Guest Post: The 2016 Election in Niger: A Missed Opportunity?

[This is a guest post from Ibrahim Yahya Ibrahim, a Research Associate with the Sahel  Research Group and a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida. – Alex]

Continuous Political Tension

On February 21st, Nigeriens voted massively – 67% of registered voters cast their vote – in a ballot that turned out to be Niger’s most controversial election in recent history. Hama Amadou, one of the major contenders, was in prison throughout the electoral process, accused of involvement in a baby trafficking scandal.  Given the multiple allegations of electoral fraud, not to mention the boycott of the run-off election on March 20th and the subsequent rejection of the election results by the opposition, the 2016 election appears as a missed opportunity for Nigeriens to resolve in a peaceful and institutional manner the ever-growing political tensions that seem to herald yet another cycle of political instability.

Figure 1 Niger

Figure 1: Voters waiting to cast their ballot on February 21st.

It is worth mentioning that Niger is a country with a long history of political instability. The most recent episode started in August of 2013 when President Issoufou, in reaction to a deteriorating climate within the ruling coalition, and threatened with losing the majority in the National Assembly, suggested the formation of a government of national unity, which he invited the main opposition parties to join. But, drawn by the prospect of creating a new coalition that could impose a regime of cohabitation – where Issoufou would remain President while the opposition took control over the government – the opposition decided to decline the offer. A climate of disdain and mistrust emerged between the two camps, each one seeing only conspiracy and sabotage in the other’s actions. In a last-minute struggle, the government managed to divide the opposition coalition and extracted crucial support from opposition breakaways, so that it maintained its parliamentary majority and remained in power.

Following this power struggle, Issoufou’s government adopted an uncompromising stance vis-à-vis the opposition on various issues related to the organization of elections, the so-called crushing of the opposition parties, and the arrest and imprisonment of opposition leaders. In reaction to this rigid and aggressive approach the opposition also adopted an increasingly confrontational attitude that often included the incitation to civil disobedience and fanning of ethnic resentment.

This political tension raised the stakes of the 2016 election. It appears, in fact, as if Niger’s aging political elites, viewing the end of their political careers approaching, have become more aggressive in their fight to conquer or hold on to political power. The growing animosity among the elite contributed to the radicalization of campaign discourse, and pushed the protagonists to use all means possible, including non-conventional ones, in order to secure victory. Resorting to ethno-regionalist arguments to mobilize voters as well as the organization of electoral fraud that included underage voting, vote buying, and rigging of election results, were but some of the radical strategies that politicians on both sides used in order to garner votes.

The perspective of a run-off between Issoufou Mahamadou and Hama Amadou – respectively winners of 48% and 17% of the vote in the first round – temporarily allowed for some relaxation of tension. But on March 17th the coalition of the Opposition for Change in 2016 (Copa 2016) declared that they would “withdraw” from the ongoing electoral process, and called on their supporters to boycott the run-off ballot on March 20th. They took this radical position following the Constitutional Court’s validation of what they deemed the fraudulent results of the first round of the elections. Whether this stance is interpreted as the attitude of “ sore losers,” or the only recourse available to victims of fraud, the boycott announcement certainly set the stage for contestation and a post-election struggle.

The “Coup K.O.” Controversy

One of the major issues of the 2016 election was the controversy around President Issoufou’s campaign slogan of “Coup K.O.” – “knockout” in English – meaning his expectation of an undisputed victory in the first round. Throughout the electoral campaign, Issoufou’s partisans asserted he would win the first round. They pointed out that Issoufou was able to win 36% of the vote in the first round of the 2011 presidential election, and that this came to pass despite fifteen years spent in the opposition (1995 – 2011) and at a time when he was running as the candidate of only his party, the PNDS Tarayya. Now that he was running on behalf of a coalition of 44 parties, and after governing the country for five years and successfully implementing his “Renaissance Niger” program, it was very realistic to forecast his reelection in the first round.

