RFI (French) reports that over the weekend, Nigerien soldiers in the northeast of their country clashed with armed Chadian bandits. The bandits reportedly fled toward the Nigerien border.
The incident reminds me of a quote (French) I’ve come back to again and again, from Mohamed Anacko, president of Agadez’s regional council. This came in the context of discussing France’s Sahel-wide counterterrorism program, Operation Barkhane, in a 2015 interview:
First of all, I should say that if Barkhane had not been there, the last Nigerien lock would have been forced open during the war in Mali. The national army would not have been able to prevent the terrorists from coming to set up shop in the north. But it is true that from the start, Barkhane suffered from a lack of communication. When you send helicopters and planes into the desert, without having created an information mechanism, you should expect that the populations will see a new form of colonialism in it…The inhabitants do not understand that Barkhane only takes action against certain armed groups. There are gangs, coming from Chad or Sudan for example, that practice looting, particularly since gold panning became important. But Barkhane, because that is not its mission, does not take an interest in them. Neither do the Nigerien security forces, moreover. However, these are the persons who create conditions propitious for the installation of terrorism. The risk is that the population will create militias to defend itself. What’s more, the struggle against terrorism, it’s first of all about intelligence. There must be collaboration with the inhabitants, who know the region. If not, Barkhane will have to content itself with doing tourism in the desert.
Words worth reflecting on.
It’s been a while (.pdf, p. 13) since I’ve written about the periodic waves of strikes by professionals and students in Chad. Here is a recent strike worth noting (French):
On Thursday, 31 May, Chadian lawyers, bailiffs, and notaries joined magistrates in a country-wide strike in order to support a lawyer who was taken to task by security forces…The magistrates decided on the “cessation of all activities throughout the national territory” to protest against the aggression against a lawyer and his clients by the security forces on 22 May in Doba.
RFI (French) provides more details on the incident in Doba:
The Chadian judicial system is today paralyzed by an affair that has shaken it since 22 May. That Tuesday, in Doba, in the south of the country, the justice system released three men accused by the city’s highest political and military authorities of “complicity in associating with wrongdoers” linked with a murky affair of alleged arms possession. Except that the men were then attacked by gendarmes, arrested and beaten up publicly. The affair has since taken on a national dimension…Meeting in general assembly that Sunday, the Order of Lawyers decided to launch a strike in the tribunals for three days, together with a condition: that three high authorities of the oil town of Doba, including the governor and the head of the legion of the gendarmerie, be relieved of their functions and judged.
At least one source (French) reports that the governor has been sacked by presidential decree. If true, that would be a sign of the presidency’s real concern over these strikes. After all, these judicial personnel are highly educated and well-placed people making extremely serious and specific political demands. It’s not easy to ignore them.
I’m up at Foreign Policy today with an article on how Chad is reacting to the Trump administration’s travel ban. As always, I welcome your thoughts and feedback in the comments section here.
I’m up at Global Observatory with a piece on Chad. Here’s an excerpt:
The Chadian government is also asking Western and African donors for more development funding. Chad will hold a roundtable in Paris in September to seek contributions for its newly adopted national development plan. Potential partners have already shown a willingness to participate: Deby recently hosted the vice president of the African Development Bank, which is financing projects in Chad’s electricity sector; the Bank confirmed that it will attend the Paris roundtable. The adoption of the development plan was one factor in the IMF’s decision to grant a new loan. The IMF did not make any allusion to Chad’s role in regional security, but other actors are clearly aware of the bargaining power that Chad has with donors because of its security role. Meeting the committee organizing the roundtable, France’s ambassador to Chad asked the Chadian government—according to the paraphrase of a Chadian news site—“to avoid playing the security card.” But the card has already been played, and with effect.
I welcome any comments you may have.
In October, I wrote about how a Chadian court had ordered an oil consortium, headed by Exxon, to pay $74 billion in back taxes and fees. At the time, Bloomberg and other outlets suggested that that figure was merely one bid in negotiations between Chad and the oil companies. That prediction may have come true, although it’s hard to tell. Le Figaro/AFP reports (French) that the Chadian government and the consortium have signed an agreement that ends the suit against the consortium and grants the consortium a permit to operate until 2050 in the Doba basin (.pdf). However, the report adds that while the suit has been dropped, there are rumors that the consortium paid $200 million to the government. The government has denied those rumors.
More details, especially about the signing of the accord, here (French).
Earlier this month, I discussed the process whereby Chad’s Moussa Faki Mahamat was elected chair of the African Union Commission.
Over at the World Policy Institute, John Mukum Mbaku has a smart post on the challenges Mahamat and the AUC will face now. Mbaku identifies five: the Western Sahara issue (now that Morocco has been readmitted to the AU); the International Criminal Court; poverty; “sectarian conflicts”; and terrorism. Here is Mbaku’s conclusion:
During the last decade, the AU has failed to confront major issues threatening peace and security in various parts of the continent. There is hope that Faki, who has gained significant experience dealing with terrorism during his chairmanship of the council of ministers of the G5 Sahel, which has been quite active in the war against terror, can provide the leadership needed to move the AU in the right direction. Some observers believe that Faki’s close working relationship with the EU and the United States in the fight against religious extremism in the Sahel could help him, as AU Commission chairperson, to secure resources for the continent’s peace and security efforts. Although he is Francophone and will be viewed by those countries as representing their interests, he is fluent in English, French, and Arabic and will be able to reach out to virtually all of the continent’s stakeholders. This is critical because dealing with the continent’s multifarious problems would require significant levels of consultation with all relevant groups. Nevertheless, some critics question whether he has the political will to democratize the AU and the continent, especially given Chad’s increasing authoritarianism—Déby has ruled Chad with a strong hand since 1990 and was reelected in April 2016 to a fifth term as president in an election that was considered by many international observers as not fair, free, or credible. Nevertheless, Faki has promised to prioritize development and stability and to undertake necessary reforms to render the AU more responsive to continental crises.
The whole post is worth a read.
Recently, Chadian President Idriss Deby reshuffled his cabinet. Part of the reshuffle was prompted by the departure of Foreign Affairs Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat, who is going (with Deby’s blessing) to become the new chair of the African Union Commission.
Another factor in the reshuffle, however, was the less amicable firing of Finance and Budget Minister Mbogo Ngabo Seli (French), who had only been in his post since August 2016. Seli, it seems, had been unable to maintain a good relationship with Deby’s inner circle and had been equally unable to manage a crisis resulting from the “non-payment of salaries” to civil servants and other key personnel. That “non-payment” is a core part of the budget/austerity crisis that has evoked recurring protests in Chad in recent months, an issue I discuss here (.pdf, p. 13).
In December, there was another firing: Mines Minister Gomdigué Baïdi Lomey (French). In that case, no reasons were given.
The new government promotes Hissein Brahim Taha, the Chadian ambassador to France and a veteran diplomat, to the post of Foreign Affairs Minister. Other new and key appointments include the promotion of three senior technocrats, Christian Georges Diguibaye, Ngueto Yambaye, and Ahmat Mahamat Hassan, to the posts of Finance Minister, Minister of the Economy, and Minister of Justice, respectively. The new government also includes the famous Chadian filmmaker Mahamat Saleh Haroun to the post of Minister of Touristic, Artisanal, and Cultural Development.
The reshuffle did not affect ministers in the security and defense sphere, suggesting that the move was more about dealing with the country’s economic crisis than anything else.