On Salafism and Terrorism in Mali: A Response to the Monkey Cage

On November 20, a team of gunmen stormed the Radisson Blu hotel in Mali’s capital Bamako, taking hostages and killing twenty people. The tragedy reflects the complex aftermath of Mali’s 2012-2013 civil war, which was centered in the northern part of the country, but which has left in its wake a nationwide terrorism problem.

There has been much helpful commentary on the attack, and there has been some unhelpful commentary. In the latter category is a piece published on the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, entitled “After this month’s attack in Bamako, what do we know about fundamentalist Islam in Mali?” The author, a University of Florida political scientist named Sebastian Elischer, unfairly links some non-violent Malian Muslim political activists to terrorism. By “fundamentalism,” Elischer means Salafism, a literalist form of Sunni Islam.

Elischer’s argument is politically dangerous. He writes in the context of a wider environment in which many observers assume that Salafism, a theological position, predisposes its adherents to jihadism, a form of violent politics. This assumption is wrong: as Jacob Olidort has pointed out, if the hundreds of thousands of non-violent Salafis around the world “were involved in forming political parties or in direct violent activity, the world would look very different” (p. 4, footnote 1).

The fact that the majority of Salafis reject jihadism has been largely ignored amid the media’s and the terror-ology industry’s constant equations of Muslim activism with violence. This environment makes it easy for various governments to justify crackdowns against a wide swath of activists, regardless of whether or not they are involved in violent jihad. This environment also distorts Western policymakers’ understandings of the roots of jihadism and terrorism. The current and naïve framework of “countering violent extremism” has yielded many failures, and these failures stem in part from the assumption that the “wrong beliefs” are the main factor in people’s embrace of violence.

Elischer, of course, denies that he is engaging in guilt by association. But listen to the language he uses:

The political Salafists in Bamako are not behind the recent attacks on the Radisson. But they provide an ideology that opposes democracy and secularism — two major achievements of Mali’s political trajectory in the past two decades. Nonetheless, the international community should note that the forces seeking to destabilize Mali are not just isolated in far-flung northern regions but are actually not that far from the presidential palace.

Let us pause briefly here to ask how one ought to explain the Radisson Blu attack. First, one should start by elaborating the histories and agendas of the groups that have claimed responsibility and have previously been involved in violence. One should then contextualize these groups’ violence within the broader history of politics and conflict in Mali during the colonial and post-colonial periods, with particular emphasis on the period 2011-present. One should also make appropriate reference to how the aftermath of Algeria’s “Black Decade” of the 1990s has affected Mali, especially in terms of the spillover of Algerian-led jihadist groups into northern Mali and their long-term efforts to implant themselves in local communities there. In his effort to link southern Salafis to terrorism, Elischer skims over or neglects the relevant history.

The villain in Elischer’s piece is Mahmoud Dicko, a southern Salafi cleric who serves as president of Mali’s High Islamic Council. Dicko is a major Malian public figure who is, by all accounts, uninvolved in jihadist activity – and who has publicly condemned the Radisson attack. In Elischer’s eyes, however, Dicko’s political activities are anti-democratic and “destabilizing.”

Dicko is not going to be any Western policymaker, academic, or human rights activist’s ideal of a “moderate Muslim.” Dicko linked the Radisson attack, for example, to what he calls the Western world’s “promotion of homosexuality.” Dicko envisions and works toward a Mali that is religiously and socially conservative.

But are Dicko’s actions anti-democratic? Elischer writes that Dicko and his camp seek “to impose fundamentalist Islamic beliefs on society by asserting a role in the political sphere.” Doesn’t everyone who participates in politics seek to impose some kind of belief system on their society? In a U.S. context, I want everyone to have free medical care, housing, and a minimum income – and if I can help get politicians elected who support those views, then I am willing to have that system “imposed” on voters who disagree with it. That’s how politics works: even in a democracy, some people don’t get their way.

