Kenya’s Oil and the Turkana People

Tullow Oil discovered oil in Turkana county in Kenya this March. In early May, Tullow announced that its Kenyan project had so far contained “more than double [the oil] encountered in any of our East African exploration wells to date.” The Kenyan government has greeted the discovery enthusiastically, but a new report from IRIN highlights the complex ramifications of the project for people in Turkana. According to IRIN, many residents barely consider themselves Kenyan. Most are desperately poor, and cycles of drought and conflict have damaged the livelihoods of pastoralists. Reactions to the prospect of an oil boom are mixed:

“We are happy with the oil find,” Lokichar resident Lokapel Katilu told IRIN. “We pray that the find is real. We are just idle, there is no work. We just walk around. Before, we would rely on grazing, but the herds have been stolen.”
[...]
But according to oil industry analyst Antony Goldman, no major jobs bonanza is on the horizon.
“Typically oil is capital- rather than labour-intensive: unlike mining, it does not yield many unskilled or semi-skilled jobs,” he told IRIN.
[...]
Katilu said that to date he knew of only a few people who had found oil-related work, “to control traffic and to prevent people from accessing the rig site”.
Lokichar resident Kamaro said there was a widespread fear that lack of local skills would “lead to people from Kenya coming in” to the area.
People here “are afraid of an influx of foreigners, that there will be congestion, that the foreigners will bring diseases, that their culture will be polluted,” said Kamaro.

If an oil boom comes but does not employ many local people, there could be a political backlash that would create problems for Tullow and the Kenyan government.

More hopeful for the Turkana people could be a recent discovery of water:

Turkana county in which oil deposits were recently discovered, has huge amounts of underground water. To tap the resource, the government has launched a Sh131 million water survey in the area. “The survey of the groundwater in the drought affected Turkana county using radar technologies will go a long way in enhancing our understanding of ground water in this area,” said director of waters resources in Kenya John Rao Nyaoro.

The project, launched in Nairobi yesterday, is supported by Unesco and financed by the Japanese government. Nyaoro said past satellite surveys have shown that Kenya has 60 billion cubic metres of renewable underground water compared to 20 billion cubic metres of surface water. This is the first time the government has embarked on large-scale mining of ground water. Nyaoro said a satellite technology called Watex System will map water wells in Turkana to help drillers reduce cost.

The project will benefit thousands of drought-hit pastoralists, who currently walk for many kilometres looking for water. Somalia and Ethiopia are also involved in the project because most ground water straddles between different countries. Director of Unesco in Nairobi Joseph Massaquoi said the water will be exploited in a sustainable way. “Nine months following the onset of the 2011 drought and famine crisis in the region, some nine million people still face food and water shortages in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia,” he said.

For more on the Turkana people and the problems pastoralists face, see here.

Nigeria: A Statement by General Buhari on Boko Haram, and Its Aftermath

Speaking to supporters on May 14 in Kaduna, General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd) made several incendiary statements, calling the Federal Government (FG) of Nigeria “the biggest Boko Haram” and saying that presidential elections of 2015 must be free and fair, warning (as the press has translated it), ”If what happened in 2011 should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood.” These statements have caused considerable uproar in the Nigerian press and major controversy among the political class. (Some say that Buhari, who spoke in Hausa, was misquoted and misinterpreted; see here for an interesting discussion of the Hausa proverb “kare jini biri jini.”)

Buhari, who was military head of state in Nigeria from 1983 to 1985, was runner-up in the last three Nigerian presidential elections. Buhari challenged the results in each case; since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has won all four presidential elections the country has held. Boko Haram, of course, is the violent movement based in Northeastern Nigeria that has carried out numerous attacks over the past two years on government and Christian targets, mostly in the Northeast but also in Kano, Kaduna, Abuja, and elsewhere.

The significance of Buhari’s statements is, for me, two-fold.

2015

First, Buhari’s remarks show that politicians are already looking to the next presidential elections in 2015. On one level, Buhari’s rhetoric is aggressive campaign rhetoric. In his remarks, he stated that he does believe there is a real movement called Boko Haram, as well as associated patterns of criminality. He implied that the FG is incapable of dealing with the insecurity, partly because in his view Federal leaders do not listen to Northerners. The idea that President Goodluck Jonathan is incompetent on security issues is an extension of Buhari’s campaign rhetoric from 2011.

