Three Items on Mauritania

1. Jeune Afrique has a good article (July 15, French) on Mauritanian policy towards Mali – and why Mauritania has opted to keep the relationship functional and functioning despite many, many problems next door, including the deaths of Mauritanian citizens in Mali. One Mauritanian minister, quoted anonymously, sums it up, referring specifically to the decision to keep export corridors open during the period Mali was under sweeping sanctions: “We would derive no benefit from the collapse of our neighbor. Starving the populations was totally out of the question.”
2. Mauritania’s ruling party was renamed and rebranded earlier this month, changing its name from the Union for the Republic (French acronym UPR) to al-Insaf, Arabic for “equity” (the translation that French-language Mauritanian media outlets are using) or perhaps “even-handedness.” (The root n-s-f has to do with halving and sharing, as in nisf, “half.”) The party also has a new president, Mohamed Melaïnine Ould Eyih, who is also minister of national education – you can read a short biography of him here (French). There is a long backstory involving the party and a power struggle between former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the party’s founder, and current President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani – who appears to be in firm control of the current iteration of the party.
3. In the course of one of my research projects I finally tracked down the text of a 2015 fatwa (Arabic) by a Mauritanian cleric, Shaykh Ahmad Jiddu Wuld Ahmad Bahi, giving a blanket condemnation of present-day slavery. The lines of argument will likely be familiar to anyone who has looked in depth at the “Islam and slavery” debate (if you haven’t, you might start here), but to simplify greatly, the fatwa says that early Islam acknowledged the reality of slavery but worked to improve slaves’ conditions and end the practice, and that public interest, as well as what he views as legal consensus among states (Muslim and non-Muslim) against slavery, should compel present-day Muslim societies to completely eradicate slavery. There’s a lot more to the fatwa than that, of course, but those are a few of the key points. You can also watch a rich discussion between the shaykh and a Mauritanian journalist here (Arabic).

Mauritania: Moustapha Ould Limam Chafi Returns to Nouakchott

On October 18, Mauritanian national Moustapha Ould Limam Chafi returned to the country’s capital Nouakchott after what Le Figaro estimates is “a dozen years’ exile.” At least two Mauritanian regimes – that of Maaouya Ould Taya in 2004, and that of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in 2011 – issued warrants for his arrest (in 2004 over charges of helping to plot a coup, in 2011 over charges of colluding with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM). But he was never arrested by Mauritanian authorities, and is now back home roughly a year after Ould Abdel Aziz’s successor, President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, canceled the warrants for Ould Chafi and two other prominent Ould Abdel Aziz-era dissidents/exiles.

How to classify Ould Chafi? Businessman, politician, intermediary, power broker? Jeune Afrique has covered his career extensively over the years, writing profiles and updated profiles in 2011, 2017, and 2019. In the first profile, we read, “His network goes from Niger to Cote d’Ivoire, where he spends a lot of time around Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, and to Mali, among other [places]. Outside West Africa, his connections go from Morocco to Darfur (Sudan), and also to Rwanda. But he is, first of all, a faithful companion of the Burkinabè president Blaise Compaoré, and has his house and family in Ouagadougou.”

The accusations of collusion with jihadists stem largely from his role in negotiating ransom payments for and releases of western hostages of AQIM, a role he sometimes undertook on behalf of Compaoré. Jeune Afrique‘s 2017 article discusses this dimension of his career a bit more. And nowadays, when accusations arise that Compaoré’s inner circle colluded with AQIM, Ould Chafi’s name continues to come up. I personally have not seen decisive evidence of collusion on the part of either Compaoré or Ould Chafi. I shed no tears when Compaoré was overthrown but in my eyes, negotiations or hostage payments are not tantamount to direct collusion. But I do not, and likely will never, know the full story on any of these dealings.

Back in Nouakchott, Ould Chafi is presenting his return home as purely personal and is disavowing any political agenda.

Mauritania: Ex-President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz Under a Police Microscope As Parliament Reconvenes

Mauritania’s former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (in power 2008-2009 as military ruler, and 2009-2019 as civilian president) faces an ongoing investigation into alleged corruption during his time in office. Here at the blog I last checked in on the story when Ould Abdel Aziz had given an interview to France 24 on September 10; in the interview, as in other press engagements, he dismissed the allegations and the investigation itself as baseless and politically motivated.

