The story I want to tell here can be told with headlines:
- AFP, May 18: “France Accused of Favouring Mali’s Tuareg Rebels.”
- Reuters, May 19: “After Crushing Mali Islamists, France Pushes Deal with Tuaregs.”
- USA Today, May 20: “French Troops Depart Mali, Leaving Joy, Worries.”
These articles leave the reader with the impression that France is continuing to intervene in Malian politics even as it reduces its military presence there, and that its political stances are proving unpopular.
France and other outside powers have flirted heavily with the idea that the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), a movement that advocated northern Malian separatism during the early phase of last year’s rebellion, is a politically acceptable negotiating partner, and one that deserves some political stake in post-conflict northern Mali. Some Western policymakers find this belief alluring, I suspect, because it helps them categorize northern Malians into “good” and “bad” rebels and offers hope of putting various genies back into various bottles. If the MNLA speaks for northern Malians, the argument runs, reaching an agreement with it could resolve the conflict.
My own opinion is that the MNLA’s brutality and loss of political control in early 2012 refutes the notion that they can speak for northern Mali – they only speak for part of it. The recent withdrawal from the MNLA of one of its key leaders provides further evidence that the MNLA only speaks for some.
Outsiders would be wise to question the reductionist view that positions the MNLA as the most significant political force in northern Mali. Outsiders’ attempts to apply such a view could cause backlash on the ground. As the city of Kidal, which the MNLA now helps control, becomes a symbol in struggles over the future identity of Mali, France’s positions appear out of step with the views of many Malians. The Reuters article mentioned above explains:
A standoff over how to restore Malian government authority to Kidal, the last town in the desert north yet to be brought under central control, is sowing resentment with Paris and could delay planned elections to restore democracy after a coup.
Mali’s army has moved troops towards Kidal, a stronghold of the MNLA Tuareg separatists, but missed a self-imposed deadline this week to retake the Saharan town. France, which has its own forces camped outside, does not want Malian troops to march on the town, fearing ethnic bloodshed if it is taken by force.
[…]
Many in government and on the streets of Bamako blame the January 2012 uprising by the Tuareg MNLA for unleashing the other calamities that nearly dissolved the country. Nationalists now want the army to march into Kidal to disarm the rebels.
France is instead backing secretive talks being held in neighboring Burkina Faso, designed to allow the July elections to take place, while urging Bamako to address Tuaregs’ long-standing demands for autonomy for their desert homeland.
Clashes between Arabs and Tuaregs have shown that ethnic tension remains high.
More on the talks here, and a short case study of Arab-Tuareg clashes here.
As of Wednesday (French), the MNLA had expressed willingness to let Kidal participate in presidential elections in July, but continued unwillingness to allow the Malian army to enter the city. The longer the political and military standoff over Kidal continues, the more frustrated other parts of the country could become – RFI (French) writes that Kidal has become “a national obsession in Mali,” and that its name “is on all the lips in Bamako.” Historical memories may contribute to this “obsession”: Kidal was created in 1991 (out of the Gao region) with the hopes of helping resolve the Tuareg-led rebellion of that time. Many non-Tuareg Malians reportedly blame the Tuareg for Mali’s crisis and view the Tuareg as angling for a greater share of government largesse than they deserve. As anger grows over the situation in Kidal, Malians who hold such views may become outraged by outsiders’ attempts to elevate the MNLA as the north’s premier political force.
Sahel Blog 
Thanks Alex,
Kidal is not the north, it’s only part of the north. It’s also, to my mind, the only part which, as you possibly contend in your piece, the MNLA truly speaks for. Were the MNLA to convert itself into a political party, I believe that it would be in a definite minority if northern Mali as a whole were to go to the polls tomorrow. But it would be in a majority in Kidal and most parts of the Adagh. Of that I’m certain. The French policy in Kidal, which is apparently driven mainly by the French military who are well aware of the realities on the ground and often at loggerheads with less well-informed French politicians, is to keep the Malian army out of the area simply to avoid an all out war between the MNLA and the Malian army. Quite reasonably, they want to deal with the residual problem of jihadism in the north first. That’s their main priority and the reason behind their intervention of January 11th last. Why open another front and complicate matters? In that I believe they have acted with particular astuteness. Of course, the situation cannot last forever. But then the solution won’t be to open the doors and let the Malian army take over again, but rather to achieve some kind of intelligent and lasting settlement between Bamako and Kidal and then take it from there.
With respect, Andy.
The Malian Army deeds of the past, and deeds in the January 11th invasion by the French has not made this an amiable atmosphere. The MNLA is not going to give up its arms, allow the Malian Army to descend on them and kill them. And with that for a fear, no wonder Niger is being swallowed up by refugees.
Bamako has really done nothing to quell those fears. Had they then there would not be the continued flight of people away from Mali.