Calling the FG itself “the biggest Boko Haram,” meanwhile, is a provocative political move, one that aims to redirect attention from the violence in the North to the violence and theft allegedly perpetrated by the FG. This accusation plays directly into Buhari’s image, among his primarily Northern supporters (see a map of the 2011 election results here),  as a tough leader who would end legal and financial abuses within the FG.

Buhari said after 2011 that he wouldn’t run again, but now it seems he may be changing his mind; some observers expect Jonathan not to run, but he may do so as well. If the 2015 election is a rematch between Jonathan and Buhari, then it looks like Buhari may already be firing the opening shots.

The administration has already fired back. Playing into Buhari’s image among many of his opponents as a partisan of Northern Muslims, an administration spokesman decried the General’s comments:

We find it very sad that an elder statesman who once presided over the entirety of Nigeria can reduce himself to a regional leader who speaks for only a part of Nigeria. We now understand what his protégé and former Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Malam Nasir El’Rufai, meant when he wrote in a public letter in October of 2010, telling Nigerians that Buhari remains “perpetually unelectable” and that Buhari’s  ”insensitivity to Nigeria’s diversity and his parochial focus are already well-known.”

The president and Buhari are not the only politicians participating in the debate, of course. Some Northern heavyweights have defended Buhari, either by supporting him, by saying that he was misquoted, or by using the remarks to call for electoral reform. Other Northern groups, though, have condemned the remarks.

What do we make of Buhari’s invocation of violence? 2011 has the image, internationally, of having been Nigeria’s “cleanest” election since 1999, but according to Human Rights Watch it was also “among the bloodiest”: over 800 dead, and some 65,000 displaced. Much of the violence occurred in Northern states, when protests by Buhari’s supporters “degenerated into violent riots or sectarian killings.” In this context, Buhari’s suggestion that 2015 could be violent has ominous overtones.

Inter-Communal Tensions

Second, Buhari’s statements have significance in that they contribute to ongoing interreligious, inter-regional, and inter-ethnic tensions in Nigeria. Boko Haram’s uprising, and particularly the sect’s violence against Christians, has intersected with long-standing inter-communal tensions in different parts of the country such as Jos and Kaduna. As Boko Haram’s violence continues, some Christian leaders have taken tough rhetorical stances, warning of Christian “self-defense” in ways that imply the possibility of Christian reprisals against Muslims. Buhari’s statement has produced concern in places like Jos, while the Niger Delta Youth Leaders Forum has raised the issue of reprisal violence, implying that if Buhari’s words incite Northern youth to attack Southerners in the North, they will respond in kind. Several Nigerian press articles say that Buhari’s statements are “overheating” Nigeria, a powerful image. Buhari has raised the temperature further by daring Jonathan to arrest him.

As a coda, I should say that Buhari does not speak for all Northern leaders. His statements on Boko Haram exist as part of a continuum of Northern leaders’ responses to the problem, which have ranged from proposing dialogue to condemning the FG’s approach to, if some allegations are to be believed, actively supporting the movement. Looking more closely at this continuum would be worth a separate post; I will tackle that in June if the news cycle allows.

Mauritania and Northern Mali

The rebellion continues in northern Mali. The Tuareg-led separatist National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA, where “Azawad” refers to the regions of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu in northern Mali) and the Islamist group Ansar Dine (Arabic: Ansar al Din, “Defenders of the Faith”) recently announced an alliance (Aray al Mostenir says it has the text of the agreement here, in Arabic). In addition to the nervousness caused by the trajectory of the rebellion as a whole, Ansar Dine’s apparent alliance with Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is worrying Mali’s neighbors.

Mauritania seems ready to react militarily. Magharebia reports that Mauritanian troops are drilling near the border with Mali:

Mauritania held extensive military exercises last week outside the city of Bassiknou, located along the Malian border.

The operations were part of efforts to step up border surveillance and prevent the infiltration of terrorists and smugglers, Mauritania’s Aray al-Mostenir reported May 22nd, noting that the country’s security forces were placed on high alert.

The website stated that a heavy artillery bombardment could be heard outside Bassiknou for two days. Meanwhile, military aircraft carried out sorties over the area and bombed virtual moving targets as part of a training drill supervised by French experts.

The Mauritanian army conducted reconnaissance sorties over the Wagadou Forest and the area where most of the past armed confrontations with al-Qaeda and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa took place.

I could not locate the original article from Aray al Mostenir, but you can view a map of Bassiknou here.