The issue raised by people like Dicko is what happens when democratic contexts coincide with mobilization in the name of illiberal values. What happens, in other words, when a group of Malian Muslims mobilizes to protest a family code that would give greater rights to women, as happened in 2009? Dicko helped lead a campaign that pressured former President Amadou Toumani Toure to back down and amend the proposed code in a more conservative direction, in line with the wishes of Dicko and others. Such changes, however, were accomplished without significant violence. Arguably, that’s just democracy in action – but for Elischer, all of Dicko’s political actions constitute an inappropriate fusion of religion and politics, a form of “intimidation” against the government, and/or a nefarious “influence” over elected officials and civil servants.

Worth adding, too, is that Dicko is not the only proponent of social conservatism in Mali. Does anyone think that Sufi shaykhs in Mali, or post-Sufi media stars like Shaykh Cherif Haidara, are going to be lining up to advocate for the rights of homosexuals in Mali? Dicko and the Salafis, after all, were far from the only voices arguing against the more liberal family code. And if we’re talking about threats to democracy in Mali, then surely the politicians who steal public money, the junior army officers who staged a coup in 2012, to say nothing of the northern jihadists and separatists, deserve some mention. With secularism, finally, one might ask whether Mali must remain beholden to the version of secularism it inherited from France, or whether the country’s vast Muslim majority has some right to reimagine the relationship of religion and politics in their country.

Elischer’s own orientation, ironically, is nakedly anti-liberal. In his recent article for African Affairs, he suggests that the state of Islamic affairs was better in Sahelian countries like Niger during the 1970s and 1980s, when an alliance of military rulers and Sufi shaykhs could more tightly regulate the religious sphere. Elischer implies that the free of exchange of ideas – allowing Salafis to compete for political and social influence – is inherently dangerous and “destabilizing.” Some societies, we hear, need top-down control and a class of state-appointed “good Muslims” to keep the “bad Muslims” in check.

The ultimate problem with Elischer’s analysis of Salafism is this implicit “good Muslim, bad Muslim” dichotomy. His approach to Salafism is too simple. In his Monkey Cage piece and elsewhere, he relies on an outdated typology of Salafis from 2006, which classifies Salafis into “purists/quietists” (allegedly apolitical preachers oriented toward moral reform), “politicos” (politically engaged preachers), and “jihadis.” As I told Elischer in person at the fall 2015 meeting of the American Political Science Association, recent work has challenged this typology, showing that “purists” participate in politics, that “jihadis” can be “quietists,” and that it’s tricky to assess how theology might inform violence.

Nevertheless, the tripartite typology persists. Elischer invokes it to suggest that Salafis exist along a spectrum from quietism to jihadism, and that the more they participate in politics, the closer they move to jihadism. The case of Dicko should show why that’s too simple: Dicko participates in politics a lot, but he condemns jihadism and in no way seems to be veering toward terrorism. For Elischer and others who are suspicious of all Salafis, however, Salafis’ political behavior will always be interpreted as inherently suspect. In this worldview, other actors participate in politics with integrity, but the Salafis enter politics with the end goal of undermining democracy. If one holds Salafis to be inherently anti-democratic, then they can never prove their democratic bonafides – they will always be asked to defend themselves from the claim that they are potential terrorists.

In this, Elischer’s analysis echoes a wider claim echoed across various media outlets. It is not just Salafis, but all Muslims, who face intensive scrutiny about their relationship to violence. I commend Omid Safi’s question to the reader, “I wonder what [that relentless scrutiny] says about our preconceived notion of a majority of Muslims worldwide secretly being complicit regardless of what they do, regardless of what they say, and regardless of how many of their leading scholars, imams, and experts are denouncing the practices of ISIS” – or any terrorist group.

Returning to Mali, how are policymakers supposed to act on Elischer’s analysis? The “international community” is supposed to “note” the “destabilizing” influence of Dicko and other Salafis in southern Mali. Then what? Demand that Malian politicians repudiate Dicko? Seek to influence elections to the High Islamic Council? Advocate for the arrest of non-violent Salafi preachers? Elevate Sufi Muslims and empower them to marginalize Salafis within Malian institutions and public life? Would any of those actions make it less likely that jihadist groups would storm hotels in Bamako? Or would this kind of suspicion of non-violent Salafis make it even harder to resolve Mali’s many interlocking crises?

Analysts and policymakers desperately need more complicated maps of the religious and political terrain of the Sahel. Nearly a decade into my thinking about the region, I realize how little I understand. But I do believe that “good Muslim/bad Muslim” dichotomies serve everyone poorly, and can have dangerous and unintended consequences when applied in policy.

