Portraits of Malian Refugee Camps in Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso

Alongside armed conflict in northern Mali, Mali and its neighbors are experiencing a refugee crisis. I keep bringing this up in an effort to ensure that the scale of the crisis will not be ignored. UNHCR’s country pages for Mali and Mauritania show that massive numbers of people have been displaced: over 200,000 inside Mali, 70,000 Malian refugees in Mauritania, 50,000 in Niger, and 40,000 in Burkina Faso. Those numbers are all expected to rise by year’s end, to a total of approximately 540,000.

A few portraits from camps:

Niger:

The Mangaïze camp was officially created in May, following an influx of a large number of Malian families fleeing to Niger, said Idrissa Abou, a member of Niger’s National Commission for Refugees.
Besides a monthly food ration, refugees have access to drinking water from three small boreholes and primary health care. There are sanitation facilities with 250 showers and toilets, and a household waste management system. Refugees also have access to administrative services, a school and, with the opening of a police station, a security service.

“At the moment, there are 1,522 families, which amounts to a population of 6,037 mainly made up of Malian refugees, but there are also Nigerien returnees,” Abou told IPS, adding that an overwhelming majority of the refugees are from Ménaka, the closest Malian town to the Ouallam municipality in south-western Niger. He added that the numbers in the camp had increased in February after some 1,700 refugees from the nearby Bani Bangou camp were transferred to Mangaïze.

Mauritania:

Nearly 67,000 refugees—mainly women and children—have arrived in the border town of Fassala, Mauritania, since January 2012. “At the border crossing at Fassala, Mauritania, people are arriving thirsty and showing signs of fatigue,” explains Karl Nawezi, MSF project manager in Mauritania. After being registered by the authorities, refugees wait in a transit camp before being transferred to Mbera, a small, isolated village in the Mauritanian desert, just 30 kilometers [about 19 miles] from the Mali border.

The refugees in Mbera are totally dependent on humanitarian aid. An insufficient number of tents has been distributed, however. Families are assembled under large tents called “meeting points” that leave them exposed to the elements. Fed up with waiting, some construct their own makeshift shelters out of straw mats and pieces of fabric to protect themselves from sand and dust storms. “In Mauritania, as is the case elsewhere [in the Sahel refugee camps], people are suffering from diarrhea, respiratory infections, and skin infections because of the poor conditions in the camps,” says Nawezi.

And France24 has a video report from Burkina Faso here.

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Quick Items: Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz on Mali, Goodluck Jonathan Visits Yobe and Borno [Updated]

Two noteworthy stories:

Mauritania and Mali

In a speech on Monday, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz expressed greater openness than in the recent past to the idea of Mauritanian deployments in Mali. Mauritanian forces chased fighters from Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb into northern Mali at several points in 2010 and 2011, but during 2012 Abdel Aziz stated repeatedly that Mauritania would not intervene in Mali.

On Monday Abdel Aziz also emphasized his country’s role in “encircling [hardline Islamist fighters] in the north of Mali in order to enable Malian units to intervene and finish them off in their dens.” ANI (Arabic) has more on the speech.

Nigeria

On February 28, governors from an alliance of Nigerian opposition parties held a day-long conference in the northeastern city of Maiduguri, epicenter of the violent Boko Haram sect. The Nigerian newspaper Daily Trust commented, “the fact that the governors took the bull by the horns and held their meeting in Maiduguri, despite security reports that there may be attacks and blasts by suspected insurgents speak volume of their determination to give the [ruling] Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) a run for its money.”

Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan is set to visit the northeastern states of Yobe and Borno (where Maiduguri is the capital) today. One source says this visit “will be his first to the troubled states since his assumption of office.” Residents in Borno and Yobe interviewed by Leadership expressed a range of views about the visit, with some optimistic that Jonathan may use the moment to announce compensation programs or other initiatives, and others fearful that the visit will bring an even tighter security lockdown.

The Sultan of Sokoto, meanwhile, called on Jonathan this week to offer an amnesty to Boko Haram fighters. The Sultan said, “If there is amnesty declared we believe so many of those young men who have been tired of running and hiding will come out and embrace that amnesty.”

UPDATE: Reuters:

“I cannot talk about amnesty with Boko Haram now until they come out and show themselves,” Jonathan told reporters in Yobe state capital Damaturu, a town regularly hit by the sect’s guerrilla-style bomb and gun attacks.

See also Chike’s remarks in the comments section below.