The Coalition of the Opposition for Change  (Copa 2016), composed of 17 political parties including Hama Amadou’s Moden FA Lumana Africa, and Seyni Oumarou’s MNSD Nassara viewed the Coup K.O. slogan as “unrealistic and even provocative.” They argued that given Niger’s pluralistic and highly fragmented political party system, no presidential candidate has ever won the elections in the first round, except for Ibrahim Mainassara Baré’s fraudulent victory in 1996. From their perspective, the Coup K.O. slogan was nothing more than a pledge to another electoral fraud, which would only result in chaos for the country.

Figure 2 Niger

Figure 2: Coup K.O caricature portraying Issoufou Mahamdou knocking out Niger. Published by the pro-opposition newspaper, Monde d’Aujourdh’hui.

The Coup K.O. slogan thus contributed to exacerbating an already tense political climate between the opposition and the government. The electoral campaign was in fact marked by a series of arrests of members of the oppositions, clashes between the police and partisans of Hama Amadou, and an unprecedented level of verbal violence, particularly on social media. Two days before the elections, Amadou Boubacar Cisse, the spokesperson of Copa 2016, declared that his coalition would reject any result that gave Issoufou the victory in the first round.

Voter Mobilization and the Revival of Ethno-Regionalism

In Niger, political ideology has never been a relevant factor of political mobilization. Party affiliation, however, used to be strong, but is now in decline in favor of sympathy towards, and personal connections with, political candidates. In the absence of these two factors, ethno-regionalist feeling has emerged as one of the most effective means for political mobilization. Political parties’ strongholds correspond, in fact, to the region or city of origin of candidates. Thus in the 2016 elections major candidates such as Mahamane Ousmane, Issoufou Mahamadou, Ibrahim Yacouba, and Hama Amadou each won over 50% of the votes in their region of origin, respectively Zinder, Tahoua, Doutchi and Niamey. This preference is partly based on clientelistic incentives, such as voters’ expectation that their chance of gaining privileged access to state resources is greater if people from their region or ethnic group hold power.

In this election, ethno-regionalism was enhanced by a feeling of empathy vis-à-vis certain candidates who were deemed victims of harassment by the government. Candidates such as Hama Amadou, who ran his campaign from prison, and Mahamane Ousmane, who was ousted from his own CDS Rahama party, largely benefitted from voters’ empathy in their respective fiefdoms. In Zinder, Mahamane Ousmane’s supporters prominently used Hausa proverbs that evoke social obligations to lend support to a victimized relative or friend: naka naka ne komin lalacewarshi (“yours is yours no matter how bad he is; if you reject yours, then who will love/support him?”) or ranar takaici kai ya cire (Anger must be expressed regardless of the consequences), or also Ba aro ba haya, yaw aikin gidanmu muke yi (“No loan no rent, now we are working for our own.”) In their local meaning and contexts, these proverbs convey a sort of ethno-regional chauvinism that had hitherto been latent and in decline.

Ethno-regionalism, however, seems to have been more prevalent in the presidential than in the legislative elections. Regarding the latter, local relations of reciprocity such as attending neighbors’ social ceremonies, helping out people in need, generosity, and other such valued personal traits, tended to override the ethno-regionalist considerations. Thus for example in Zinder, a city that is overwhelmingly Hausa and known for its communitarian support for Mahamane Ousmane, there was nevertheless a strong enthusiasm for ethnically Zarma legislative candidates from Dosso and Tillabery.

Remarkably, religion did not play a significant role in the campaign, except for a few references to the anti-Charlie Hebdo riots that struck the country in January 2015. Religious leaders’ activism in the electoral process was limited to invocations and appeals for peaceful elections. Despite the unprecedented rise of political Islam in the region, it is quite surprising that no religious-based movement similar to the Malian Sabati 2012 or the Mauritanian Tawassoul arose in Niger. Perhaps the popular view of politics as dirty and ungodly, together with the Nigerien government’s assertive management of the religious sphere, have created an unfavorable context for religious leaders to develop political ambitions.