Observations from Ouagadougou: Preliminary Legislative Results and the President Elect

[This guest post is part of a series on Burkina Faso’s 2015 Elections. My colleague Daniel Eizenga, a Research Associate with the Sahel Research Group and Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Florida, has been based in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou since August 2015 conducting dissertation research. He has generously offered to share his observations from the ground as the elections take place. Readers and journalists may contact Dan at: deizenga at ufl dot edu.  – Alex]

Date: Wednesday, December 2, 2015 at 8:33 AM UTC

On Sunday, November 29th somewhere close to sixty percent of registered voters cast their ballots in Burkina Faso’s presidential and legislative elections. Reports from around the country, and in the international media praised the free, fair, transparent and peaceful electoral process. While the results of the legislative elections are still being tallied, just after midnight on the 1st of December the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI) announced that the preliminary results gave Roch Marc Christian Kaboré of the Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP) just over 53 percent of the votes cast in the presidential poll.

Kaboré avoided heading to a runoff election by securing a majority, catching a number of analysts both Burkinabè and international, myself included, by surprise. Most of those following the election assumed a second round would need to take place between Kaboré and his closest rival the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement’s (UPC) candidate, Zéphirin Diabré. Even more surprising is how effectively the MPP won its majority. Diabré received slightly less than thirty percent of the vote according to the CENI and some quick electoral math demonstrates that the UPC trailed the MPP by a large margin—more than 23 points.

Out of the twelve other presidential candidates the next largest percentage—just over three percent—went to Tahirou Barry, a young lawyer who entered the political circuit following the popular insurrection of October 2014. Longtime Compoaré-opponent and leader of the Union pour le Renaissance – Parti Sankariste, Bénéwendé Sankara, fell to fourth place, winning just under three percent. No other candidate received more than two percent of the vote. Prior to the elections many people guessed that these would be the top four candidates, but few assumed that the large pool of presidential hopefuls would hurt the UPC more than the MPP. Hindsight, it seems, remains 20/20.

As I mentioned in my previous post, the MPP is composed almost entirely of former CDP members. The CDP is the former ruling party which was barred from presenting a presidential candidate in this election because it supported former president Blaise Compaoré’s attempt to modify the constitution to remain in power. When the MPP leadership resigned from the CDP in early 2014, alongside some 75 other CDP members, they brought significant human and financial resources with them. Fast-forward through the popular insurrection which forced Compaoré to resign and the subsequent political transition during which the CDP lost a significant amount of its political influence, and it becomes clear that the MPP became the logical home for many politicians jumping ship from the sinking CDP. Since the CDP permeated the entire country under Compaoré, the ability of the MPP to incorporate even a portion of the CDP’s network meant it held a strong advantage nationally over the other parties.

The leaders of the MPP held another important factor for winning the vote in the countryside: political recognition. Kaboré, as a member of the CDP and during Blaise Compaoré’s tenure as president, held the positions of Prime Minister, President of the National Assembly and more recently the President of the CDP. As a neighbor of mine explained, “For those in the countryside who spent their entire lives voting for Blaise, the change to Kaboré makes sense because they already know him. He was with Blaise. As Zéph[irin Diabré] said, a vote for Kaboré is a vote for continuity through change.” While my neighbor is not entirely unbiased, her point, I think, is valid. Since its leaders previously held several government positions, the MPP successfully campaigned on its ability to run the country and maintain stability. For those in the countryside with little interest in the politics of Ouaga, a vote for Roch was the closest option to a vote for Blaise.

Still, the MPP will face some immediate and long-term challenges now that its fight for the presidential palace is coming to a close. Many of their specific policy proposals such as creating teaching positions for all unemployed persons holding a certain level of education, are targeted at ameliorating rampant unemployment, especially amongst the growing population of urban youth. These policies will take time to implement and will undoubtedly face challenges along the way. Consequently, the ability of the MPP to appease the immediate demands of an urban youth which now has the experience of creating political change by taking to the streets, will be paramount in the next few months and years. It’s not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Kaboré and his MPP co-leaders’ past connections to the former regime quickly transform into a political liability in eyes of an urban youth movement.

