The key backers of Mahamat after round four of voting were reportedly (French) North Africa (especially Libya, Algeria, Mauritania), the Sahel, and Southern Africa, especially Angola and Mozambique. In other words, much of the continent aligned in favor of Mahamat, while Mohammed retained East African support until the end. Mahamat received only fourteen votes on the first ballot, but he emerged as a consensus candidate.
- The victory has been widely interpreted as a sign of Chad’s influence and particularly the influence of its President Idriss Deby. As RFI (French) wrote, “It is a victory for Idriss Deby who waged a discreet, but methodical campaign in favor of his protege. It is a victory for Chadian diplomacy, but still more for the Chadian army, which for five years has paid a bloody price in Africa for defending Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon against the terrorists of al-Qaida and Boko Haram. Finally, it is a victory for Francophone [Africa] because the outgoing president, Madame [Nkosazana] Dlamini-Zuma [of South Africa], did not speak a word of French.”
- Chad’s military deployments in recent years directly mapped onto the voting for Mahamat: the West African countries that supported Mahamat over Bathily included (French) Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, as well as Burkina Faso, which borders Mali and Niger and suffered a major terrorist attack in 2016. Chad’s deployments have been expensive financially, but rewarding in foreign affairs. There has been much analysis of how Chad has positioned itself as a key African counterterrorism partner for France and the United States, but clearly Chad has also positioned itself as a key ally for other African countries.
Some biographical details on Mahamat, as well as some coverage of his election, can be found in English here.
Last week the Wilson Center released its “Africa Year in Review” for 2016. The document (.pdf) features twenty-one short reflections, treating various important themes. One is by me, entitled “Austerity and Unrest in Chad” (p. 13). That piece is a sequel of sorts to posts I wrote for this blog here, here, and here.
If you read the piece, please share your comments below.
Recent weeks have seen significant backlash and protest against the Chadian government’s austerity policies.
One way to understand the backlash would be to go sector by sector: we are seeing strikes and protests by students, clerks, civil servants, magistrates, health care workers, and others. The basic grievance is unpaid salaries and/or loss of bonuses and stipends. The sum of such discontent may be greater than its parts: if enough sectors go on strike, the consequences for the machinery of government, the economy, and daily life could be severe. A sign of severe trouble may be the delays in salary payments to soldiers and even to members of the presidential guard.
Another way to understand the backlash would be to focus on its politics. The government of Chad would like Chadians to understand the austerity measures as a result of external shocks, especially the global drop in oil prices. The opposition (or at least part of it) would like the population to understand the economic crisis as a result of the government’s policies, and especially in terms of the government’s management of oil revenues and its military spending, including military expeditions outside Chad. Amid the struggle to determine perceptions of the crisis and to allocate blame, one key arena is the National Assembly, where roughly twenty opposition deputies have backed a motion to censure Prime Minister Pahimi Padacké Albert over the government’s handling of the economic situation. From what I can tell now, the motion has been held up, and the opposition has involved the Constitutional Council to try to force the transmission of the motion to the government itself. I doubt that the motion will pass, but it is a symbol of some of the discontent in the country.