In August, Ould Abdel Aziz was held by the Economic Crimes Police for questioning for approximately a week, and then a few days later was briefly questioned again. On September 27 (more here, in Arabic), he was summoned once more, although he does not respond to questions in keeping with his legal team’s argument that he continues to benefit from presidential immunity. Meanwhile, his passport was confiscated in August, but he has now been barred from leaving the capital Nouakchott.

One source I missed in this story was this interview (Arabic) from August with the head of the parliamentary commission of inquiry, Habib Ould Brahim Diah. Jeune Afrique profiled Diah back in May, describing his background in the ruling Union for the Republic (French acronym UPR) party under both Ould Abdel Aziz and current President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani. The interview is worth a read. In it, Diah argues that there has been a clear separation between the executive and the legislature during the parliamentary corruption inquiry, implicitly rejecting Ould Abdel Aziz’s characterization of the inquiry as a political vendetta.

What comes next? On October 1, a new ordinary session of parliament starts – in a “heated atmosphere,” to loosely translate this headline (Arabic). Directly relevant to the corruption inquiry, and to Ould Abdel Aziz’s ultimate legal fate, is the question of (re-)establishing a high court of justice, the sole body constitutionally empowered to try a former head of state. In July, deputies voted to create such a court, so now comes the implementation.

I have no idea how all this ends. A prison term for Ould Abdel Aziz is certainly possible at this point, I’d say. But I could also see a scenario where he simply leaves the country for good. Or a scenario some former ministers get harsh sentences, but not the ex-president. I’m still a bit surprised that the inquiry got this far, actually. I suppose I’ve gotten used to a Sahelian (and global) norm of former heads of state mostly being beyond the reach of the law – although I should add that multiple things can be true at once: Ould Abdel Aziz almost certainly oversaw major corruption, and the parliamentary inquiry is in my view quite obviously politically motivated. You don’t have to pick between those two interpretations.

 

Notes on France 24’s Interview with Former Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz

Mauritania’s immediate past president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (in office 2008-2009 as a military ruler, and 2009-2019 as an elected civilian president), is facing legal difficulties connected with a corruption investigation by the Mauritanian parliament. See my timeline of his encounters with parliament and the police here, and that post also links to pieces that give more context about the situation.

Ould Abdel Aziz gave a press conference on August 27, accusing the investigators (and, implicitly, his successor-turned-enemy, current President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani) of using the investigation to settle scores and damage his reputation.

On September 10, from his home in Mauritania’s capital Nouakchott, Ould Abdel Aziz gave an interview to France 24. Again, as France 24 noted in their writeup, the former president denounces a “political vendetta” but without directly naming Ould Ghazouani as the instigator of that vendetta.

Here are a few other notes and comments on the interview:

• Ould Abdel Aziz describes himself, along with his son-in-law Mohamed Ould Mboussabou (who was questioned by police in late August) and one of his sons,* as the principal targets of the inquiry. He complains that out of the 317 people (his figure) named in the report, only he and his two family members have been detained at length.
• Ould Abdel Aziz traces the genesis of his current troubles to the power struggles over the ruling party, the Union for the Republic (French acronym UPR), a contest he lost to Ould Ghazouani in late 2019/early 2020.
• He describes the members of the parliamentary commission of inquiry as close associates of the current president – a claim with some truth, although as Jeune Afrique has noted, the head of the commission is a long-time UPR member, meaning he may have been close to Ould Abdel Aziz himself at some point.
• Ould Abdel Aziz argues that his treatment has violated the Constitution and specifically Article 93, which basically grants the president immunity for all acts in office – except, and this is crucial, for high treason, and in that case an ex-president can be judged by a High Court of Justice. In late July, deputies voted in favor of re-establishing such a court in connection with the corruption inquiry. Asked directly about such a court, he dodged a bit, saying that the whole inquiry had been suffused with bias and irregularities from the beginning.
• The second half of the interview is less interesting than the first; the second half basically consists of Ould Abdel Aziz mostly denying different things, including the suggestion that he wanted a third term or that, once out of office, he tried to organize a coup against Ould Ghazouani.
• Ould Abdel Aziz is evidently frustrated and affronted, repeatedly saying that he had resisted all those close to him who encouraged him to seek a third term, and insisting that he left the country in excellent shape, stable, etc. He seems to have expected to receive a great deal of deference and exercise a great deal of influence in his post-presidency, and neither of those outcomes has occurred.