Another challenge will be the ability of the MPP to organize an effective government and form productive coalitions at the Nation Assembly. Thanks to a massive effort from the CENI and the additional hi-tech observation of an informed and active civil society, the electoral process advanced without significant irregularities giving Burkina Faso, arguably, the best organized elections in its history. In light of this, nearly all of the presidential candidates opted for offering their congratulations to MPP and Kaboré rather than contesting the preliminary results. That does not mean, however, that establishing legislative coalitions will proceed as smoothly.

Results for the legislative seats continue to be counted today, but an interesting trend to follow will be the performance of the CDP in the elections. According to local radio station, Omega FM, as of 7 AM this morning preliminary results from the CENI show the CDP to be the third largest party in the National Assembly behind the MPP in the lead and the UPC in second. Importantly, no single political party holds a majority of seats, but there still remains 28 seats for which the preliminary votes have not yet been tallied. A online local media outlet stated the remaining seats belong to the provinces of Kadiogo (Ouagadougou’s province) and Gnagna, as well as the National seats. If the proportion of seats remains the same as the final 28 seats are decided, the role of the CDP will be both important and potentially disruptive in the National Assembly.

The chances of an MPP-CDP legislative alliance appear to be remote, given that the MPP effectively rose to power by undercutting the political support of the CDP. Yet, the two parties share ideological positions, policies, and a political history. Alternatively, the UPC which is the natural leader of an opposition under a MPP majority, previously led the opposition when the CDP was in power and stands to gain very little politically from any kind of cooperation with the CDP. All of a sudden, it seems that every seat counts in a previously lopsided National Assembly.

In its worst possible outcome this could lead to political deadlock featuring votes of no confidence and failed attempts at consensus politics. But in the best potential outcome it could mean the legislature receives more political bargaining power and importance in a political system which has historically been dominated by the executive.

Despite the first round presidential victory for the MPP, these initial legislative results point to an increasingly plural and potentially competitive political system in Burkina Faso. We cannot know for sure until the final counts are in, but in the meantime it’s possible to think that Burkinabè citizens may see both continuity and change in their political future.

 

Observations from Ouagadougou: The Days before the Election

[This guest post is part of a series on Burkina Faso’s 2015 Elections. My colleague Daniel Eizenga, a Research Associate with the Sahel Research Group and Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Florida, has been based in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou since August 2015 conducting dissertation research. He has generously offered to share his observations from the ground as the elections take place. Readers and journalists may contact Dan at: deizenga at ufl dot edu.  – Alex]

Date: Thursday, November 26, 2015 at 4:33 PM UTC

With only a few days left before presidential and legislative elections take place Sunday, 29 November, political campaigns in Burkina Faso are in full swing. So, I thought I’d offer some observations on a few of the big issues confronting political parties, candidates, and voters ahead of Election Day.

There are fourteen candidates making a run for the presidential palace, but most analysts and Burkinabè agree that the two front runners for the presidential election are the Union pour le Progrès et le Changement’s (UPC) Zéphirin Diabré and the Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès’s (MPP) Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Both candidates have been considered the most likely to win since the current transitional government was established in November 2014. Since the official campaign began over two weeks ago, both presidential candidates have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from the former ruling party, the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP). Yet in reality, neither party offers much of a change.

The MPP’s strategy relies primarily on touting the fact that the party formed following the massive resignation of former CDP members who stood up to former president Blaise Compaoré’s attempt to remain in power. The subsequent creation of the MPP and its outspoken opposition to another term for Compaoré, helped to insure that it was not excluded from the upcoming elections like other former CDP-supporters and party members. It’s also helped the MPP, a party composed almost entirely of former CDP members, distance themselves from association with the former regime, despite the active role its leaders played in Compaoré’s government for decades.

The three leaders of the MPP—Kaboré, Salif Diallo and Simon Compaoré— are all well-known politicians who worked very closely with the Compaoré regime in which each held at different times leadership positions. In fact in 2010, Kaboré, as the president of the CDP, was one of the first public figures to openly call for Compaoré to modify the constitution and run for another term. And, while in general, it is unpopular to be associated with the former ruling party, it is precisely the MPP’s direct connection to the CDP which is responsible for its potential electoral strength.

