Texas in Africa looks at piracy in Somalia and argues that “the reason the response to the pirates has largely been effective is that piracy isn’t really the problem here. Young Somali men only become pirates because they don’t have other employment options.”

William Easterly and Laura Freschi ask whether Ethiopia is having a famine.

As often is the case, there are two forces pulling in opposite directions that make it hard to answer the question.

On the one hand, the authoritarian government wants to cover up any famine to mute criticism of its performance.  Ethiopia is due for elections next year, and the government is determined not to go the way of previous regimes toppled in part because of anger at famines in the 1970s and 1990s. The government’s solution? Prohibit journalists from entering the worst-off areas, and fight tooth and nail with aid agencies to repress or delay information on humanitarian needs.

Complicating the situation further is that the government army is operating against insurgents in the suspected famine areas in the South and cites security reasons for not allowing outsiders to enter, so nobody really knows what is happening there.

On the other hand, NGOs have a well known tendency to cry wolf and exaggerate—to see famine where there is no famine—perhaps in order to raise more money for their own organization (I am echoing here fierce accusations of exactly this from Ethiopians I talked to during my visit who were NOT allied with the government).

Reuters writes that the population of Africans in China hovers around a quarter of a million.

FP Passport flags an interview highlighting the SPLM’s views on Scott Gration. The same blog examines dynamics of aid and violence in Chad.

And finally, Kal critiques a recent Newsweek piece on terrorism in the Sahel. Definitely worth a read.

What are you reading today?

Burundi, Kenya, Rwana, Tanzania, and Uganda “signed a common market protocol on Friday that they hope will boost commerce between their five countries when it comes into effect in July 2010.”

China and Senegal plan to increase military cooperation.

A few news items on Somalia: the BBC asks whether Somali pirates can be defeated; the Christian Science Monitor says that al Shabab “now controls much of the country, and it has made viable threats against neighbors Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya.”

The UN says Chad is “moving to a calmer phase” as political stability increases and refugees return. However, Sudan says Chad is dragging its feet on normalizing bilateral relations between the two countries.

VOA reports that for some US officials, terrorism in the Sahel is “an increasing concern.” However, Newsweek writes that America should not “expand the War on Terror to North Africa.”

What do you think?

As I’ve said before, there is cause for optimism regarding the peace process in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta. This week, however, there are causes for both pessimism and optimism.

First, the bad news: after “frank and fruitful” talks between the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and Nigeria’s Federal Government last weekend, a military raid on the home of former MEND commander Christian Don Pedro threatened to jeopardize the ceasefire MEND has so far maintained. The raid followed a riot on Monday in which “hundreds of former gunmen looted shops, firebombed a police vehicle and assaulted dozens of people in the oil hub of Port Harcourt on Monday in protest against what they said was the non-payment of their October allowance.”

Leaders on both sides, despite tensions, seem reluctant to pursue conflict. Security forces arrested no one when they broke up Monday’s riot, and MEND leaders responded to Tuesday’s raid with a statement, not an attack.

Troop levels in the Delta are a sore point in general. MEND accuses the Joint Task Force (JTF) of deploying more and more soldiers to the region, though the military says this is not the case. Some Delta residents want all federal troops out now that a mechanism for peace is formally in place.

Spokesman for the Niger Delta state of Bayelsa Adeyi Asara tells VOA the federal government must reciprocate the region’s acceptance of a government-sponsored peace initiative by reviewing the presence of the military.

“It is time for these road blocks to be removed completely from our roads because it is slowing down the economy of the state,” he said. “You are also trying to scare away prospective investors because they might be thinking it is a war zone.  The soldiers can be withdrawn to their barracks and allow the police to do their work.  We have given the federal government our words; no more militancy.  But the people should also be loosened.”

Many former militants have also asked the federal government to withdraw thousands of troops stationed in the Niger Delta.  Security analysts warn the situation in the Niger Delta remains fragile, despite what has been acclaimed as “a highly successful” amnesty and disarmament program.

Military spokesman in the region Timothy Antigha says security forces are not in a hurry to leave and that the government will decide the fate of the military task force deployed in the Niger Delta.

And the last item in the bad news department is that some Niger Delta residents say the amnesty has encouraged former militants to pursue criminal activity. The riots appear to have badly shaken residents and businesspersons in Port Harcourt, though the linked article does not provide evidence that there has been a wave of criminality apart from that incident. Without further reporting, I can’t tell whether people are simply voicing a fear of the militants or whether crime is truly on the rise. If it is, though, political support for the amnesty could take a hit.

Now for some good news, which mostly concerns money flows. As of yesterday, “the Federal Government…commenced payment of arrears of allowances owed former militants in various camps in the Niger Delta.” This article notes that militants have fought each other in the rehabilitation camps, potentially bolstering the crime argument, but if money reaches those to whom it has been promised, perhaps tensions will decrease.

