On 15 September, Mauritania held the second round of its simultaneous legislative, municipal, and regional elections, following the first round on 1 September. Jeune Afrique has a good breakdown of the key outcomes here; most importantly, the second round saw the ruling Union for the Republic (UPR) increase its number of parliamentary deputies from 67 in the first round to 89 overall, out of 157 total seats in the assembly. UPR also extended its domination of Nouakchott’s communes, going from 5/9 before the elections to 6/9 afterwards. At both the legislative and the municipal level, the Islamist party Tewassoul was in second place, sometimes in coalition with the HATEM party. According to official estimates, turnout fell from 75% in the first round to 55% in the second round.
Some of the municipal results can be found here. Picking almost at random (someone should write a paper on these data, they’re fascinating), a few patterns stand out:
- Sometimes Tewassoul and UPR really ran neck and neck. For example, in the commune of Aouleiygat in the region of Trarza, Tewassoul won by fewer than two hundred votes – and the ultimate outcome was 9 seats for Tewassoul, 8 for UPR. Jeune Afrique notes this pattern as well.
- Again, I’m struck by Tewassoul’s ability to compete far beyond Nouakchott – here is a commune in Al-Hodh al-Gharbi, Devaa, where they edged out UPR 10 seats to 9. There are many places where Tewassoul obtained no seats, and UPR has wider representation overall, but Tewassoul is not just a Nouakchott-based party by any means.
- The UPR-Tewassoul rivalry is not at all the whole story of the elections – even together, their vote share in the first round was under 50%. In the municipal elections, UPR was beaten out in many communes by other parties. One example is Moudjeria in Tagant, where the Democratic Renewal Party won 7 seats to UPR’s four.
The “Les Afriques dans le Monde” project at Sciences Po Bordeaux has posted some useful maps and charts on Mali’s presidential elections.
Here are a few takeaways:
- It’s really striking to see the pie charts that include abstentions. The visuals really underscore the weakness of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s second term mandate.
- The post highlights that of more than 65,000 new voters added to the rolls for the 12 August runoff, approximately half of them were in Gao and half in the diaspora. These are the kinds of numbers that have raised eyebrows in Mali.
- The maps showing vote share by region are also extremely useful. The map of the first round highlights how well IBK did in the north (especially Kidal and Gao) and how poorly he did in Mopti (which also had, far and away, the highest number of polling place closures due to violence. Interestingly, as the authors note, IBK’s main rival Soumaïla Cissé had his best score in Timbuktu (20%), and his second-best in Gao, so this is not a story of Cissé doing well in south and IBK doing well in the north – rather, it’s the story of two candidates with significant northern support amid a divided south, where the share of votes going to other candidates was much higher. Cissé had minimal support in the south, actually.
- The map of the second round reinforces these patterns. IBK dominated Kidal, but Cissé preserved a substantial vote share in Timbuktu (increasing, actually, to 26% there) and Gao. Only in those two regions, moreover, was the share of people voting greater than the share of people not voting. In the south, again, Cissé had relatively little support. Moreover, abstentions reached 70% in Segou, Bamako, and Sikasso.
- I would reiterate what I’ve said before, namely that IBK is in some sense not really the president of Mopti (and even, one could argue, Segou). The violence was so severe, and the abstentions so high, that I take the outcome there as a rejection of the process itself.
In the lead-up to Mali’s presidential election in July and August, some of the country’s most prominent religious leaders publicly broke with President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK). One of these men, arguably the most influential Muslim figure in the country, was the Cherif of Nioro, Mohamed Ould Cheicknè or Bouyé (whose name is transliterated numerous ways, even in the Malian press). In the first round of the elections, the Cherif endorsed Aliou Diallo. In the second round, the Cherif endorsed IBK’s opponent Soumaïla Cissé. As I wrote then, “One takeaway is that key Malian religious leaders appear confident that they can break with IBK and come out okay even if he wins a second term.”
