Tag Archives: Baga

Boko Haram/ISWAP Roundup for August 6, 2020

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Previous roundup here.

On August 4, after meeting with his top security personnel, President Muhammadu Buhari ordered what his National Security Advisor Babagana Monguno has referred to as “an immediate re-engineering of the entire security apparatus” (it is not clear to me whether this framing represents Monguno directly quoting, or just paraphrasing, Buhari). It is not immediately clear, however, what this might actually mean (Hausa).

Snapshots of some of the latest violence:

Issue 245 of the Islamic State’s Al-Naba’ (July 30, p. 10) details ISWAP’s attacks in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon as part of the Islamic State’s “Attrition Campaign (Ghazwat al-Istinzaf.” Available here for registered users of the website Jihadology.

On August 2, presumed Boko Haram fighters killed at least 16 people in an attack on an IDP camp at Nguetchewe (or Guetchewe), Cameroon, near the Nigerian border. Here is a French-language video report (saying 18 people killed):

For context, here is UNHCR:

This attack follows a significant rise in violent incidents in Cameroon’s Far-North Region in July, including looting and kidnapping by Boko Haram and other armed groups active in the region. The Far North region, tucked between Nigeria’s Borno and Adamawa states and Lake Chad, currently hosts 321,886 IDPs and 115,000 Nigerian refugees.

The incident is also a sad reminder of the intensity and brutality of the violence in the wider  the Lake Chad Basin region that has forced more than three million people to flee: 2,7m are internally displaced in Northeast Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, while 292,682 Nigerian refugees fled into neighbouring countries.

Cameroon reports that since January this year, it has recorded 87 Boko Haram attacks on its northern border with Nigeria. Twenty-two of them were in the northern district of Mozogo alone.

More context, from FEWS Net, on the economic impact of Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon’s Far North:

Markets in the Far North region play an important role in regional trade with neighboring Chad and Northeast Nigeria. The Douala – Maroua – Kousseri corridor that extends to Chad includes the flow of imported commodities. The Maiduguri (Nigeria) – Maroua and Maiduguri – Kousseri corridor, both continuing to Chad, includes the flow of processed goods and also the re-export of key staples such as sorghum and rice back into Cameroon during the lean season and imported staples from surplus producing areas in Nigeria during harvest and postharvest periods. However, as result of frequent Boko Haram attacks, these trade corridors are often closed by the government re-orientating trade flow more towards southern destinations precisely Yaounde, Douala, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Central Africa Republic (CAR).

Via Nigeria’s The Guardian, new possible indications of Boko Haram activity in Niger State, north central Nigeria:

The Abubakar Shekau-led faction of Boko Haram has released a video showing members claiming to be from Niger State.

A footage seen by The Guardian Nigeria shows about 100 persons praying Eid in the heart of a bush before showing three fighters sending Eid greetings in Hausa, English and Fulfulde.

Malik Samuel of the Institute for Security Studies writes, in a short article, that “Boko Haram is extending its reach from north-east Nigeria into the country’s north-west. It is taking advantage of old and new local conflicts and insecurities to further embed itself in the area through violent extremism.” This is now a widespread narrative among journalists and analysts. I’m reserving judgment until I see more evidence.

In another story, on August 5, This Day reports, the Borno State Police Command announced the arrests of 45 alleged criminals, including one alleged Boko Haram logistics supplier. According to the police, the individual had 200,000 Naira in cash, which might sound like a lot but it’s a little over $500. I’d be surprised if this individual was a major player.

Meanwhile, there is continued fallout from the July 29 attack on Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum’s convoy in Baga. My post on the incident, and the ensuing battle to control the media narrative, is here. Ambassador John Campbell has also blogged about the episode here. The Nigeria Governors Forum, among others, have expressed support for Zulum.

Zulum’s camp has voiced skepticism about the military’s narrative regarding the Baga incident. Responding to that, the Defence Headquarters Media Operations has once again stated that

From the analysis, [the attack] was purely that of the enemies, Boko Haram, in that area. From the tactics, and from the search conducted, it was the insurgents. So, our fears were allayed within 48 hours. It is not anything sabotage from the tactical, operational and strategic level, that is if you want to rate it from rank down to the person on the frontline.

Finally, on another note, Ewan Davies writes about the Urban Africa Labelling (URBAL) tool and how it can be used to analyze violence:

The URBAL tool can also be used to study how the patterns of attacks of specific extremist groups such as Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa have changed over time (Figure 1). For both groups, the percentage of events and fatalities occurring in urban areas have dramatically decreased over the years despite the rapid population growth of cities in Somalia and northern Nigeria. While Al Shabaab and Boko Haram were predominantly active in cities until the early 2010s, both groups have reorganized into rural guerrilla forces following the counter-offensive of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) in Somalia and the Nigeria-led Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) around Lake Chad.

Feel free to share any relevant links in the comments.