The Nigerian government has also concluded a $1 billion agreement with the EU “aimed at combating corruption and promoting peace in its troubled, oil-producing Niger Delta region” in the period from 2009 to 2013. Perhaps those funds will also boost the prospects for peace and reconstruction. Whether a budget crisis in the Nigerian National Assembly will affect the Federal Government’s ability to undertake a stimulus program in the Delta I can’t say, but in any case it seems money is already flowing to the region.

As an added bonus, relative peace in the Delta may be increasing Nigeria’s capacity to deliver electricity to residents.

So there you have it, evidence for both the cynics and the hopeful. I’ll conclude by saying that we can note both that the peace process is not problem-free and that it is far from over.

When I write about violent clashes occurring in South Sudan, I feel like a broken record: typically I cite concerns that the clashes are a harbinger of renewed civil war, and then speculate about what effects this violence will have on the political transitions planned for the next two years, namely the 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum on Southern independence.

I’m going to try a slightly different approach in this piece and look at how different theories explain the violence.

To do that, it helps to get a sense of the chronology. Reuters has a timeline of major incidents of violence from March, when major violence began, through late September. To give a partial update, clashes between the Dinka and Shilluk tribes took place in Jonglei State on at least two occasions earlier in November, and this week Mundari fighters attacked Dinka villagers in Lakes State, with 47 casualties reported. Much of the violence has involved Lou Nuer and Murle groups, especially in Jonglei State, with some involvement by the Dinka and other groups.

It’s possible to explain the violence as tribal rivalry, but if you end the conversation there you miss other aspects of the situation. Here are some additional factors to consider:

• The history of conflict and disarmament: when the North-South war ended in 2005, the South was still awash with weapons. Government-sponsored disarmament in South Sudan beginning in 2006 changed power balances both for ordinary people and between tribes; for example, when the government disarmed the Lou Nuer, “it exposed the community to attack from the Murle, who were not disarmed.” Arms remained widely available, however, meaning that tribal militias could re-arm and take revenge when others victimized them.
• Return of refugees after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement: new arrivals placed strain on communities and increased competition over land and resources. Older cycles of cattle-raiding and revenge began to take on a deadlier and more urgent character in the new social and political environment.
• Lack of government capacity in the South: Human Rights Watch argues that the SPLA does not have a sufficient security presence to deter tribal violence, and that the Southern government has allowed a culture of impunity to persist.
• Oil: related to the last point, some analysts believe that the government in South Sudan is not distributing oil wealth equitably, and that poverty and anger at corruption contribute to tension and violence.
• General instability: fighting has affected refugee populations and intersected with public health and hunger problems, exacerbating humanitarian issues and potentially generating more violence and instability.
• Politics: some Southern Sudanese leaders blame the North for the violence, claiming Khartoum wants to destabilize the South in order to win the elections next year and undermine prospects for Southern independence. Other political explanations focus more on local dynamics, arguing that tribal fighters are challenging the power of the Southern Sudanese government.

What do you make of these explanations? To the extent that any of them are persuasive, they are more so in combination. Perhaps it makes sense to say that changing power balances created by peace and partial disarmament, combined with instability, poverty, lack of deep governance, and the continued availability of weapons, inflamed ethnic conflicts and competition for resources. I’m not ready to commit to that explanation yet, though. Any reader insights or additional information would be much appreciated.

In any case, I think looking at these factors adds depth to the oft-made but seldom-elaborated statement that these clashes are a precursor to a broader civil war. Thinking about the widespread problems in the region and about the fact that so many groups are heavily armed, and looking at areas on the North-South border where tensions run high, it’s easy to see how something that begin as ethic or tribal conflict could quickly, under certain political circumstances, draw the SPLA or the Northern army – or both – into the fray.

In the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia home to many ethnic Somalis, the separatist Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has launched a new round of fighting against the state. This fighting has repercussions not just for Ethiopia, but also for war-torn Somalia next door.

Ogaden region, Ethiopia

It is difficult to tell exactly what is happening in the Ogaden. The ONLF says it has inflicted hundreds of casualties on the Ethiopian army, but the government in Addis Ababa denies these claims. Journalists have not been able to enter the area.

However severe the fighting is, it seems clear that at least some violence is taking place. That, in and of itself, has regional implications. Ethiopia’s government accuses its rival Eritrea of funding the ONLF, which keeps tensions between the two countries running high. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian-Somali border region is already the zone of intense fighting, including cross-border interventions by Ethiopia in Somalia’s Hiran region. Reports from Somalia continue to speak of Ethiopian troop movements inside the country. With violent conflict raging at their doorstep, and armed rebellion inside their territory, the Ethiopian military is likely on edge, to say the least.