*I’m having trouble pinning this point down. He refers to the questioning of “the administrator of the foundation” connected with his son, and Al Jazeera refers to an accountant connected with that foundation being questioned. But I had trouble finding any more details. Relatedly, for what it’s worth, this columnist describes ex-Oil Minister Mohamed Abdel Ould Vetah as a kind of “adopted son” of Ould Abdel Aziz. So family connections appear to be involved in more ways than one. Readers’ insights on these points, and others, are welcome as always.

Mauritania: A Timeline of Former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz’s Legal Woes During Summer 2020

Here on the blog I try to keep pretty current on events from Mauritania to Chad but it’s hard not to fall behind with so much going on. In this post I’m going to try to catch myself (and you, if you need it) up on the corruption investigation into Mauritania’s immediate past present, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (in power 2008-2009 as a military ruler, and 2009-2019 as a civilian president). For my last post on the investigation, see here, and for broader background on the falling out between Ould Abdel Aziz and his successor, current President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, see here.

For now, I want to assemble the timeline of key events this summer:

• July 6: The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry summons Ould Abdel Aziz to appear at a July 9 hearing; he refuses.
• July 27: The Parliamentary Commission presents its final report, and a majority of parliamentary deputies vote to reinstate the High Court of Justice, the sole institution capable of judging past presidents.
• August 17: Ould Abdel Aziz questioned and detained by the police, specifically by the Directorate-General of National Security.
• August 23-24: Ould Abdel Aziz released, but banned from leaving Nouakchott.
• August 25: Ould Abdel Aziz summoned again for questioning by police.
• August 27: Ould Abdel Aziz gives a press conference and charges that the Parliamentary Commission’s real goal is to settle scores and ruin his reputation.

For analysis of the most recent developments, see Geoff Porter’s briefing (available to those who sign up) at North Africa Risk Consulting.

Mauritania’s New Government: Continuity, and a Corruption-Related Mini-Exodus

On August 6, Mauritania’s President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani replaced his prime minister. I wrote about the new prime minister, the engineer and former housing minister Mohamed Ould Bilal, here. Ould Bilal then formed a government whose members were announced on August 9. The full list is here. The new cabinet met for the first time on August 12.

Jeune Afrique points out that the new government largely comprises members of the old government: “Out of 23 ministers, only 8 are new.” (Le Monde‘s count varies from that a bit, saying that 18 ministers have returned – I have not found time to go through to confirm who is correct.) Among the continuing/reinstated ministers are some of the most important ones: Ismaël Ould Cheikh Ahmed at Foreign Affairs, Hanenna Ould Sidi at Defense, and Ahmed Salem Ould Merzoug at Interior.

Yet there are some important new appointments, as the Mauritanian journalist Bakari Guèye points out in this interview: Ousmane Mamoudou Kane at Economy (replacing Abdel Aziz Ould Dahi, who remains in government but as Minister of Fishing and the Maritime Economy); Abdessalem Ould Mohamed Saleh at Petroleum; and Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Cheikh Abdullah Ould Boya at Justice.

There is a double context for the specific ministers who were removed and replaced. First, some were named in the July 26 report from a parliamentary commission investigating corruption under former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (in power 2008-2019), Ould Ghazouani’s immediate predecessor. As the above-linked Jeune Afrique article mentions, on August 9, three days after the new prime minister was appointed, a presidential spokesman explicitly confirmed that the cabinet reshuffle was linked to the corruption investigation and its fallout. Among those named in the parliamentary investigation was the outgoing prime minister, Ismaïl Ould Bedda Ould Cheikh Sidiya. The presidency’s spokesman said that those under investigation will now have time to prepare their defenses – but clearly the president also wishes to distance himself and the serving government from the corruption case.

Second, at least according to Guèye, the number of ministers carried over from Ould Abdel Aziz’s time is now down to just one: Sidi Ould Salem, Minister of Higher Education. If this is right (again, I haven’t found time to confirm), then it would represent a furthering of a wider process of Ould Ghazouani replacing Ould Abdel Aziz’s people within the ruling party, the military, and the civilian government.

When Ould Bilal was selected as prime minister, I speculated a bit that Ould Ghazouani might be attempting to fulfill his (somewhat vague) campaign promises to have greater inclusivity of different socio-racial categories within government and society. Ould Bilal hails from the Haratine, a socio-racial category of Arabic speakers who are defined as “black,” in contrast to the Arabic-speaking “whites” or Bidan. In Mauritania there are also “Afro-Mauritanians” from ethnicities such as the Wolof and Peul. At first glance, the new government looks relatively diverse, with several Haratine in prominent posts, several recognizably Afro-Mauritanian surnames, and several women. That kind of diversity, however, does not necessarily translate into a shakeup in terms of how power and race operate within the elite or within the society more broadly.