After twenty-seven years as the ruling party, the CDP developed a massive network of both human and financial resources. Kaboré, Diallo, and Simon Compaoré, long-time party barons of the CDP, brought much of that resource base with them when they led the resignation movement in January 2014.

In addition to their resource base, the MPP’s leadership also profits from a more intangible political good: their reputation. The leaders of the MPP often publically reference their experience managing the administration of the state and government when comparing themselves to their political opponents. And it’s true that they are amongst the few candidates who can claim to have experience governing the country, but behind these multi-layered references is also a warning to their political foes: join us and reap the rewards, cross us and face the consequences.

When the leaders of the MPP were leaders of the CDP, they were well known for their patronage and in contrast, their retribution. As one Burkinabè businesswoman told me, “The people are scared of the MPP…that’s why no one talks about how close they were with Compaoré. [Kaboré and Diallo] only care about getting their political revenge and they will humiliate anyone in their way.”

It seems that in a slightly ironic twist, the past semi-authoritarian practices of the CDP remain so pervasive in Burkinabè political memory that the MPP leaders can now denounce the former ruling party and simultaneously benefit from the role they played in both its rise to power and its fall from grace.

Meanwhile, the UPC and Diabré continue to trumpet their role as the leader of the political opposition during the last two years of Compaoré’s rule. The party often cites Diabré’s former position as the Chef de File de l’Opposition and his role in organizing and leading demonstrations and protests against Compaoré’s bid to modify the constitution. Following legislative elections in 2012, the UPC won more seats in the National Assembly than any other single opposition party had ever won against the CDP. Yet, the UPC remains a fairly new political party without a long track-record in Burkinabè politics.

Diabré is well known, but prior to 2010 he held the position of Economic Advisor to then president Compaoré. Following his advisory position he accepted an international post with the UNDP and later the French Uranium company AREVA. Many suspect that Diabré’s success internationally can be credited to Compaoré’s personal connections.

Diabré and the UPC were ardent critics of the CDP and Compaoré over the last four years and they helped lead the opposition movement against Compaoré’s attempt to modify the constitution. Nevertheless, they continue to face challenges from other opposition figures because of Diabré’s past connections to the CDP regime.

Perhaps more damaging than his past connections to Compaoré and the CDP, however, are the recent accusations that the CDP joined Coalition Zéph 2015—a coalition of parties and organizations supporting Diabré’s presidential candidacy. The UPC has denounced these rumors on several occasions and Diabré himself disavowed any formal agreement with the CDP. Still, the damage might already be done.

The politics of the situation are such that, however unlikely it might be that the CDP would support the UPC, it’s even more unlikely that the former ruling party would support the MPP. Given that the leaders of the MPP led the massive sortie from the CDP and then actively worked against the former ruling party, most acknowledge that there is no possibility of the political parties cooperating together. As one political activist pointed out to me: “the CDP will never accept an [MPP] victory. [The CDP and its allies] will support anyone other than the MPP for president.”

In light of that common assumption, rumors of a UPC-CDP alliance have gained significant traction during the campaign. Even if no formal agreement is made between the UPC and CDP, it stands to reason that the UPC will receive the CDP’s support, simply because the UPC presents the most viable threat to the MPP. Prior to the fall of the Compaoré regime, it would have been incredibly difficult to imagine that one of the UPC’s supporters would end up being the party it was then in opposition against, but so goes the Burkinabè political circus.

Following the massive rejection of the failed coup in September, one might think the parties and candidates with no past connections to the CDP might have the best chance at winning this coming Sunday, but they’d be mistaken. The probability of a candidate who never collaborated with or profited from the former regime emerging victorious seems slim at best. Partially because the political atmosphere in Burkina Faso remains very divisive and partially because the presidential candidates with no past connections have failed to establish a cohesive coalition of electoral support behind a single candidate.

Some high-profile members of civil society—who protested the authoritarian nature of the Compaoré regime as far back as the late 1990s—have gone so far as to suggest that it may be better not to vote at all. Chrysogone Zougmoré, first vice-president of Coalition nationale de lutte Contre la Vie Chère and leader of the prominent human rights association, Mouvement Burkinabè des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, went so far as to state that voting was not compulsory and that those Burkinabè, like himself, who did not feel adequately represented by any of the candidates’ campaigns, would not vote. Other civil society organizations are calling on their supporters to boycott the elections altogether.