Nigeria: Competing Narratives Circulate in the Aftermath of Attack on Borno Governor Zulum’s Convoy

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On July 29, the convoy of Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum was attacked in the town of Baga (map), possibly by Boko Haram. The incident has generated competing narratives and speaks to the wider “information war” that is a core part of the crisis – even Boko Haram’s own leader Abubakar Shekau has referred to the centrality of the “information war (yakin bayani).”

In the aftermath of the attack, some of the main contention is between the governor and the Army. Various videos of the attack (see here) have circulated, including one clip from the vantage point of a driver in the convoy, and one short clip of Zulum arguing with a Nigerian Army officer. Zulum has also been quoted as saying to the Army officer:

You have been here for over one year now, there are 1,181 soldiers here; if you cannot take over Baga which is less than 5 km from your base, then we should forget about Baga. I will inform the Chief of Army Staff to redeploy the men to other places that they can be useful. You people said there’s no Boko Haram here, then who attacked us?

Some of Zulum’s staff have also been blunt in their criticism of the military:

MNJTF here refers to the Multi-National Joint Task Force, which includes the militaries of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon with some participation by Benin as well. Note too that part of the information war concerns not just who perpetrated the attack, but also how serious it was or wasn’t.

In remarks to the press the day after the attack (see also here), Zulum appeared to imply that there were no actual Boko Haram fighters involved in the attack, and that there was “serious shooting by the Nigerian armed forces.” These remarks are tricky to parse. The prominent Nigerian analyst Bulama Bukarti has implied that the military staged the attack (or feigned being under attack?):

I’m not convinced. It seems to me that if the Army wanted to block Zulum from Baga, it could have done so without staging a kind of theatrical performance. But anything is possible.

Zulum also stressed, in that press interview, the economic importance of Baga. He suggested that eventually it may be necessary for the military to leave Baga, if they cannot secure the town, and for the local population “to take destiny into their own hands.”

In additional remarks that were, I believe, delivered over the weekend, Zulum noted that the situation in Borno since 2015 has been different, and in his view better, than in the period 2011-2015, but he made headlines (even more so than for the other interview) for referencing “sabotage within the system” as a (the?) reason why the insurgency persists.

More coverage of Zulum’s remarks can be found here.

Amid the competing narratives, part of what’s at stake is that the governor’s ability to move around the state is, both practically and symbolically, inseparable from his ability to demonstrate control – both in the face of the jihadist insurgency and vis-a-vis the military. Threats to his free movement are also threats to his political capital.

In the aftermath of the attack (as beforehand), Zulum has emphasized his direct physical outreach to Borno’s most vulnerable populations. I don’t think such gestures are cynical or empty, but I also think they have a political dimension:

Meanwhile, the leadership of the Nigerian Army has framed the attack as a Boko Haram attack but also as “an isolated and most unfortunate incident that occurred in a territory where normalcy has since been restored with socio-economic activities picking up.” We see a hint of a gap between the statements of the officer who appears in the video I linked to above, who can be heard saying “there is no Boko Haram inside the town,” and the official Army statement, another portion of which reads, “The good people of Baga town and indeed the entire Borno State are enjoined to continue to provide credible information that will assist the security agencies to successfully combat terrorism as well as apprehend and flush out the perpetrators of the attack.” The Army is keen to present itself as being in control, but there is the faintest acknowledgment here that they do not have the human intelligence they need. The reasons for that are manifold, but one obvious reason is the Army’s own past history in Baga. The statement has also promised an investigation into the incident.

The Army is also keen to control the narrative about the trajectory of the conflict – in other words, the Army would like audiences, local, national, and international, to believe that the trajectory is positive. This convoy attack, however, has prominent voices in Borno and beyond saying that the situation is deteriorating – the State’s foremost religious leader, the Shehu of Borno, said, “If a convoy of such highly placed person in the State will be attacked, I repeat, nobody is safe. The matter is getting worse, I urge everyone to raise up our hands to seek Allah’s intervention.” This is precisely how the Army does not want people to feel.

There are multiple audiences in play. One is President Muhammadu Buhari – Zulum explicitly said, in his remarks about sabotage, that this is something he is conveying to the president. The Army, obviously, also wants Buhari to be convinced that they are making progress. Another key audience is ordinary people (and voters) in Borno. And there is an international audience too, obviously.

Who controls what now, in Borno? The picture is constantly shifting, but humanitarian access maps give one perspective – here is one June 2020 map of educational activities in Borno, for example. For context, Baga is located in Kukawa Local Government Area (LGA), northeastern Borno State. The map does not classify Kukawa as inaccessible but it does mark two nearby LGAs, Abadam and Marte, as red zones. Adjacent Monguno LGA is also very dangerous. Contrary to the military’s claims, Baga is still very much part of the conflict zone.

Finally, for further context, this is not the first time a Borno governor’s convoy has been attacked – Zulum’s predecessor, Kashim Shettima, was attacked on the road between the state capital Maiduguri and the northeastern town of Gamboru in February 2019.