Mauritania is undoubtedly concerned about defending its own territory, where AQIM has periodically conducted raids, kidnappings, and bombings since 2005. But it is possible that Mauritania is also considering taking the offensive. In 2010 and 2011, long before the rebellion began, Mauritanian forces entered Mali several times hunting AQIM: in September 2010 (Arabic), in the Timbuktu region; in June 2011, when they reportedly raided an AQIM base in the Wagadou Forest (more here); and in October 2011, when they launched an air raid on the Wagadou Forest. If readers are aware of other Mauritanian operations in Mali, please let us know in the comments. In any case, it is worth paying attention to this show of force from the Mauritanian army.

Africa Blog Roundup: Mauritania’s “Arab Spring,” Kenyan Foreign Policy, Boko Haram, Elections in Lesotho, and More

At The Guardian‘s Comment is Free, Sharif Nashashibi says that the international media have overlooked the protest movement in Mauritania. He argues:

There is…the possibility, or perhaps even the probability, that the protests in Mauritania will intensify, mainly because the government seems not to have learned from the mistakes of other Arab regimes that are under threat. It has used a combination of repression and pledges of reform that have left Mauritanians unconvinced and more frustrated.

Demonstrations have thus far been peaceful and centred around reforms. However, as in other Arab states, if protesters feel they are being indefinitely ignored or oppressed, not only might calls for reform become demands for regime change, but violence may become a means to advance those demands – a particularly dangerous development given Mauritania’s ethnic fault lines.

By the way, for those who read Arabic, Twitter user Mint Mauritanie is a great resource for news on Mauritanian politics and the protests.

Amb. David Shinn flags a discussion by Kenyan scholars of Kenyan foreign policy.

Two pieces on Boko Haram: G. Pascal Zachary parses a recent Financial Times piece’s language on Boko Haram’s alleged ties to Al Qaida, and wonders whether the US will start taking a more hands-on approach to the rebel sect. Andrew Walker compares two views on Boko Haram that are “almost diametrically opposite…except they both agree that journalists (people like me) have it wrong.” What do you think the international media has done well in its coverage of Boko Haram, and what has it done poorly?

And two others on Nigeria: Attempting Denouement on oil bunkering in the Niger Delta, and Laura Dimon on the social effects of desertification in the Lake Chad area.

Bruce Whitehouse on a sermon he heard on Friday in Bamako:

A few minutes into today’s wajilu I heard the imam utter the word CEDEAO (“sedeyawu“), the French acronym for the Economic Community of West African States.

Now I was interested. Why was the imam talking about ECOWAS in his sermon? This is a preacher who often urges parishioners in general terms to join together and work for unity, and to overcome petty differences. But I had never heard him venture into such explicitly political territory before. It soon became clear that he was coming out in full support of the agreement signed last weekend between ECOWAS and Mali’s military junta, the CNRDRE. Mali’s leaders and ECOWAS would never advocate anything that was against the nation’s interests, he said. He condemned the recent disturbances in Bamako and admonished us not to follow those who seek to destabilize the country.

[...]

From the international news media one often hears about firebrand imams throughout the Muslim world using their pulpits to whip their congregations into a political frenzy. In Bamako, however, I rarely hear imams address overtly political topics in Friday sermons. Which made the Badalabougou imam’s message this afternoon all the more powerful.

Royal Africa Society Director Richard Dowden posts excerpts from an interview with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

Zachary Rosen on the elections in Lesotho.

This year’s National Assembly contest has been marked by massive voter engagement with an especially strong showing for young and first time voters. Rallies, famo musicperformances and to a lesser extent, social media, have been used to generate support for parties and candidates. Key issues that affect the majority of Basotho include: employment, agricultural investment, union wage negotiations, access to education and labor mobility to and from South Africa. Because no party wants to resort to forming a coalition government with their rivals, competition for voters’ allegiance has been rather intense.

While each party is representing itself as the one that can best be trusted by Basotho factory workers, farmers, civil servants and students, it’s evident that other, more clandestine constituents are being courted as well. The incumbent Prime Minister Mosisili in particular has realized the value of partnerships with foreign investors, especially South Africans and Chinese. Kenny Kunene, South Africa’s infamous “Sushi King” (who also invests in mining) has reportedly been acontributor to Mosisili’s political campaign at a time when Lesotho’s diamond mines are exhuming some of the largest stones in the world. Lesotho’s mountainous highlands have long been of strategic interest to the South African government as well, with giant dams supplying essential water to the Johannesburg area for domestic and industrial use. Chinese investors, who operate many of Lesotho’s textile factories, have benefited from being able to keep wages low on Mosisili’s watch, to the vexation of Basotho factory workers. Chinese contractors have been busy with projects across Maseru. Notably, the recently opened Ying Tao restaurant in one of Lesotho’s nicer hotels, the Lesotho Sun, has quickly become a popular meeting place for Basotho elite and Chinese businessmen.