In a recent interview, the Cherif recounted his history with IBK and with Malian politics generally. There are a few notable points:
- He considered himself apolitical under President Amadou Toumani Touré (in office 2002-2012) until the controversy over the proposed family code (which the Cherif and other leaders saw as harmful to Islam) circa 2009. The family code debate influenced his thinking even after the fall of Touré in the coup of 2012, and the Cherif came to support IBK as someone who had been, in his eyes, wronged by Touré and who could “take the country forward.” Endorsing IBK in 2013 was the first time the Cherif had supported a presidential candidate, he says.
- The Cherif said that IBK deceived him and the Malian people, and that IBK’s first term revealed an autocratic personality. The Cherif recounted a story about one of his sons being harassed and beaten over a toll, and how the affair escalated into a political confrontation between his family and IBK after it appeared to the Cherif that the harassment had been “a sort of political score-settling” connected with his son’s own political activities.
- The portion of the interview posted online ends there, from what I could find. But the fact of the interview itself being given and published stood out to me in and of itself. Who knows how the relations between IBK and the country’s Muslim leaders will play out over the next five years, but things are not necessarily off to a great start in the second term.
Nigeria’s premier intelligence service, the Department of State Services (DSS, formerly known as SSS), has been at the center of several controversies in recent weeks. On 7 August, Nigeria’s then-Acting President Yemi Osinbajo fired the DSS’ director general, Lawal Daura. The DSS had barricaded the National Assembly, preventing some lawmakers and staff from entering the building as rumors swirled about plans to impeach Senate President Bukola Saraki. Disputes continue about who exactly was acting on whose orders.
Replacing Daura has also been controversial. President Buhari, once back from another medical trip to London, named Yusuf Magaji Bichi as the new director general on 13 September. Bichi took over from Matthew Seiyefa, a southerner who had stepped up as the interim head of the service. Bichi is a thirty-five-year member of the DSS/SSS. The controversy, however, stems from accusations that Buhari passed over as many as six qualified southerners in order to appoint a northerner. The fear among such critics is that Buhari is not only promoting figures from his home region, but also subordinating the DSS to his own agenda. Other reports say that Bichi “was a compromise candidate between the preferred candidate of some powerful presidential aides and the choice of the president who was said to have preferred a retired military officer to head the nation’s secret service.” So perhaps Buhari did not get exactly what he wanted. The presidency may have even been hoping that Bichi’s appointment would be seen outside of the context of regional “zoning” and more in the context of technocracy – but in that case they were obviously mistaken about how reactions would play out.
It’s really difficult for me to separate rumor from fact with stories like this, so to me one important point is the controversy in and of itself. Every federal appointment carries the potential for scrutiny and controversy, but this appointment seems to have been received particularly poorly by Buhari’s critics (see this roundup of online reactions). it is also striking how multi-faceted this particular controversy is. Even before the announcement of Bichi’s appointment, moreover, the whole spectacle of Daura, the National Assembly, and Buhari’s management style had provoked public speculation about whether and how the DSS fits into the chain of command – and about who really runs the agency. In other words, this controversy seems to involve more wide-ranging issues than other recent personnel matters, such as the controversy around the Finance Minister’s national youth service or lack thereof.
Obviously all of these concerns by the public and the president’s critics are heightened during the present election season, when various observers fear that the presidency will use the DSS as a tool of autocratic power – or that the DSS is freelancing in Nigerian politics for its own reasons. The saga of the DSS, Daura, and Bichi has also re-awakened fears that Buhari has not changed much from his time as military dictator in 1983-1985. At the link above, one can read the accusation that “it however appears difficult for those at the top to understand and accept the fact that the nation is no longer running a military regime. There is therefore the need for Buhari to lead by example. There is huge but disturbing politicisation of the various security agencies in the country, the DSS being the most susceptible, even though the police and others are not any better.” These are serious charges indeed.
On 3-4 September, the governments of Germany, Nigeria, and Norway, together with the United Nations, hosted a “High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region.” The primary aim of the conference was to close the funding shortfall for humanitarian operations in the region affected by Boko Haram – namely, northeastern Nigeria, southeastern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, the islands of Lake Chad, as well as some parts of western Chad. The conference generated some $2.17 billion in pledges, more than the organizers had hoped.