Boko Haram/ISWAP Roundup for July 30, 2020

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I’m considering doing a weekly roundup on Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Here’s my first stab at it:

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General, “Children and Armed Conflict in Nigeria” (July 6, posted to Relief Web July 24). The report covers January 2017-December 2019. One excerpt (p. 6):

According to information gathered and verified by the country task force, the recruitment and use of children accounted for the greatest number of verified violations in north-east Nigeria. A total of 3,601 children (780 girls, 2,820 boys, 1 sex unknown) aged between 6 and 17 years were verified to have been recruited and used by CJTF [Civilian Joint Task Force] (2,203), followed by Boko Haram (1,385) and the Nigerian Security Forces (13). Of the total attributed to CJTF, 41 children were recruited and used between January and September 2017 while the remaining 2,162 were recruited and used between 2013 and 2016 but verified as such during the reporting period. Within the framework of its action plan, CJTF granted access to the country task force to carry out extensive verification of children formerly associated with the group.

On Wednesday, July 29, gunmen attacked the convoy of Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum as it was returning from Kukawa to Baga, northern Borno – see The Cable‘s report and video:

Some of the latest violence by ISWAP:

Issue 244 of the Islamic State’s al-Naba’ newsletter is available here (with registration). Page 7 discusses ISWAP operations in Nigeria and Chad, while page 9 features a brief (and quite generic) biography of a slain company commander.

Kingsley Omonobi, Vanguard, “Chaos as Boko Haram/ISWAP executes its own ‘governor of Lake Chad’ in power struggle” (July 28). I’ve been tinkering with a separate post about all these reports and rumors of internal violence, and how difficult it can be to verify any of what’s reported.

Channels Television, “601 Repentant Boko Haram Members Graduate From DRR Camp Set For Integration” (July 26).

On the other hand:

More on Ndume’s comments here.

Shola Oyepipo, This Day, “In Buratai’s Nigeria, Insecurity Now ‘Under Control’” (July 26).

Finally, here is the latest weekly roundup from the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker, covering July 18-24.

Roundup on Boko Haram/ISWA Attacks in Gudumbali and Baga, Borno State, Nigeria

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In recent days, the Boko Haram faction led by Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi and known as “Islamic State West Africa” (ISWA or ISWAP) has attacked two towns in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria – Gudumbali and Baga. The latter, of course, has been the target of prominent attacks by Boko Haram dating back years. (Note also that there was a recent kidnapping attributed to Boko Haram in Borno.) As often with Boko Haram attacks, conflicting information makes it hard to assess what happened. But here’s a roundup of coverage and analysis:

Gudumbali (map of Local Government Area)

AFP: “Boko Haram jihadists were in control of a town in northeast Nigeria on Saturday [8 September] after sacking a military base, in the latest attack that raises questions about claims they are weakened to the point of defeat. Local officials and security sources said scores of fighters believed to be loyal to a Boko Haram faction backed by the Islamic State group overran troops in Gudumbali.”

Vanguard: “The Nigerian Army on Sunday [9 September] said it had restored normalcy in Gudumbali and environs with the concerted effort of troops of Operation Lafiya Dole deployed to the area. Newsmen report that scores of jihadists in gun trucks and bearing various calibre of arms, stormed the town and engaged troops in fierce battle that lasted for many hours.

Premium Times: “Mr Bukar said when he realised the criminals were not targeting civilians, he decided to lock himself with his parents with a padlock so they would not come into their home. ‘They left the town after several hours. They were chanting ‘Munkama garinsu gabadaya’ which means we have taken over the town completely,’ he said. ‘The rains of bullet suddenly stopped but we were advised to remain in the house. At that time we knew that the military had also left the place because they fought nonstop for almost 12 hours.'”

Nigerian Army (official): “It will be recalled that Gudumbali is one of the communities in Borno state, that were recently reoccupied by Internally Displaced Persons who had voluntarily returned to their ancestral homes. The people of Gudumbali community and Guzamala Local Government in general are urged to remain calm and resilient as Operation Lafiya Dole troops tirelessly combat the terrorists. They are also implored to maintain high level of vigilance and monitor strange faces to prevent fleeing Boko Haram terrorists from infiltrating and hibernating in their communities.” My comment: this reads to me as insensitive and paranoia-inducing language. Better to say something along the lines of “we won’t be sending any more people back to these areas until we’re sure they’ll be safe there.” Note also that the Army’s statement contradicts press accounts, particularly in terms of the assertion that “no human casualty was recorded in the encounter.”

Baga (map)

Punch: “Boko Haram terrorists have staged a fresh attack on a military base in Baga in the Kukawa Local Government Area of Borno State, a day after they invaded Gudumbali area in the Guzamala Local Government Area and sacked the residents.”

Finally, see also the group’s recent video release (filmed, of course, before these recent attacks), consisting of battle footage and displays of soldiers’ corpses and Book Haram’s arsenal.