What are you reading today? Any new bloggers out there I should be reading?

Africa News Roundup: Politician Assassinated in Nigeria, Protests in Mauritania, Conquest of Afgoye, and More

A party chairman for the People’s Redemption Party in Gombe State, Nigeria, was assassinated today in Maiduguri (Borno State) by gunmen suspected to be from Boko Haram.

Also in Nigeria, the case of Chinese textile traders arrested in Kano for “economic scavenging” – and now released – is interesting. Some local businessmen, long before this case, have been accusing the Chinese of destroying local industries by undercutting prices with cheap imports.

Sudan and South Sudan are scheduled to resume negotiations this Tuesday over issues like oil revenue sharing, border demarcation, and ending armed conflict.

A major anti-regime protest took place yesterday in Mauritania. Mauritanian opposition parties have condemned the “brutal repression” they say authorities used against demonstrators (Arabic).

Magharebia on religious activists’ demands for stricter rules on public and private behavior in Mauritania:

In Mauritania the demands have taken a more organised form, with the creation of the “No to Pornography” movement by young people last year. The group, aiming to promote virtue and prevent vice, has organised Friday demonstrations outside mosques and marches throughout Nouakchott. Participants in the events wave signs calling for a bans on improper dress, pornography, prostitution and liquor sales.

These requests were repeated in a ten-point statement distributed at marches last week. Additional demands include the creation of “morality police”, stiffer penalties for rape and other sex crimes, and a series of religious reforms to public education.

In Somalia, forces from the Transitional Federal Government and the African Union have taken the town of Afgoye, one of their major goals, from the rebel movement al Shabab. AP calls it “the biggest victory over al-Shabab since the pro-government forces took control of the capital last August.”

At the International Criminal Court, trials will move forward for four Kenyans accused of fomenting post-election violence in 2007-2008.

What else is going on?

Sahelian Food Crisis: Update and Resources

The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, made headlines this week after she visited Senegal and Burkina Faso and stated, “The humanitarian situation [in the Sahel] is expected to remain critical at least until the main harvest this autumn.” The UN estimates that fifteen million people in the region do not have enough to eat; Oxfam puts the number higher, at eighteen million. The World Food Programme has called the current situation “one of the most complex and widest reaching food crises to hit the Sahel of West Africa in living memory. Whereas the 2005 and 2010 food crises hit mainly two countries – in Niger and Chad – this current crisis has hit in no less than 8 countries from Mauritania all the way to Chad.” The situation is tragic.

Here are several resources for those who want to understand the crisis more fully:

• The United States government’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) has a helpful map of the crisis in West Africa. Portions of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad are marked as “stressed” (the second level on a five-point scale) while some portions of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad are in “crisis” (the third level).
• The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs offers important coverage of the crisis. One piece emphasizes the troubled situation in northern Mali, where the ongoing rebellion has taken a major humanitarian toll. This is just the most vivid illustration of how the intersection of politics and drought can prove deadly. 3.5 million people face hunger in Mali.
• The World Food Programme has a useful Q&A on the crisis.
• Finally, this reporting from on the ground in northeastern Senegal is worth reading to get a sense of how ordinary people are experiencing the drought.

Somalia: A Political Agreement and a Military Offensive

Somalia took an important step this week in its bid for stability. In neighboring Ethiopia, Somali leaders have signed a deal setting August 20 as the date for a transition to a new government (presidential elections must take place before that date). Meanwhile, within Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have launched a new offensive to capture territory from the rebel movement al Shabab, pushing into areas outside Mogadishu, where the TFG-AMISOM forces hope to take the towns of Elasha and Afgoye (map).

As is often the case, we can greet these events optimistically – VOA says that Somalia is “on track to end failed state status” – or pessimistically, noting the challenges that remain.