Oddly enough, those, like Zougmoré, who will not vote because they feel none of the campaigns offer a viable change from the past regime, might be joined by others who are not voting for an entirely different reason: there is no CDP candidate. Today a die-hard CDP supporter informed me that she will be voting for the CDP in the legislative elections, but plans to cast a blank ballot for the presidential poll.

I regularly meet those who do not support the exclusion of the CDP from the electoral process. For some, they oppose the exclusion because they view it is as anti-democratic in principle, but for many others they oppose it because it bars their ideal candidate from taking part in elections. Thus, in one final twist, it seems those most opposed to the former regime may end up joining those most in support of former ruling party by opting out of the presidential election.

It’s difficult to guess what results these historic elections will produce, but one thing is certain: Burkinabè politics are living up to their reputation for the improbable and unexpected.

Buhari and the Perm Secs

BBC, August 29:

It is now three months since Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in as president of Nigeria and five months since he won historic elections, the first time an opposition candidate had won…But it took nearly two months for him to replace his security chiefs and so far he has only made appointments in about a dozen government offices.

[…]

While it is clear that President Buhari has shown that Nigeria can run without a cabinet, there may be an unacknowledged cost.

On the bright side, with the briefings he is getting from civil servants, the ministers, when they are eventually appointed, will find that their boss knows more about their departments than they do – and that should keep them on their toes.

Vanguard, November 10:

President Muhammadu Buhari on Tuesday, approved the appointment of new Permanent Secretaries in the Federal Civil Service.

This came some hours after the President sacked about 17 permanent secretaries.

Permanent Secretaries are, in theory, civil servants who are not political appointees. This does mean they are immune from political controversies, however.

As the BBC said, the months without a cabinet may have allowed Buhari to interact more directly with senior civil servants than presidents usually do. Apparently the president did not always like what he saw.

Talk by Dr. Usman Bugaje at Johns Hopkins SAIS This Wednesday

If you happen to be in Washington, DC this Wednesday, November 4, consider attending a talk by Dr. Usman Bugaje, a prominent northern Nigerian scholar and politician who has served in the House of Representatives and as adviser to former Vice President Atiku Abubakar. Bugaje is currently Convener of the Arewa Research and Development Project.

Bugaje will speak on “Democracy and the Challenge of Political Change in Nigeria” at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies from 12:30-1:45pm on Wednesday. The talk will be in Room 736, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue, NW.

The End of the Political Crisis in Burkina Faso: Observations from Ouagadougou

[This guest post is part of a series on Burkina Faso’s ongoing political turmoil. My colleague Daniel Eizenga, a Research Associate with the Sahel Research Group and Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Florida, has been based in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou since before the coup of September 17 conducting dissertation research. He has generously offered to share his updates from the ground as the situation evolves. Readers and journalists may contact Dan at: deizenga at ufl dot edu.  – Alex]

Date: Friday, October 2, 2015 at 5:43 PM UTC

Since the surrender of the RSP on 30 September, a number of things occurred which suggest that the political crisis in Burkina Faso has finally come to a close. After the week-long coup and then the dramatic events in which the RSP refused to disarm, the political transition emerged not only victorious, but stronger.

General Diendéré, the coup leader, was taken into custody by the National Gendarmerie yesterday after negotiating with authorities for his, and his family’s safety. A few hours prior to the military assault on the RSP base, Naba Koom II, which forced RSP to surrender, Diendéré sought refuge at the Vatican Embassy. From the diplomatic branch of the Catholic Church, Diendéré called on his fellow RSP soldiers to surrender and began negotiating his personal surrender with Burkinabé authorities.

Today, the Vatican Embassy clarified that Diendéré did not request asylum or exfiltration from the country, and had he, the Embassy would have denied it given the stance of the transitional government. The Vatican’s representative in Burkina Faso justified their actions by citing their ecclesial mission to promote social peace. The Embassy went on to note that from the outset of granting his refuge, Diendéré agreed to hand himself over to Burkinbè authorities. Others participated in the negotiations as well including the American Ambassador, Tulinabo Mushingui, Archbishop Phillipe Ouédraogo, and former president Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo. The announcement comes after many criticized the Embassy for protecting Diendéré.