A Call for De-Salafization in Mauritania

Mauritania’s Al Akhbar (Arabic) reports that a group of political and human rights activists in that country have released a statement calling for “confronting Salafi thought.” These campaigners “expressed their displeasure with the security services’ tolerance of ‘activists for the idea of hatred’.” I could not find the text of the statement. The signatories, as mentioned by Al Akhbar, include prominent anti-slavery activists like Boubacar Ould Messaoud (bio in French here) and Biram Ould Abeid (article on him in French here).

As described in the article, the statement links the spread of “Salafi culture” (issues of dress, gender, etc.) with political “extremism” and with forced Arabization of black Africans. “The utopia Salafis preach is founded on nothing but the ruins of African culture, through a continuous, deceitful Arabizing process characterized by terrifying the masses and tearing them away from their roots.”

It is no accident that the statement comes in the context of military intervention in neighboring Mali. Its signers support the intervention. The statement frames Islamist rule in northern Mali as part of the effort to enforce Arabization against black Africans.

Mauritanian authorities have arrested a few Salafis in recent weeks on suspicions of having links to jihadist groups. This does not mean that anti-slavery activists’ concerns are driving state policy. Anti-slavery activists in Mauritania have their own difficulties with the state – Abeid was detained for four months in 2012 (.pdf) over politico-religious controversies, and there is a long history of racial tensions in Mauritania. It should also be said that if authorities detain Salafis with family ties to imprisoned jihadists, or arrest students, that is not necessarily a country-wide crackdown on Salafis. Yet anti-Salafi discourses do seem to be coming from several corners of Mauritanian society right now, and as the war in Mali continues we may hear more calls for de-Salafization in Mauritania.

A Mauritanian Convoy to Gaza

For some time now I have been following the Mauritanian Salafi Sheikh Muhammad al Hasan Ould Dedew and the country’s Islamist Tewassoul Party, for which Sheikh Dedew acts as a spiritual mentor. One important aspect of Islamist activism in Mauritania is Islamists’ deep concern with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This concern has taken the form of protests, including pressure on the Mauritanian government to break ties with Israel (Mauritania recognized Israel in 1999 and suspended relations in 2009), and in the form of trips by Mauritanian Islamist delegations to Palestine. For example, Tewassoul’s Vice President Mohamed Ghoulam Ould Hadj was on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla in 2010.

I was therefore interested to read in the Mauritanian press (Arabic) about a convoy recently organized in part by Mauritania’s National League for the Assistance of the Palestinian People. The convoy’s members traveled to Gaza earlier this month to distribute aid and attend events such as the December 8 rally celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Hamas’ founding. The convoy included Sheikh Dedew, as head of the delegation, Ould Hadj (who heads the League), and Saleh Ould Hannena of the Hatem Party (Arabic; Wikipedia bio here). Worth noting is that both Hamas and Tewassoul have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood.

The delegation returned to Mauritania yesterday. You can read a first-person account of the first leg of the trip here (Arabic), and more coverage of the return (with photographs) here (Arabic). The press refers to the delegation as the “Shinqit Convoy 3,” suggesting there were two previous delegations, though I have not been able to find references to them online.

This video contains interviews, in Arabic, with participants in the convoy, including Ould Hadj, a student leader, and others. I have embedded Sheikh Dedew’s speech at the Hamas rally below.

I have no major analytical point to make about the convoy – and I am not trying to gin up any alarm over Tewassoul’s contact with Hamas. My interest is in three issues: (1) how different Muslim movements and communities respond to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even in places the international media often treats as peripheral; (2) how Tewassoul’s activism on Palestine relates to its broader position within Mauritanian domestic politics; and (3) how Sheikh Dedew frames his interventions on the Palestine issue, and how this issue relates to his broader self-presentation as a religious leader. The convoy is one data point to consider in thinking about those questions.

Mauritania: Complaints from the Opposition of President Abdel Aziz’s Absence

Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who was shot by soldiers on October 13, continues to recuperate in a Paris hospital, where according to his son he is doing well. As the President’s absence lingers on, though, the opposition is beginning to make complaints and call for the establishment of a transitional framework.

The Coordination of the Democratic Opposition (CDO), an umbrella group for opposition parties, began to ask for an investigation soon after the shooting. Opposition leaders have continued to press for information. Messaoud Boulkheir, president of the National Assembly and leader of the People’s Progressive Alliance, spoke with Abdel Aziz by telephone (French) on October 31. Boulkheir expressed frustration that he had not been able to speak with the President earlier.