ONLF actions have repercussions not just for Ethiopian-Somali interactions, but also for the interlocking conflicts inside Somalia. As Somalia’s two main Islamist groups, al Shabab and Hizbul Islam, continue to spar, al Shabab is accusing the ONLF of supporting Hizbul Islam. (To complicate matters, Ethiopia claims that ONLF assists al Shabab).

It’s difficult to disentangle all the potential relationships here, but VOA’s suggestion that “the fighters identified as ONLF by al-Shabab may be a group from the Ogaden region. But they are more likely to be fighting alongside [Hizbul Islam] as fellow clan members rather than as representatives of the ONLF” may be on the money. If so, that means regardless of what groups are formally allied with other groups, the ethnic Somalis on both sides of the border are involved in the conflict regardless of their official nationality. Depending on the scale of that involvement, this trend could destabilize eastern Ethiopia.

Back in Addis Ababa, meanwhile, maneuvering in advance of Ethiopia’s 2010 parliamentary elections continues. The Globe and Mail writes that the ruling party is conducting a “campaign of intimidation,” and the British government is concerned about charges that Ethiopia is “keeping food aid from opposition members to force them to join the ruling party.” But Western aid to and support for Ethiopia’s government is likely to continue, and as many observers have mentioned, that support may play a key role in maintaining the ruling party in power.

What effect would increased violence and instability in eastern Ethiopia and western Somalia have on the political atmosphere in Ethiopia, and on Western countries’ calculations regarding their support for Ethiopia? No one can predict the future, but it seems more likely to me that instability will boost, not reduce, Western powers’ support for Ethiopia as a bulwark against greater chaos in the region.

I’ve been following the involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Niger’s political crisis, but ECOWAS has also taken on the crisis in Guinea. Guinea has drifted out of the headlines recently, but problems there remain unresolved.

Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Campaore is lead mediator for ECOWAS in the Guinea crisis. Campaore has visited Guinea and held talks between the junta and opposition groups in Burkina Faso. ECOWAS, for its part, has imposed sanctions on Guinea.

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

Yesterday, Campaore headed to Nigeria for another round of talks. Campaore is meeting with Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua, and Wednesday Campaore will meet with both sides in Guinea crisis back in Burkina Faso.

ECOWAS has expressed confidence in the mediation process, but others are skeptical. Reuters writes that “prospects of international mediation breaking the political deadlock between Guinea’s ruling junta and the opposition are slim, with a failure potentially leading to a new bout of unrest.” With opposition leaders demanding that military ruler Moussa Dadis Camara step down, and Camara refusing to do so, the political situation in Guinea is deadlocked, Reuters goes on to say. Voice of America bolsters this argument, quoting Guinean military spokesmen who say that “there is no way their current leader, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, will relinquish his role in a transitional government.”

Will violence intensify? Rumors continue to circulate concerning the presence of foreign mercenaries in Guinea and their potential to spark “ethnic warfare” there. If mediation fails, will the opposition press their case in the streets of Conakry? If so, another crackdown could well follow.

And what implications for ECOWAS? The regional trade body has kept a high profile in recent months, and its pressure on Niger appears to have won at least superficial concessions. If crisis and violence persist in Guinea, will ECOWAS lose face? It certainly seems that Yar’Adua, Campaore, and other West African leaders are working hard to prevent that outcome.

My willingness to believe in the prospects for peace in the Niger Delta has held. In fact, recent reports of “frank and fruitful” talks between Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, the main rebel group in the region, means that peace has received another boost.

Mend has waged a violent campaign against oil facilities in the Delta for more than three years, saying it wants a greater share of oil wealth for its communities.

Mend, represented at the talks by Henry Okah et Farah Dagogo, said in a statement that the two hours of talks were “frank, cordial and useful”.

“This meeting heralds the beginning of serious, meaningful dialogue between Mend and the Nigerian government to deal with and resolve root issues that have long been swept under the carpet,” the statement read.

Rebel activities have reduced Nigeria’s oil output by about a third, from 2.6 million barrels a day in 2006 to about 1.7 million.

In June, Yar’Adua decided to offer an amnesty which led to the surrender of arms by Mend fighters.

Although the group did not take part in the amnesty, it did declare an indefinite ceasefire on October 25 to allow talks to go ahead.

The key issue is still whether the government can deliver jobs and distribute resources more equitably in the region. Skepticism on that front exists in many quarters. Still, as I’ve said before it’s clear that many of the major players are interested in peace. At the very least, that represents the seed of real hope.