Electoral Frauds

Although the elections took place peacefully and on a globally satisfactory note from the point of view of international observers, there have also been reports of several types of fraud that included underage voting, rigging of election results, and vote buying.  While vote buying has remained an effective political tool in Nigerien elections, particularly in rural areas, its effectiveness was in fact declining, as voters had become increasingly aware that, given the way the electoral system operates, they can actually accept money and still vote for the candidate of their choice. But given the high stakes of this election, vote-buyers proved more persuasive, raising the offered amount to a level never reached before in order to try to ensure the voters’ full loyalty. The “cost” of a vote has thus varied significantly. While some people in Zinder apparently accepted to sell their vote in exchange for small amounts of cash – between 1,000 and 2,000 CFA (about $2 to $4) – or for small items such as soap, in Maradi, a closely-contested town, the cost of vote saw an unprecedented inflation, reaching up to 10,000 CFA (about $20) per vote, or a bag of rice.

In other instances, party brokers collected voters’ cards from owners, or managed to get the non-distributed ones from village chiefs or districts leaders, and then re-distributed these to their supporters with ready-made ID cards that allowed them to vote again. This is a preferred procedure for vote buying because the buyers are certain to get the vote. Some people voted several times with different voters and ID cards. In Niamey, another closely contested city, credible information reported people selling their voter cards for up to 20,000 CFA ($40).

Although, the accusations of fraud have been usually directed toward the government, the use of fraudulent practices by all political parties, especially vote-buying, had been in fact more a matter of degree and resources. Many legislative candidates and political brokers from both the ruling and the opposition parties resorted to these strategies in order to garner votes.

A Contested Victory

On March 22nd, the electoral commission announced the results of the run-off. Issoufou Mahamadou came out victorious, winning 92% of the votes. This margin of victory was not surprising, given that the opposition had boycotted the ballot. What was surprising, however, was the 59% participation rate, which contrasts with the low turnout reported by many observers, at least in most urban areas. In a press conference organized on the same day, the Coalition of the Opposition for Change in 2016 reiterated its rejection of the electoral process, as well as of all of the institutions that will result from it. It further declared that it would consider Issoufou’s regime illegitimate starting from April 2nd, the day when Issoufou’s first term comes to an end. Beyond this outcry, the only solution that the Copa 2016 proposes is calling on the international community to help establish a transitional government that will organize new elections. It goes without saying that a transitional government is not on the government’s current agenda. Moreover, in his short victory speech, Issoufou Mahamadou focused on national unity and social cohesion as the only solution to the current crisis. He called upon Nigeriens “to come together, to not waste energy in vain quarrels, to unite in order to construct the nation.”

It is clear that at this moment, government and opposition sit on separate tables and that the gap between their respective proposed solutions is wide.  Although a promising diplomatic effort to bring the two parties to the negotiating table is ongoing, for those who hoped to see in these elections the proof of Niger’s democratic maturity, the 2016 elections were a source of great disappointment.

 

 

Nigeria: President Buhari’s Trip to Niger and Chad

On June 3 (yesterday), Nigeria’s President Buhari started his first trip abroad since taking office, visiting Niger (June 3), Chad (June 4), and then heading to the G7 Summit in Krün, Germany. As Jeune Afrique (French) points out, the trip signifies the importance Buhari attaches to the fight against Boko Haram, and particularly to his relations with Niger and Chad, both of which have been deeply and increasingly involved in the Boko Haram effort.

The trip, in my view, is meant to signal appreciation for these countries’ efforts and convey a continued willingness to work with them, but also to re-assert Nigeria’s leadership.