Culling information from the BBC, VOA, and the communique from the meeting published on the site Raxanreeb, here are some facts about the transition framework:

• The agreement has six signatories: TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, TFG Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, President Abdirahman Farole of the semi-autonomous Puntland region, President Mohamed Ahmed Alin of the semi-autonomous Galmudug region, and Khaliif Abdulkadir Moallim Noor, a representative from the pro-government militia Ahl al Sunna wa al Jama’a (Arabic: “The People of the Traditions of the Prophet and the Muslim Community”).
• By June 20, Somalia must assemble a National Constituent Assembly whose members will meet in Mogadishu by June 30.
• By July 10, Somalia must adopt a new constitution.
• By July 20, Somalia must swear in a new parliament with 225 members selected by elders.
• On August 4, the parliament will elect a speaker and deputy speaker.
• These MPs will then elect the next president by August 20.

Now for the potential problems:

• Establishing the framework could prove to be the easy part; carrying it out could be difficult. A power struggle between President Sharif Ahmed and Speaker Sheikh Aden has already forced a delay of one year (the presidential election was originally set to take place in August 2011). At each step in the process, there is potential for factionalization and deadlock. Additionally, it is possible that the time-frame will prove too short to move through all the steps, at least without rushing and thereby creating problems that will appear later.
• Despite gains in the military offensive against al Shabab, there have also been costs, particularly massive displacement of civilians. Some critics are also charging that the Kenyan offensive against another al Shabab stronghold, Kismayo, is going too slowly and may be futile. Military progress, in other words, has come in fits and starts, taking a heavy toll on civilians, and the new government will still control only portions of southern Somalia.
• Reuters wonders whether oil production in Puntland might complicate relations between that area and the TFG (and the TFG’s successor).

So should we be optimistic or pessimistic? I certainly think that the agreement in Addis Ababa marks a positive step. And political progress is critical to solidifying any military gains – if the government at the center is plagued by infighting and confusion, how can it establish a legitimate and continuous presence in newly conquered areas? For once, the politics and the conquests seem to be moving partly in sync. But this summer will put optimism to the test, as we see how papers signed in Ethiopia will translate into realities in Somalia.

Libya, Mauritania, and Abdullah al Senussi

During the civil war in Libya last year, various lieutenants and family members of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi fled to North African countries like Algeria and Tunisia, and to Sahelian countries like Mauritania and Niger. The new Libyan government wants to extradite them so that they can stand trial in Libya, but it is getting more cooperation from some countries than others.

One important case concerns Abdullah al Senussi, Qadhafi’s former intelligence chief, who was arrested when entering Mauritania in March. Libyan officials traveled to Mauritania at the time, and for a moment it looked like they had struck a deal to extradite al Senussi. It turned out Mauritanian authorities had not agreed to let him go. This week brought a new chapter in the story when al Senussi was indicted by a Mauritanian court (more here). It seems al Senussi is likely to remain in Mauritania for the time being.

Contrast the approach in Mauritania with the one in Tunisia:

Tunisia will extradite former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s prime minister to Libya and the handover could take place in “days or weeks”, Justice Minister Noureddine Bouheiri said on Tuesday.

Should he be handed over, Al Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi would be the first senior official to be sent back for trial under Libya’s transitional leadership and his extradition could establish a precedent for other countries who have given refuge to or arrested members of Gaddafi’s old entourage.

Mahmoudi served as the Libyan dictator’s prime minister from 2006 until he fled to neighboring Tunisia around the time that rebel fighters took the capital Tripoli in August.

As for the Colonel’s son Saadi Qadhafi, who has taken refuge in Niger, I have seen no news on his extradition since earlier this month, when Niger was still in talks with the Libyan government. It will be interesting to see what fault lines emerge in the region in terms of which countries agree to extraditions, and which refuse or delay.

Debating a Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation for Nigeria’s Boko Haram

Several US congresspersons and the US Justice Department are asking the US State Department to put the Northern Nigerian rebel movement Boko Haram on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The State Department gives information about the FTOs list here. These are the criteria for an FTO designation:

1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

Since I first started hearing talk about an FTO designation for Boko Haram, I’ve felt it likely that the designation will happen. That feeling derives from two sources. First, there is a thermodynamic argument of sorts: an object in motion (pressure for the FTO designation) will stay in motion (and even acquire momentum if more forces push it along) unless a force acts to stop it. More bluntly, Republican lawmakers and conservative organizations like the Heritage Foundation are using rhetoric like, “The Obama Administration should not jeopardize U.S. security with its complacency.” What would President Obama have to gain from picking a fight over a Nigerian rebel sect? It would be easier, politically, to either ignore the issue or (if pressure grows, as it seems to be doing) go ahead with the FTO designation.