Mauritania: A Change in Prime Minister Amid the Parliamentary Corruption Investigation

Yesterday, August 6, Mauritania’s Prime Minister Ismail Ould Cheikh Sidiya resigned, along with his government. President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani has tapped an engineer and former minister, Mohamed Ould Bilal, as the next Prime Minister and has tasked him with forming a new government. My impression from the news stories I’ve read is that the president does not need parliamentary approval to make this change.

Biographies of Ould Bilal can be found here (Arabic) and here (French). Born in 1963, he hails from Keur-Macene (map) in the Trarza region. Ould Bilal rose through the ranks of development and food security agencies before his appointment as Minister of Equipment, Urban Planning, and Housing under the civilian President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi (in office 2007-2008). Under the next head of state, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (in power 2008-2019), Ould Bilal briefly served as director the Mauritanian Electricity Company (Somelec). Under Ould Ghazouani he has been working as an advisor within the Prime Minister’s office, so he is being promoted from within.

Ould Bilal is from the Haratine, meaning that he comes from a socio-racial category of Arabic speakers who are defined in Mauritanian society as racially black, unlike the Bidan who are Arabic speakers socially defined as white. Mauritania’s elite largely hails from the Bidan even though the Bidan are a demographic minority in the country.

In the press and beyond, the change in prime minister is almost universally seen as connected to the ongoing parliamentary investigation into alleged corruption under Ould Abdel Aziz (the immediate past president, if you’re losing track of all the names). As Reuters points out, “several ministers” from the departing government of Ould Cheikh Sidiya may be implicated in scandals.

My hot take is that the appointment of (a) a technocrat and (b) a Hartani* may be intended to project an image of professionalism and inclusivity at a delicate moment for the president. During his election campaign last spring and summer, Ould Ghazaouni indicated that he would take a more inclusive approach than past (Bidan) heads of state – through the appointment of Ould Bilal, the president may be seeking (among other goals) to show that he will make good on such intentions. This is not the first time that a Hartani has held a senior post in the government (Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, for example, served as president of the National Assembly), but the racial politics of the appointment are notable.

*Singular of Haratine

Mauritania: Latest Developments in the Parliamentary Inquiry into Alleged Corruption under Former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz

In Mauritania, former President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (ruled as military head of state 2008-2009, and as an elected civilian 2009-2019) is under investigation by the parliament over allegations of corruption. See here for a previous post of mine on the investigation.

This week two important developments occurred in his case:

• On July 27, the National Assembly voted to pass a law allowing for the creation of a High Court of Justice, the only institution authorized to judge ex-presidents. The law now goes to the Constitutional Council for review and validation, a process that can take 8-30 days; and then the law goes to the current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, for promulgation, a process that can also take 8-30 days. Opposition deputies, however, have expressed skepticism that anything substantive will come out of the process.
• On July 29, President Ould Ghazouani approved the parliamentary commission of inquiry’s report on Ould Abdel Aziz’s tenure. One major allegation in the report is that Ould Abdel Aziz may have tried to sell/give an island within the Banc d’Arguin National Park (official website here, map here) to the Emir of Qatar in 2012.

More on the island issue here, here, and here:

With all the talk about former #Mauritania President Ould Abdelaziz trying to gift an island (Ile de Tidra) to the Emir of #Qatar, here's a picture of said island (out on the horizon) from December 2019.

(Old lateen rig on the fishboat and some pelicans.) pic.twitter.com/jWJEHGix73

— Geoff D. Porter (@geoffdporter) July 29, 2020

Parliament is now in recess. On July 30, Justice Minister Haïmouda Ould Ramdane stated that the government will follow normal legal procedures in pursuing the inquiry and stated that the process would be apolitical and objective – obviously, though, many observers read the corruption investigation partly or heavily in the context of the falling-out between Ould Abdel Aziz and Ould Ghazouani, who were close associates for decades prior to the latter’s election.

A notable statement on the whole affair has come from Sidi Mohamed Ould Maham, a former president of the ruling Union for the Republic (French acronym UPR). On Facebook, Ould Maham warned, “There is an organized campaign in a deliberate fashion aiming to absolve the former president of this corruption and offer these [former ministers and officials] as a sacrificial ram* to the people and to the judiciary.” The statement could be parsed in a lot of different ways, to say the least. More coverage of Ould Maham’s statement can be found here.