Here are some key moments from Niger and Chad:

Niger

  • Speech in Niger. Key quotes:
    • “I would like to convey the appreciation of Nigeria for the sacrifices by Niger in the on-going efforts to counter the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency.”
    • “I wish to reassure that with the new impetus [in the fight against Boko Haram] and resolve to seek for closer collaboration with our neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroun, Boko Haram insurgency will soon be defeated, insha Allah.”
    • “Another issue of concern to us which is closely associated with the insurgency in the region is the influx of refugees and other displaced persons. We are aware that currently, there are over one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) displaced persons comprising refugees and returnees taking refuge in various parts of Niger…Our administration will work closely with governments of the affected States to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the displaced persons and their host communities. The ultimate objective however, remains to end the insurgency and facilitate their return to their homes.”
  • News:
    • Reuters: “Nigeria’s army will take a bigger role in the effort to crush Boko Haram, by taking over from soldiers from Niger in occupying towns liberated from the Islamist militant group, President Muhammadu Buhari said on Wednesday.”
    • Premium Times: “President Muhammadu Buhari said Wednesday he will review a report by the human rights group, Amnesty International, alleging widespread torture and extrajudicial killings by Nigerian military in the fight against Boko Haram.” Official readout of Buhari’s comments here, Amnesty report here.
  • Photographs of Buhari with Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou.

Chad

  • Speech and final communique (unverified). Key quote:
    • “Your Excellency, permit me to note that our security is intricately linked. This compels us to cooperate fully on security issues in a robust and sustained manner. To this end, we must redouble our efforts to operationalize the Multi-National Joint Task Force with its Headquarters in Ndjamena. I believe the Task Force will stabilize the areas that have been ravaged by the Boko Haram insurgency when it becomes fully operational. I am very confident that, Insha Allah, this insurgency will be brought to an end soon.”
  • News:
    • AFP: “Buhari on Thursday praised Chad for joining the fight against Boko Haram, saying further cooperation was essential in the future…Deby for his part ‘reaffirmed Chad’s involvement and availability’ to work with Nigeria, according to a statement from his office.”
    • Premium Times: “President Idris Deby of Chad has praised President Muhammadu Buhari for his ‘wise decision’’ to relocate the Nigerian Military Command center from Abuja to Maiduguri, to speed up the defeat of the insurgent group, Boko Haram.”
    • Channels: “While in the Chadian capital, President Buhari also held a closed-door meeting with Major-General Tukur Buratai of Nigeria, who was recently appointed Force Commander of the MNJTF, with headquarters in N’Djamena.”
  • Photographs of Buhari with Chadian President Idriss Deby.

What are your impressions of the trip?

Niger: President Issoufou’s Trip to Saudi Arabia

Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou and a delegation of cabinet ministers and other senior government officials traveled to Saudi Arabia from approximately May 10-12. The visit is not unusual, but in light of Senegal’s recent decision to send troops to support Saudi Arabia in its military venture in Yemen, there has been more attention to Saudi-Sahelian relations. So it is interesting to look at the content of Issoufou’s trip, which centered on themes of Saudi investment in Niger and Islamic solidarity between the two countries.

Upon his arrival in Riyadh (French), Issoufou met King Salman. This was Issoufou’s first visit since King Salman took the throne in January, so Issoufou gave both condolences on the death of King Abdullah and congratulations on King Salman’s coronation. In addition to meeting the Foreign Affairs and Education Ministers, Issoufou met (French) Finance Minister Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Assaf as well as Hajj Minister Bandar al-Hajjar. With al-Assaf, Issoufou discussed the Saudi Fund for Development and its projects in Niger.

(Unfortunately the Fund’s website does not have a country page for Niger, but the Saudi embassy in Niger provides a few details here, writing that the Fund works in “health, education and the construction of dams, as the fund is now building seven health centers in seven regions in Niger and the [sic] of 150 primary schools project. You can also read about a dam project in Mali here [Arabic].)

Issoufou’s other meetings concentrated on spurring greater Saudi investment in Nigerien businesses and development.

After his stop in Riyadh, Issoufou visited (French) the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina and made ‘umra (lesser pilgrimage) in Mecca. He then met the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Jeddah. (Niger was a founding member of the OIC and hosts the Organization’s Islamic university for Francophone Africa, located in Say near Niamey.) Issoufou also sat down with the vice president of the Islamic Development Bank, and the Bank and the Government of Niger signed a financing agreement for a road between Tébaram and Tahoua. See the Bank’s announcement here.