In addition to requesting information, the opposition has started to formulate demands. Reuters writes that demonstrators in Nouakchott yesterday called not only for more information, but for an end to the military’s role in politics (Abdel Aziz, formerly a general in the armed forces, originally came to power in a military coup in 2008). Reuters adds that Boulkheir’s report of a conversation with Abdel Aziz came as an attempt “to calm the country’s citizens.” ANI, meanwhile, reports (Arabic) that the COD “doubts the official story of the President’s accident and calls for the establishment of a new transitional stage.” ANI quotes opposition leader Saleh Ould Hannena as calling for this transition, Islamist leader Jamil Mansour as calling for the army to distance itself from politics, and opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah as calling for dialogue. More, in French, here (h/t Boc@r and Peter Tinti).

How long can Abdel Aziz stay out of the country without precipitating major alarm or unrest? Kal writes that for the moment,

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mohamed Ghazouani is the man in charge and among opposition types and some closer to the government there is a feeling that Ould Abdel Aziz is a dangerous position, and that remaining abroad too long could invite coup plots, political unrest or attacks from AQIM. Key variables at this point include the political ambitions of Gen. Ghazouani and the loyalty of the armed forces and intelligence service to the president – especially the commando units and BASEP (the republican guards), which Ould Abdel Aziz founded and led until ‘leaving’ army in 2009.

 

The 2006 Mauritanian constitution (English text here, French text here), which I believe to be the one in operation (I am not sure), has this to say about the incapacity of the president (Part II):

Article 40: In case of vacancy or incapacity declared permanent by the Constitutional Council, the President of the Senate as
acting President of the Republic for the current business. Prime Minister and members of Government, considered resigning, ensure the current business.
The Acting President may not terminate their appointments. He can take the people by referendum, nor dissolve the National Assembly.
The election of new President of the Republic shall, except in cases of force majeure declared by the Constitutional Council within three (3) months from the declaration of the vacancy or permanent incapacity.
During the interim period, no constitutional amendment can not intervene either by referendum or by parliamentary vote.
Article 41: The Constitutional Council, to find a vacancy or permanent incapacity, is seized by either:
· The President of the Republic;
· President of the National Assembly;
· Prime Minister

How this works in practice is not clear to me and may, I suspect, not be clear to others, which could occasion some serious debate if Abdel Aziz’s stay outside the country goes on for long.

Looking around the region, there are no comparative cases that I can think of that are relevant to Mauritania’s situation. When Guinea’s military leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara was shot in the head on December 3, 2009, it was not until January 16, 2010 that he formally renounced power – though, in retrospect, it seems clear that his power was gone well before that. Dadis’ case, though, seems very dissimilar to Abdel Aziz’s, given that Abdel Aziz enjoyed much greater legitimacy before his wounding and that his wound appears less serious. Another possible comparison might be Nigeria’s President Umaru Yar’Adua, who convalesced in Saudi Arabia from November 23, 2009 to February 24, 2010. Vice President Goodluck Jonathan was appointed Acting President on February 9, 2010, and became President on Yar’Adua’s death on May 5 2010. But Yar’Adua’s case does not seem very relevant to Abdel Aziz’s either; Yar’Adua was a very sick man, but he was not a victim of violence. The relevant point from Nigeria’s experience may be, again, the passionate legal disputes that Yar’Adua’s absence evoked.

All this may be moot – Abdel Aziz may be back in Mauritania, and back in full command, quite soon. But the longer he is gone, the louder the complaints from the opposition will become, and the greater the uncertainty in the streets.

Secretary Clinton, Algeria, and Mali

As Mali’s interlocking crises continue and regional and international powers work to plan a military intervention for 2013, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Algeria yesterday. The State Department has the text of Sec. Clinton’s remarks following her meeting with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. An excerpt:

We had an in-depth discussion of the region, particularly the situation in Mali. I very much appreciated the President’s analysis, based on his long experience, as to the many complicated factors that have to be addressed to deal with the internal insecurity in Mali and the terrorist and drug trafficking threat that is posed to the region and beyond. And we have agreed to continue with in-depth expert discussions, to work together bilaterally and with the region – along with the United Nations, and the African Union, and ECOWAS – to determine the most effective approaches that we should be taking.

Reuters quotes an anonymous US official:

“The secretary underscored … that it is very clear that a political process and our counter-terrorism efforts in Mali need to work in parallel,” the official said.

“We have an awful lot at stake here, and an awful lot of common interests, and there’s a strong recognition that Algeria has to be a central part of the solution,” the senior U.S. official told reporters traveling with Clinton.

VOA and AP have more.