The buildup to Ethiopia’s 2010 parliamentary elections has drawn coverage here and elsewhere, but Ethiopian politics also involves armed conflict: in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia, largely populated by ethnic Somalis, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) periodically mounts offensives against the government. Their latest campaign has, if reports are to be believed, turned into a serious rebellion.

Last week, ONLF fighters said they had captured seven towns in the Ogaden. The rebel movement claims local townspeople have welcomed their presence and that it has inflicted substantial casualties on Ethiopian government forces.

EthioBlog writes that western media sources have fallen victim to unsubstantiated ONLF propaganda, which is at least somewhat unfair considering that outlets like the BBC and AFP qualified their statements about ONLF victories. Whatever the case, EthioBlog reminds us that the story is still evolving, and that we should all be cautious about whose accounts we accept.

The situation in the Ogaden raises serious questions. What effects would instability in the Ogaden have? Would an active rebellion influence the election process in Ethiopia, either by causing a clampdown by the government or by exposing deeper fault lines in the country? Would increased violence near the border with Somalia stir up greater conflict inside Somalia, or raise hopes among hardline Somali groups that they might be able to unite ethnic Somalis into a broader polity? I’ve had difficulty getting reliable information about the ONLF, but all these issues are worth considering.

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Here are some blog posts on Africa worth checking out:

Kal sets recent political maneuvers by Mauritanian Islamists in their historical context.

A few bloggers look at the politics of US restrictions on aid to Somalia: Steve Bloomfield points to contradictions in policy toward Somalia and actions in Afghanistan; Mike Smith examines the effects that delaying food aid has:

The impact of the interruption is becoming clear and causing huge problems, with rations to starving people being cut. The decision in October to suspend millions of dollars worth of aid came due to fears that food and money was going to an Islamic insurgent group, with the U.S. assuring the UN that the delay would be brief. But now the World Food Program has suggested “The food supply line to Somalia is effectively broken.” Food is stuck in Kenya until bureaucrats can decide better regulations — regulation that makes demands that the UN fear are unrealistic in such a chaotic environment like Somalia.

Shashank Bengali fills us in on architecture in Eritrea.

Turning to Sudan, Rob Crilly comments on a recent op-ed about Darfur by Michael Gerson. At the State Department’s Dipnote blog, US Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration discusses his engagement with American activists through new technology. Bec Hamilton gives her take on the event:

The best summation of the State Department’s first foray into citizen engagement 2.0 is, appropriately enough, encapsulated in a tweet by TechPresident blogger Micah Sifry. Responding to the frustration advocates were expressing in real-time to the vagueness of the administration’s answers, he wrote, “Whatever you may think about substance of Gration/Power’s answers, State Dept just raised the bar on admin transparency efforts.” Indeed.

Finally, Texas in Africa directs us to another nice post by Louisa Lombard on the Peace Corps and the Central African Republic.

What are you reading today?

Here are some news stories that caught my attention in the last few days:

Violence broke out in South Sudan again this week, claiming 11 lives in Jongelei state. Meanwhile, IRIN reports on North-South tensions in the Nuba Mountains.

Tuareg rebels return to Niger from Libya under an amnesty deal.

The Wall Street Journal has suggested that changing oil policies in Nigeria might prompt oil companies to move elsewhere in West Africa. Ghana’s leaders are thinking hard about the ramifications of an oil boom.

Ghana’s offshore Jubilee Field is set to begin producing oil and natural gas next year that could earn the country as much as 20 billion dollars over the next 20 years.

But the new government need look no farther than neighboring Nigeria to see how quickly squandered oil wealth can bring resentment, violence, and environmental destruction.

So lawmakers in Ghana want to make sure they have a plan in place for spending that oil revenue responsibly before the money starts coming in.

The EU may train 2,000 Somali troops. The proposal under consideration would send EU troops to Uganda and would take around one year. The BBC says Somalia wants to train around 6,000 new troops and police, and adds that “the move by the EU is expected to complement efforts made by France, Djibouti and Uganda who have all committed to training Somali troops.”

Two quick items for those interested in Afro-Chinese relations: check out Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s comments on China and the US, and take a look at this article on violence against Chinese workers in Angola.

Finally, here’s an article about anti-French sentiment in former French African colonies. The article opens with anecdotal evidence that I don’t find completely convincing, but then moves to a discussion of power politics that is definitely worth reading. The author includes some quotations from African intellectuals for whose work I have a great deal of respect. Here’s Dr. Mamadou Diouf, a prominent scholar from Senegal:

In Africa, “opposition to power also means opposition to France,” said Mamadou Diouf, the director of Columbia University’s Institute of African Studies. “We find ourselves in a paradox: The champion of the rights of man practices a politics absolutely contrary to its principles,” Mr. Diouf said of France’s policies in Africa.

What are you reading?