This post offers a few notes on the outcome statement, but first, here is the program, which is also worth a glance. The panel I would have most liked to see was on the afternoon of 3 September, and entitled “Regional cross-border cooperation: Interventions of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Governors from the region.” The speakers were Mamman Nuhu, Executive Secretary, Lake Chad Basin Commission; Kashim Shettima, Governor of Borno State, Nigeria; Abali Salah Mahamat, Governor of Lac Chad Province, Chad; Midjiyawa Bakary, Governor of the Extreme North Region, Cameroon; and Mahamadou Bakabe, Governor of Diffa, Niger.
Turning to the outcome statement, a lot of the language is pretty banal and predictable. So here I’m only highlighting points that struck me as unusually substantive or noteworthy:
- It is worth reading the statement in conjunction with UN Security Council Resolution 2349 (2017), which is referenced on p. 1. That resolution, among other matters, “Calls upon relevant United Nations entities, including UNOCA, UNOWAS, and the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) to redouble their support for Governments in the Region, as well as sub-regional and regional organizations, to address the impact of Boko Haram and ISIL violence on the peace and stability of the Region, including by addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and violent extremism that can be conducive to terrorism, in line with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organizations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses” (p. 4).
- Laudably, the statement repeatedly emphasizes the need for programming that specifically addresses the needs of women and girls.
- In the three main pages of the Outcome Statement’s text, the word “resilience” appears eight times and seems to me to have been the buzzword of the conference (as it is in various other development and humanitarian settings these days). Here is some sample language: “Strengthening resilience for sustainable development is essential for reducing vulnerabilities in the long term and efforts are already under way. We highlighted the leadership of governments in the region and the centrality of resilience-building measures at all levels.” Honestly, I have troubling telling what this means concretely. There is a section on p. 3 that clarifies things a bit: “Resilience means going beyond simply restoring the status quo ante, which contributed to giving rise to the crisis: it means building a better standard of living than before. There is an urgent need for governments and partners to continue to scale up efforts for transformational change.” But the language is so vague, even here, that I don’t quite know what the authors meant. I understand “resilience” as the capacity to withstand and even thrive amid setbacks; I suppose the real subtext here is that the donors are worried about either a real worsening of the conflict, or a future conflict, and so “resilience” becomes a code word for saying that governments need to prevent something like this from happening again.
- Here is some more language that I found odd, from p. 2: “The conference highlighted that stabilization in the Lake Chad region is understood as supporting political processes on the ground and supporting security efforts in order to reduce violence. Stabilization seeks to enable first steps towards reconciliation between parties to the conflict and to establish social and political consensus as a foundation for legitimate political structures and long-term development. The conference underlined the importance of joint efforts to prevent further outbreaks of violent conflict and an escalation of conflicts into crises. The conference further underscored that supporting political processes to develop a common regional approach on stabilization is pivotal. The conference welcomed the establishment of the Governors’ Forum in Maiduguri in May 2018 as an important tool for cross-border cooperation. In this regard, we welcomed enhanced cooperation by the Governors of the riparian provinces and states and the consultation processes which increased civil society participation at the local level, especially of traditional and religious leaders, youth and women movements, and community health workers.” One could read “political processes” here as referring to the possibility of negotiations with Boko Haram (“reconciliation between parties to the conflict”), but one could also read it as coordination between different governments and different levels of government (“a common regional approach on stabilization”). Perhaps both senses are meant or implied.
- The notes of criticism toward the Lake Chad governments are subtle, but they are there. From p. 3: “The conference stressed that reforms are needed to pursue more effective decentralization, and reach greater geographical equity in the allocation of public resources based on national realities. This would help building the capacity of public institutions to deliver key public services and serve their citizens to build resilience.” And from p. 2: “The conference called upon all parties to uphold their obligation to allow and facilitate timely and unhindered passage of impartial humanitarian relief for civilians in need. We expressed concern about the dangers faced by aid workers and reminded all parties that humanitarian personnel and assets must be respected and protected.” I’m sure the text of the statement was carefully negotiated, but reading between the lines suggests – to me, at least – that donors are concerned about how hierarchy, corruption, and authoritarianism are impeding humanitarian responses.
- p. 4 of the statement breaks down the pledges made.