In addition to Diendéré’s arrest, two other arrests took place in the last forty-eight hours. First and unsurprisingly, the spokesperson for the National Council for Democracy—the RSP established governing body during the coup—Mamadou Bamba, was placed under arrest and now awaits his hearing with the justice system. Bamba’s assets were frozen by the Court of Appeals this past Saturday along with Diendéré’s, Gen. Djibrill Bassolé’s—arrested this past Tuesday—and eleven other individuals’.

More surprisingly, authorities at the international airport in Ouagadougou detained and questioned the vice president of the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), Mahamadou Djéri Maiga last night. The MNLA is a Tuareg separatist organization which arose during the 2012 Malian political crisis.  Apparently, suspected of involvement in Bassolé and Diendéré’s accused attempts of calling on foreign fighters to destabilize the country, Maiga remained in the custody of Burkinabè officials for several hours before being released to his residence in Ouagadougou. So far, the government has provided no evidence that Bassolé or Diendéré reached out to foreign or jihadi fighters, despite their accusations. Personally, I find it difficult to believe, but as I’ve been frequently reminded: politics in Burkina Faso tend to surprise.

These arrests demonstrate a clear effort from the government to rapidly bring those involved in the coup to justice. The special investigation commission into the coup also got underway this week scheduling a number hearings with those already implicated in the coup events. The commission’s mandate will last one month.

Meanwhile, the political activists who previously comprised the ‘Collective against Exclusion’ remodeled themselves as the ‘Collective for a United People’ in a clear attempt to distance the group from the aftermath of the coup. As some civil society organizations were quick to point out, the pro-inclusion group also changed its message. Only three months ago the then ‘Collective against Exclusion’ rejected any reform of the RSP, however in a recent press conference the now ‘Collective for a United People’ saluted the dismantlement of the former presidential guard and condemned the coup. Clearly, popular opinion matters.

The dissolution of the RSP, the reintegration of some 800 RSP soldiers into the regular army, and the indictment of several high profile actors for their involvement in the failed coup, not only suggests that the transition weathered the storm, but popular support for the transition seems to have strengthened, perhaps even, emboldened it. If that’s the case, one potential challenge facing the Burkinabè people might become the need to insure that the political transition remains just that, a transition. A new date for elections continues to be promised but undelivered. Obviously, failing to schedule elections in the tumultuous situation which unfolded over the course of the last weeks is understandable. However, it would be worrying if in the next week an election date, regardless of delay, remains unannounced.

Still, the restoration and renewed strength of the political transition bodes well for Burkina Faso. The willingness of the Burkinabè people to defend their democratic transition even in the face of violence brought its brief political crisis to a close. Now, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Burkinabè people will need to stay vigilant and hold the political transition accountable to its purpose: peaceful, free, fair, dare I say, democratic elections. Let’s hope the leaders of the transition are up to the task.

The Evolving Political Crisis in Burkina Faso: Observations from Ouagadougou, continued

[This guest post is part of a series on Burkina Faso’s ongoing political turmoil. My colleague Daniel Eizenga, a Research Associate with the Sahel Research Group and Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Florida, has been based in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou since before the coup of September 17 conducting dissertation research. He has generously offered to share his updates from the ground as the situation evolves. Readers and journalists may contact Dan at: deizenga at ufl dot edu.  – Alex]

Date: Wednesday, September 30, 2015 at 7:12 PM UTC

Well, after waiting all day for an official announcement from the government or military on the results of last night’s military operation, here’s what we know. Bear in mind this may change in the next few hours, days, or weeks, depending on how the government decides to handle the release of information.

Late yesterday evening, the regular army attacked the barracks of the RSP at military camp Naba Koom II, located close to the presidential palace. The operation succeeded in forcing the surrender of RSP troops. As I noted yesterday, Gen. Diendéré himself took to the airways of local radio stations imploring the soldiers of the RSP to lay down their arms to avoid further bloodshed.