It’s a busy travel season for Issoufou – this week he is in Ghana for a summit of the Economic Community of West African States.

In Niger, a Divided Unity Government

On August 13, Niger’s President Mahamadou Issoufou authorized a cabinet reshuffle in order to create a government of national unity. The new cabinet comprised thirty-seven ministers, up from twenty-six, and dismissed ten members while bringing on eighteen. Jeune Afrique (French) profiled Issoufou’s first cabinet here.

The unity cabinet includes members of opposition parties, but Issoufou retained key officials such as Prime Minister Brigi Rafini, Foreign Minister Bazoum Mohamed, and Defense Minister Karidjo Mahamadou. One source reports, “Among the prominent opposition leaders who joined the government are Albadé Abouba, who becomes senior minister assigned to the President’s office, Wassalké Boukary as minister of Water and the vociferous Alma Oumarou, now minister of Trade.” An official list of the new cabinet members can be found here (French). The government’s formation, in Issoufou’s words, responds to heightened regional and domestic insecurity, especially the crisis in neighboring Mali and the bombings of May 23 in northern Niger.

Division appeared swiftly. On August 17, seven ministers from the Nigerien Democratic Movement (French: Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien, or MODEN), a party allied with the ruling Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (French: Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme, PNDS) suspended their participation in the government, complaining that their party had received sub-optimal posts. Six posts (French) remain in the hands of new cabinet members from the opposition. On August 23, MODEN announced its withdrawal from the entire governing coalition, called the Movement for the Renaissance of Niger (MRN). In the wake of these disruptions, Issoufou on August 26 (French) gave some ministers additional portfolios and made several new appointments. What long-term effect MODEN’s withdrawal will have on Issoufou’s government I cannot predict, but in the short term the partial collapse of the unity government is a defeat for the president.

Niger and Libya on the Recent Bombings

(Somehow I goofed and didn’t post this on May 28th, the day I wrote it. It’s still relevant, so I thought I would post it today. – Alex)

Following the May 23 bombings in northern Niger, the country’s president, Mahamadou Issoufou, charged that the attackers had come from southern Libya. Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan denied this claim.

I do not know who is right. But Issoufou and Zeidan’s statements interest me in large part because of the views they reflect on what post-Qaddhafi Libya has become.

Issoufou:

Libya continues to be a source of destabilisation for the countries of the Sahel…I had already warned from the beginning of the Libyan crisis…that it was necessary to avoid solutions after Kadhafi’s defeat that would be even worse, and I had said that if the Libyan state turned into a Somalia or fell into the hands of fundamentalists, the solution would be worse…Today the situation is very difficult, the Libyan authorities are doing their best to control it, but the fact is, Libya continues to be a source of destabilisation for the countries of the Sahel.

It’s noteworthy that Issoufou frames the problem as a regional one and not just as an issue for Libya and Niger.

Zeidan:

It was Gaddafi who exported terrorism…The new Libya will not tolerate that.

Issoufou depicts the bombings as the work of foreigners, Zeidan depicts Libya’s problems as being the fault of Qaddhafi.

Libya and Niger have had some tension since Qaddhafi’s fall. Niger was relatively slow to recognize the new Libyan government, and the two countries have not reached an agreement on the extradition of Qaddhafi family members and lieutenants from Niger back to Libya (Zeidan raised this issue again at his press conference). Issoufou calling Libya a “source of destabilization” is strong language, and suggests that he (and possibly other Sahelian leaders) are deeply unhappy with their northern neighbor’s trajectory. Issoufou’s concerns about Libya, in other words, go well beyond the latest bombing.