Second, proponents of the designation have a fairly easy time making their legal case, it seems to me, given the breadth of the criteria for designation: Boko Haram is certainly a foreign organization and several of its attacks (such as the UN bombing last summer) meet almost any definition of terrorism. There is more to debate on the third point, regarding US national security, but if nothing else proponents could cite the proximity of the US Embassy in Abuja to two major Boko Haram bomb sites (the UN headquarters and the police headquarters). The Heritage Foundation (link above) goes further in saying that Boko Haram threatens to destabilize West Africa and could intend to attack the US directly.

If the designation is likely, that does not mean that it is wise. A group of American scholars has sent an open letter (.pdf) to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arguing against the FTO designation. The letter warns that an FTO designation could “internationalize Boko Haram,” by which the authors mean that the designation might enhance Boko Haram’s standing among other militant groups and might even create a self-fulfilling prophecy by directing more of Boko Haram’s attention toward the US. The letter further warns that the designation could “legitimize abuses by Nigeria’s security services, limit the State Department’s latitude in shaping a long term strategy, and undermine the U.S. Government’s ability to receive effective independent analysis from the region.” Still other arguments are that the designation could distort Nigerian-American relations, limit scholarly analysis of Boko Haram, and make it “illegal for nongovernmental organizations to interact with members of Boko Haram – even if the purpose of such contact was to persuade them to renounce violence.”

The last argument is decisive for me. I am not a lawyer, but the legal consequences of an FTO designation, as explained by experts, seem like they would inhibit the efforts at dialogue that will most likely be necessary at some point if the violence, and the grievances that drive it, are to end.

Is it also important to ask how an FTO designation would play out politically in Nigeria. The Nigerian press is already covering the issue, but it is hard to get a sense of people’s reactions (commenters on Nigerian news websites represent a fraction of the population, though the few commenters – who seem to be mostly non-Muslim – on this article largely support the designation). One Nigerian commentator told me last week that the US must designate Boko Haram an FTO in order to preserve credibility with Nigerians. Within Muslim communities in the North, however, the designation could feed suspicions that America seeks greater control over Nigeria; this outcome would also, I expect, harm efforts to make peace. If reactions are divided, a designation might contribute to religious and regional polarization in Nigeria.

As we assess the potential value of an FTO designation, the point seems worth making that the US government possesses tools beyond the FTO list; deciding against an FTO designation would not equate to complacency in the face of Boko Haram.

In any case, if the increase in press coverage, public statements from lawmakers, and debate in Washington mean that an FTO designation is more likely to happen than not, the arguments for and against the designation will be put to the test.

What do you think should happen? And what do you think will happen?

Sudan Hosts Conference on Small Arms

This week, the First Regional Conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons will take place in Khartoum, Sudan:

The two-day event, organized by Sudan’s Ministry of Interior and Sudan’s Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Commission in collaboration with the Embassy of Germany, the United Nations Development Programme and the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur, will involve participation by representatives from Libya, the Central African Republic, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Specific objectives of the conference include creating a forum for regional dialogue on the illegal trade, circulation and use of small arms; developing a harmonized regional approach to control small arms; developing a strategy for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; and creating a unique and holistic mechanism to monitor small arms control programmes across the borders of participating countries.

The absence of South Sudan from the list of organizers and invitees raises immediate questions: Has South Sudan indeed not been invited? If not, will the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, and the rebellions within both countries, receive serious examination at the conference?

The conference organizers are stressing border security as a key theme. Given the list of invitees, it looks major topics of discussion might also include the Lord’s Resistance Army (whose violence has affected the DRC and CAR, as well as other countries not on the list of invitees) and weapons flows out of Libya since the fall of Colonel Muammar Qadhafi last year.

For more information on small arms flows in the Sudans, you can visit Small Arms Survey. Their latest brief on Sudan, from April, is here (.pdf). One key paragraph says:

Steady supplies of small arms and light weapons to all parties are fuelling these conflicts, threatening to extend and prolong them significantly. Since independence, official bans on materiel acquisitions by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) have been lifted and the government is exploring expanded defence contracts with a number of
interested states. At the same time, an increasing number of non-state actors
in South Sudan, including tribal groups and rebel militia groups, are acquiring weapons illicitly at what appear to be increasingly rapid rates. As the demand for weapons in South Sudan grows, external actors are meeting supply needs.

This paragraph points to the importance, then, of looking at the issue not just from a regional perspective, but an international one as well, taking account of suppliers.

What do you expect to come of the conference?