Following his re-election in August, Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) retained Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga (SBM), whom I and others have accorded a significant role in IBK’s victory. But the president did reshuffle the cabinet. The list of the thirty-two members can be found here. A good analysis of the new cabinet can be found here (French), but I also want to highlight and amplify a few things:
- During his first term (2013-2018), IBK regularly reshuffled his cabinets and fired four prime ministers, three of whom spent less than a year in the position. So no one’s job is exactly safe, even SBM’s.
- There is a great deal of continuity in this cabinet. Only twelve people left the cabinet altogether. Some prominent ministers have been retained, such as Salif Traoré (see a bit of biographical data here) as Minister of Security and Mohamed ag Erlaf as Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (who took a bit of heat during the elections, one should add). Another retention is Nina Wallet Intalou, Minister of Crafts and Tourism and someone associated with the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a rebel movement that played a central role in the 2012 rebellion and its aftermath. Yet another retention is Tierno Amadou Diallo, Minister of Religious Affairs, who (if I am correct) has been one of the few ministers to survive all the cabinet reshuffles since 2013.
- Another form of continuity is familiar faces coming back, just in new positions. This is the case with Tiéna Coulibaly, now Minister of Justice but previously Minister of Defense. It is also the case with Tiémoko Sangaré, previously Minister of Mines and now Minister of Defense.
- In terms of new entrants, the appointment of Kamissa Camara as foreign minister has been widely hailed in Mali and abroad, for two reasons: (1) because of her strong reputation, including in Washington, where she worked for the National Endowment for Democracy and other institutions [for full disclosure, I have been in contact with her several times and where she has helped me with my research, although I do not believe she has ever met] and (2) because the appointment of a young woman is seen by many as an exciting development for Mali, for Africa, and for female representation in government generally.
- In terms of party politics, the above-mentioned analysis notes that of the thirty-two cabinet members, twenty represent political parties. A total of seven parties are represented in the cabinet, and six of those belong to the presidential coalition. Another analysis floats the idea that the prominent party ADEMA-PASJ is something of a loser in this reshuffle, losing two seats and gaining only a symbolic prize with Defense – according to the writer, it is actually IBK who manages that portfolio.,
A readout of the new cabinet’s first meeting can be found here.
Mauritania held the first round of its legislative, regional, and local elections on 1 September (see my previous post on the topic here). A second round is scheduled for 15 September. Following the abolishment of the country’s Senate in last year’s referendum, Mauritania has a unicameral National Assembly with 157 seats.
Final results did not appear until 8 September, which caused some outcry in the country. The ruling Union for the Republic (UPR) won 67 seats this round. The second-best scoring party was the Islamists, Tewassoul, who received 14 seats – a loss of two seats, actually, over its numbers from 2013 parliament.
Let’s go into a bit more detail with the results. At the Independent National Electoral Commission’s site, you can find three sets of legislative results – results for the national party lists, for women’s seats, and for departments.
Within the national party list results, here is the breakdown by percentage of the vote:
- UPR: 19.47% or 136,809 votes
- Tewassoul: 11.28% or 79,283 votes
- Then you have parties that received less than 5% of the vote, or between 1,000 and slightly over 30,000 votes. In descending order, the third- through seventh-place finishers were: Union for Democracy and Progress (UDP), Karama, National Democratic Alliance Party (AND), Union of the Forces of Progress (UFP), and the Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD).
The percentages and order are roughly equivalent for the women’s list, although UPR’s and Tewassoul’s percentages were slightly higher on that one (19.6% and 12.6%, respectively).
At the departmental level, a few basic patterns appear:
- In Nouakchott, the capital, Tewassoul edged out UPR, 13% to 12.6%.
- In some places, such as Kaedi (map), UPR’s numbers were much higher than for the national lists (here, 30% of the vote), while Tewassoul’s share collapsed (here, to 3.6%, and that was in coalition with another Islamist party) and other parties took the second-place spot (here, UPD). Nevertheless, one should not conclude that Tewassoul’s appeal is limited to Nouakchott – they remained the second-place finisher even in eastern areas like Aïoun. UPR did very well, though, in the far east, in places such as Néma.
- Some parties are hometown favorites – Karama, for example, was the first-place finisher in M’Bout (map).
In short, UPR did well enough across the country to stay in the fight everywhere, and in some places it was far and away the dominant force.