Diendéré himself fled the barracks, reportedly seeking refuge with the Vatican Embassy. Initial reports suggested he might have sought shelter at the American Embassy, but US diplomats quickly took to social media to deny these claims. Although he stated publically that he is willing to present himself before the Burkinabè justice system, it appears that he is attempting to negotiate certain assurances for himself before turning himself over to authorities. This negotiation occurred throughout today and he remains at the Vatican Embassy.

Diendéré, presumably from his place of refuge, denounced the military’s actions today stressing that the assault likely resulted in the loss of innocent lives. He based this claim on the fact that the military fired heavy artillery and tank shells during the attack which, in addition to killing RSP soldiers, he suspected also damaged an on-site military clinic and may have also caused causalities amongst the families living on the base. Only minutes ago, interim President Kafando announced that the operation resulted in no causalities–it remains unclear how many soldiers and/or other individuals were wounded in the attack.

The government’s actions have yet to prompt applause throughout Burkinabè society. Indeed, some called the government’s decision to hastily dissolve the RSP into question, suggesting that prolonging the dismantlement might have helped to avoid the conflict. On the other hand, the transitional government now seems to have reasserted its complete control over the situation, in what I would deem a clear power-play from Zida and Kafando. To the government’s credit, they did issue several warnings while the military laid siege to RSP’s camp for hours prior to the assault which offered RSP soldiers ample time to surrender.

During the night and most of today, the military claimed to be combing through the Naba Koom base to ensure that there were no RSP holdouts. It remains unknown whether any elements of the RSP were able to slip through the siege and escape Ouagadougou, but this also does not appear to be a major—or at least it’s not a publically acknowledged—concern of the military or the transitional government.

Businesses mostly resumed their normal activities today throughout Ouagadougou. One exception being Ouaga 2000 where there continues to be a large military presence. Another exception to quotidian life took the form of increased military checkpoints throughout Ouagadougou—military checkpoints are typically quite rare within the city. Still, with the suspension of the general strike and most of the military activity confined to Ouaga 2000, most Burkinabè and local businesses finally recommenced their pre-coup activities.

If the government acted hastily to resolve the question of the RSP, they continue to drag their feet on the question of the electoral calendar. With that said, there is also significantly less pressure from popular opinion and political actors to reschedule the elections. The elections, originally scheduled for 11 October, are now likely to be delayed for several weeks according to Prime Minister Zida.

A representative of the political party le Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès (MPP) stated today that the party understood the need to delay the electoral cycle and would patiently await the government’s position on the matter. The MPP counts as one of the newest political parties in Burkina Faso, but is comprised of some of the most best known and longest serving Burkinabè politicians. Following the resignation of 75 members of the former ruling party—the CDP—in January 2014, the leaders of the resignation movement created the MPP to oppose the modification of presidential term limits. Owing to wide-spread name recognition and their high-profile role in the fight against Compaoré’s attempt to change the constitution, the MPP is seen as one of the favorites in the up-coming elections.

Another party, which publically announced their support for a postponement of the elections is the Union pour le Renaissance/Parti Sankariste (UNIR/PS). Despite being one of the oldest political parties belonging to the opposition under the Compaoré regime, this political party stands to gain from a delay in the electoral process. The principal challenge to the UNIR/PS as elections approach is undoubtedly the need to build a country-wide political base. In the opinion of the party’s national director of mobilization, Athanase Boudo, the government should consider delaying elections even as late as early December to provide sufficient time to resolve their current challenges.

Meanwhile, from the point of Law Professor Luc Marius Ibriga—also a civil society leader opposed to the attempted modification of presidential term limits—the holding of elections does not impede the government’s authority. The Charter of the Transition (a sort of interim constitution which elaborates the transition’s institutional structures) insures that the transition’s mandate does not depend on a given date, but rather the swearing in of newly elected officials.

In a final piece of good news which also highlights the resumption of normal activities in Burkina Faso, the African Union lifted its suspension of the country yesterday.

While many questions remain regarding elections, the surrender of the RSP bodes well for the advancement of the political transition in general. In the coming weeks, the progress of the special investigation committee into the attempted coup and the actions of those already suspected of supporting the coup are likely to feature prominently in Burkinabè news. For now, both social and political forces appear willing to set aside questions about elections in order to pursue justice for the Burkinabè people.