*It is not an accident that Ould Maham used the phrase “sacrificial ram” in a statement made in the lead-up to Eid al-Adha (which falls today). The phrase evokes the ram sacrificed by the Prophet Ibrahim/Abraham as a ransom for his son (usually thought to be the Prophet Ismail, rather than the Prophet Ishaq/Isaac, in the Islamic tradition).

Mauritania: Two Corruption Investigations Proceed Simultaneously

In Mauritania, two major investigations into alleged corruption are unfolding simultaneously. One has to do with the immediate past President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, and the other concerns a scandal that just broke under current President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani.

To begin with Ould Abdel Aziz, he left office in August 2019 after what initially appeared to be a very smooth handover to his long-time associate Ould Ghazouani. Within months, the relationship soured, making Ould Abdel Aziz quite politically vulnerable. A parliamentary commission of inquiry is looking into possible corruption during Ould Abdel Aziz’s 2008-2019 time as head of state. The inquiry concerns alleged corruption in the oil sector and beyond. The latest key development is that the former president refused to honor the commission’s summons for a hearing on 9 July. Apparently the former president and former members of government enjoy immunity from such summons and even from prosecution – except in what would be a truly dramatic development, namely charges of “high treason” before a High Court of Justice (more on how that would be “fairly juridically complex” here). On 13 July, however, the prominent and controversial deputy (and runner-up in the 2019 presidential election) Biram Dah Abeid called for the convocation of just such a court.

The parliamentary inquiry extends beyond Ould Abdel Aziz himself to encompass some of his team, including his son-in-law “Mohamed Sidi M’Bareck Msabour, his cousin Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz, and his close collaborate, the businessman Mohamed Lemine Bobati.” Petroleum, Energy, and Mines Minister Mohamed Abdel Vetah, appointed by Ould Abdel Aziz, may be summoned before the parliamentary commission as well.

The second corruption investigation concerns a brand new scandal, namely the reported disappearance of nearly 1 million euros and over $350,000 from the reserves of the Central Bank of Mauritania in June. According to the RFI at that link, “Many employees of the bank as well as outside persons may be implicated in this affair,” and some employees have been arrested. A parliamentary deputy from the ruling party has called for a commission of inquiry. It is not clear how high the scandal reaches, and whether it will touch former Bank director and current Economy and Industry Minister Abdel Aziz Ould Dahi.

Notes on Yesterday’s G5 Security Summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania

Yesterday, 30 June, Sahelian heads of state, French President Emmanuel Macron, other top European leaders, and representatives of numerous multilateral bodies met in Nouakchott, Mauritania for a summit on Sahelian security. According to Macron’s agenda for the day, the event consisted of a working lunch for heads of state, followed by a larger meeting and then a joint press conference. The Elysée (French presidency) does not appear to keep permanent links for each separate day, so I am posting a screen shot:

Another version of the agenda, which differs just slightly from the times listed by the Elysée, was published by the Mauritanian outlet Mauri Actu and can be found here. That version gives a sense of the other participants in the event.

The Nouakchott summit is the sequel to one held at Macron’s invitation in Pau, France in January 2020. You can read the transcription of the joint press conference from that event in French here, and the New York Times‘ (appropriately critical) coverage is here. The Nouakchott summit also follows the 25 February G5 Sahel summit in Nouakchott as well as the recent virtual launch, on 16 June, of the French-backed Coalition for the Sahel. Nouakchott has been the site of several key meetings this year because Mauritania currently holds the rotating presidency of the G5 Sahel, a political (and now military-political) coordinating body for Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.

In the lead-up to yesterday’s summit, a theme in Western press coverage was the suggestion that France is “gaining” militarily in the Sahel while the Sahelian governments are dysfunctional. I disagree with that framing, but let’s unpack it a bit first.

Here is AFP:

France is increasingly optimistic about the effectiveness of its anti-jihadist campaign in the Sahel, but experts caution that short-term successes will not by themselves bring lasting victory…

The governments of these countries, among the poorest in the world, are struggling to reinvest in the newly-retaken territories and win hearts and minds.

And here is Reuters, whose article is even more explicit that the assessment of “France is winning, Sahel governments are flailing” comes ultimately from the French government:

Mali and Burkina Faso must guarantee at a summit this week that their domestic political problems do not reverse fragile military successes against Islamist militants in the Sahel region, a French presidential source said on Monday.