Information on Niger’s Food Crisis

Via Reuters, the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (view the latest Niger report here, in French .pdf – I could not find the English version) says that around 800,000 people in Niger will need food aid between now and the summer. Niger faces cyclical food crises – famines in 2005 and 2011 were particularly bad – meaning that the challenges are both short- and long-term. This year, elevated cereals prices and Malian refugees are contributing to the crisis. From Reuters:

[OCHA] cited problems with supplying food to markets in some areas, such as the northern mining regixon of Arlit and Tahoua in central Niger and Tillabery in the west, which had driven up cereals prices.

Recurrent shortages in recent years have forced pastoralists to sell livestock, including valuable young females normally kept for breeding, reducing their resistance to food shocks.

The presence of some 60,000 refugees from Mali – where a French-led international mission has battled Islamist rebels since January – has exacerbated the food shortages in Tillabery [map] and Tahoua [map], OCHA has said.

The Famine Early Warning System Network’s Food Security Outlook (.pdf) for Niger gives further detail on the rise in cereals prices. From p. 1:

Increasing millet and maize prices, already well above average in April, will overshoot seasonal norms between now and the height of the lean season and the end of
Ramadan in late August due to market disruptions
triggered by last year’s floods in Nigeria. Central and
Eastern Niger will be most affected.

P. 7 of FEWS Net’s outlook, which lists factors that could affect food security, is worth reading. Notably, they list the elections in Mali (scheduled for July) and conflict in Nigeria as possible risks.

The World Food Programme has more (.pdf). An important paragraph from p. 2:

Close monitoring of food markets and the food security situation is necessary. There are indications of recent decreases in the terms of trade of pastoralists. In March, the terms of trade between goat and millet reached alert levels with a goat trading for much less than 100 kg of millet, a threshold indicative of inadequate purchasing power for pastoralists.

Available casual labour opportunities and incomes
generated by cash crops (horticulture and onions) so
far contain the deterioration of the purchasing power
among other livelihood groups. As the lean season
reaches its peak in July-September, further increases
in cereal prices will reduce vulnerable households’
economic access to food.

As far as the solutions that Niger and various aid agencies are seeking, readers may find the following resources helpful:

  • IRIN on President Mahamadou Issoufou’s $2 billion Nigeriens Feeding Nigeriens initiative.
  • WFP on Norway’s donations.

Anti-Corruption Efforts in Niger

As the crisis in Mali has unfolded, one reads periodic warnings in the press and the policy sphere that violence and instability could spill over into Niger. Meanwhile, analysts and scholars continue to examine the fall of former Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré’s government; many have identified regime corruption as a key factor in undermining the regime’s legitimacy and preparing the ground for its collapse. Given these two trends – concern about Niger, and analysis of corruption in Mali – it is important to track anti-corruption efforts in Niger.

In July 2011 (French), shortly after Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou took office, his government created a High Authority for Fighting Corruption. Issoufou has stated that combating corruption is one of his top priorities. The High Authority has investigated allegations of misappropriation of funds during the regime of the country’s last civilian president, Mamadou Tandja. This body’s mission, as its President Issoufou Boureima explained in a December 2012 interview (French), is to identify and correct financial abuses in different sectors of government. The High Authority has experienced some turmoil; in May 2012 (French), its Vice President Mahamane Hamissou Moumouni resigned after protesting “opacity” in the institution’s management of resources.

All this is a preface to mentioning a story that a reader recently told me about. In February (French), Nigerien authorities (the article I found does not mention whether these officials came from the High Authority or not) arrested some twenty doctors on charges of embezzling funds at the NGO GAVI Alliance. The Alliance has reportedly suspended its programs in Niger. The Alliance’s website is here.

This story reminded me a little of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria’s decision to suspend several aid programs in Mali in March 2011 over concerns about corruption. This affair led to the June 2011 arrest of former Health Minister Ibrahim Oumar Toure.

I am not saying that the arrest of the doctors in Niger means that Niger is following Mali’s path. The paths of the two countries are different. But the story does highlight the fact that corruption can have far-reaching consequences, including undermining the confidence of external donors. How Niger handles cases like these will shape how domestic and foreign actors view the country and its government.