Algerian-Malian relations are increasingly a subject of discussion in the international media and in US policy circles. The Moor Next Door recently rounded up new reports on the topic by Dr. Anouar Boukhars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the journalist Peter Tinti, Alexis Arieff of the Congressional Research Service, and others.

Finally, it is worth mentioning Mauritania in the context of Sec. Clinton’s visit to Algeria. Prior to the shooting of Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz on October 13, Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights María Otero had been scheduled to visit Mauritania from October 15-17. The visit has been postponed. While Otero’s stated agenda for discussion emphasized Mauritanian domestic issues, the trip – which the State Department called “the most senior-level U.S. State Department visit to Mauritania in five years” – would, I imagine, have touched on Mauritania’s relations with Mali as well. Additionally, General Carter Ham of US AFRICOM visited Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria in September, a tour that focused on the Malian crises. Senior US officials, in other words, are regularly reaching out to northwest African governments in connection with Mali, especially (but not only) Algeria, a key US partner on security issues in the region.

Contrasting President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and Captain Amadou Sanogo

My colleague Andrew Lebovich and I were at the Center for African Studies at the University of Florida last week. I mention this not only to highlight the work the Center is doing, including on the Sahel, but also because a number of conversations I had with students and faculty there have affected my thinking on current issues in the Sahel. One conversation dealt with the contrast between Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, recently in the news after soldiers shot him, and Captain Amadou Sanogo, leader of the March 22 coup in southern Mali. The contrast raises important questions about how leadership structures in the Sahel evolve and how they interact with international norms.

General (now President) Abdel Aziz and Captain Sanogo both led military coups. Yet the differences between Abdel Aziz and Sanogo are large. The former was a senior officer, the latter a mid-level one. The former participated in a well-organized, premeditated, and successful coup (in 2005) before leading another successful one in August 2008; the latter came to power in what many view as an “accidental” coup. Within days of their respective coups, Abdel Aziz and Sanogo both promised that elections would be held quickly; but while Mauritania’s military leadership was willing to weather a period of international economic sanctions as it planned a transition, Mali’s junta rapidly gave in to economic and political pressure from the Economic Community of West African States and agreed on April 6 to hand over power (at least nominally) to a transitional civilian government headed by interim President Dioncounda Traore.

Abdel Aziz outlasted international pressure and legitimated his rule, at least formally, by winning the July 2009 presidential election as a civilian. Foreign donors began to resume aid within months of the election. Abdel Aziz has received important visits from European and American government personnel and military commanders interested in seeking his opinion and cooperation on security issues. International powers, in contrast, have been keen to sideline Sanogo in favor of civilian politicians. Abdel Aziz has (until now) wielded clear authority in Mauritania, partly due to outside powers treating him as a legitimate ruler, while the question of who rules southern Mali has remained blurred since April. Sanogo is, along with President Traore and Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra, one of three key political figures in southern Mali, but his formal role is heavily circumscribed.

Why did Abdel Aziz attain the status of a recognized president while Sanogo did not? Abdel Aziz’s path was undoubtedly made easier by the fact that his country did not face a major armed rebellion as Mali did when Sanogo took over in March 2012. I would also suggest that Abdel Aziz had a more sophisticated understanding of the international system and a more organized approach to taking and maintaining power. Abdel Aziz stressed his resolve to combat terrorism, projected a sense of direction and organization, and moved through a political transition which, even though some regarded it as mere pageantry, proceeded in an orderly fashion. Sanogo and his clique offered democratic verbiage (naming their junta the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and the State) and promised to reunify Malian territory after military triumphs by Tuareg separatists in the north. Yet the Malian junta projected an image of disorganization and inexperience, and regional and international actors quickly decided that it lacked credibility.

Another difference I would point to is the different expectations and perceptions outsiders may have held concerning these two countries. Mauritania was under military rule from 1978 to 2007, and experienced numerous coups. Mali, in contrast, had been considered a model for West African democracy since 1992. The coup in Mali horrified international observers, and attracted their attention, to a degree that the 2008 coup in Mauritania did not. International actors were probably less prone to “forgive” Sanogo than Abdel Aziz.

Finally, one should note that the “success” of coup-leader-turned-legitimate-President Abdel Aziz in Mauritania may prove fleeting, or at least vulnerable to the bullets of soldiers plotting a new coup, terrorists attempting an assassination, incompetents firing irresponsibly, or some combination of the above. If one lesson is that some coup leaders are more successful than others based on circumstances, background, and strategy, another lesson is that no one is invulnerable.