“Domestic political problems” seems to mean the protests against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in Mali and the upcoming elections in Burkina Faso, or perhaps the phrase is also a veiled reference to widely reported security force abuses in those countries (and in Niger).

Clearly there is domestic turmoil in Mali and Burkina Faso – but I am uncomfortable with the framing that effectively says “African dysfunction is undercutting French accomplishments.” For one thing, I’m not sure what France’s “fragile military successes” really consist of, beyond the killing of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)’s emir Abdelmalek Droukdel on June 3. Aside from the killing of Droukdel, most of what I’ve seen recently from France’s Operation Barkhane reads to me as the same kind of operations it has been conducting for years, and any gains in one area inevitably seem to be paralleled by a degradation in another area. The press coverage of this summit is replete with references to French/Sahelian gains made in the tri-border zone (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), but the references are quite vague once you scrutinize them. Meanwhile, the events and reports coming out of the Sahel’s conflict zones seem quite grim to me – blockaded towns in northern Burkina Faso, villages under jihadist sway in the east, Mali’s premier opposition leader in presumed jihadist captivity for over three months, etc. Those are bad signs, and they don’t seem to indicate that the French and Sahelian militaries are on a path toward victory.

And then, to return to critiquing the framing of “French prowess, African dysfunction,” there is the fact that France is not merely a military actor in the Sahel but is, first and foremost, a political actor in its former colonies – and a military intervention is itself a political act, I might add. France appears most comfortable working, when possible, with strongmen; failing that, France leans on a particular type of technocratic, Francophone professional politician in its former colonies. I don’t think that French authorities hand-pick the candidates to run in Sahelian elections. But is it an accident that the heads of state so often look exactly what you would imagine the Elysée would dream up – an economist or banker turned lifelong politician, perhaps still a “socialist” according to their party’s name but generally neoliberal in economic policy and deferential to France and Europe when it comes to international relations? And then you add to that the optic of Macron basically publicly treating the current Sahelian heads of state as his subordinates and clients, and ultimately what you have is an extremely top-down and narrow conception of political authority in the region. Is it a surprise that such a system has proven brittle and fragile, especially amid a widening conflict? How the Sahel can move forward politically is an enormously complicated question and I do not have the answer, but I suspect that the answer does not begin with Macron instructing his counterparts to get their shit together.

</mini rant>

Turning to the substance of the summit, here are a few resources:

• Here is the final joint communiqué. Honestly, very little stood out to me from the document, which mostly read to me as a restatement of the principles of the Coalition for the Sahel (counterterrorism, enhancing military capacity, “the return of the state,” and development) and a restatement of what was discussed at Pau. There are references in this latest communiqué to not tolerating human rights abuses, a major topic of discussion recently, and the Sahelien heads of state called for (even) more international security contributions, but otherwise I thought the document was bland.
• Here is the video and transcript of Macron’s remarks on his arrival at the summit. His primary theme was “solidarity” in the face of COVID-19 and terrorism. A secondary theme was the “return of the state,” especially in parts of Mali and Burkina Faso. The “return of the state” is, again, one of four pillars of the Coalition for the Sahel.
• Twitter posts from Sahelian heads of state, regarding their respective participation in the summit, can be found at the following links: Mohamed Ould Ghazouani of Mauritania; Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta of Mali; Roch Kaboré of Burkina Faso; Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger; Idriss Deby of Chad.
• RFI’s readout of the summit, which notes the positive and optimistic tone that the heads of state struck.

Speaking of international security engagements, the next development on the horizon there is the anticipated deployment of the French-created Takuba Task Force. At Clingendael, Anna Schmauder, Zoë Gorman, and Flore Berger have written an excellent explainer about the force.

Ould Ghazouani posted a striking photo of the six heads of state; I leave you with that:

أشكر ضيوفنا الكرام، رؤساء دول الساحل، وقادة وممثلي التحالف الداعم له، وأثمن ما طبع قمة نواكشوط المنعقدة في هذه اللحظة الدولية الفارقة، من روح التشاور وعمق الصراحة فى الجلسات المغلقة، سعيا إلى تجسيد الأمن وتعزيز التنمية فى دول المنطقة. pic.twitter.com/7DkJpkyK2H

— Mohamed Cheikh El Ghazouani محمد ولدالشيخ الغزواني (@CheikhGhazouani) June 30, 2020