Here are some blog posts on Africa worth checking out:

Kal sets recent political maneuvers by Mauritanian Islamists in their historical context.

A few bloggers look at the politics of US restrictions on aid to Somalia: Steve Bloomfield points to contradictions in policy toward Somalia and actions in Afghanistan; Mike Smith examines the effects that delaying food aid has:

The impact of the interruption is becoming clear and causing huge problems, with rations to starving people being cut. The decision in October to suspend millions of dollars worth of aid came due to fears that food and money was going to an Islamic insurgent group, with the U.S. assuring the UN that the delay would be brief. But now the World Food Program has suggested “The food supply line to Somalia is effectively broken.” Food is stuck in Kenya until bureaucrats can decide better regulations — regulation that makes demands that the UN fear are unrealistic in such a chaotic environment like Somalia.

Shashank Bengali fills us in on architecture in Eritrea.

Turning to Sudan, Rob Crilly comments on a recent op-ed about Darfur by Michael Gerson. At the State Department’s Dipnote blog, US Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration discusses his engagement with American activists through new technology. Bec Hamilton gives her take on the event:

The best summation of the State Department’s first foray into citizen engagement 2.0 is, appropriately enough, encapsulated in a tweet by TechPresident blogger Micah Sifry. Responding to the frustration advocates were expressing in real-time to the vagueness of the administration’s answers, he wrote, “Whatever you may think about substance of Gration/Power’s answers, State Dept just raised the bar on admin transparency efforts.” Indeed.

Finally, Texas in Africa directs us to another nice post by Louisa Lombard on the Peace Corps and the Central African Republic.

What are you reading today?

Here are some news stories that caught my attention in the last few days:

Violence broke out in South Sudan again this week, claiming 11 lives in Jongelei state. Meanwhile, IRIN reports on North-South tensions in the Nuba Mountains.

Tuareg rebels return to Niger from Libya under an amnesty deal.

The Wall Street Journal has suggested that changing oil policies in Nigeria might prompt oil companies to move elsewhere in West Africa. Ghana’s leaders are thinking hard about the ramifications of an oil boom.

Ghana’s offshore Jubilee Field is set to begin producing oil and natural gas next year that could earn the country as much as 20 billion dollars over the next 20 years.

But the new government need look no farther than neighboring Nigeria to see how quickly squandered oil wealth can bring resentment, violence, and environmental destruction.

So lawmakers in Ghana want to make sure they have a plan in place for spending that oil revenue responsibly before the money starts coming in.

The EU may train 2,000 Somali troops. The proposal under consideration would send EU troops to Uganda and would take around one year. The BBC says Somalia wants to train around 6,000 new troops and police, and adds that “the move by the EU is expected to complement efforts made by France, Djibouti and Uganda who have all committed to training Somali troops.”

Two quick items for those interested in Afro-Chinese relations: check out Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s comments on China and the US, and take a look at this article on violence against Chinese workers in Angola.

Finally, here’s an article about anti-French sentiment in former French African colonies. The article opens with anecdotal evidence that I don’t find completely convincing, but then moves to a discussion of power politics that is definitely worth reading. The author includes some quotations from African intellectuals for whose work I have a great deal of respect. Here’s Dr. Mamadou Diouf, a prominent scholar from Senegal:

In Africa, “opposition to power also means opposition to France,” said Mamadou Diouf, the director of Columbia University’s Institute of African Studies. “We find ourselves in a paradox: The champion of the rights of man practices a politics absolutely contrary to its principles,” Mr. Diouf said of France’s policies in Africa.

What are you reading?

This week, Niger’s constitutional court certified the results of last month’s parliamentary elections, which occurred in a context of domestic dissent and regional outcry that began with President Mamadou Tandja’s successful bid this summer to extend his tenure in office. Prior to the elections, which drew condemnation from other countries in the region, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Niger, prompting a diplomatic offensive Tandja’s team.

Now regional powers are taking a strong interest in resolving Niger’s political crisis. Nigeria is playing a central role. On Monday, former Nigerian President Abdulsalami Abubakar began leading ECOWAS talks with Tandja’s representatives in Abuja, Nigeria. ECOWAS is taking a cautious approach and attempting to remain even-handed; yesterday, Abdusalami met with a delegation of high-profile members of Niger’s opposition. The EU backs ECOWAS efforts on Niger and a parallel effort on Guinea, and has suspended much of its aid to Niger.

Nigerian President Musa Yar’Adua, who is also the current ECOWAS chairman, is said to favor a “carrot-and-stick” approach to Niger. The linked author expands on this strategy and the challenges that remain:

Several times, Yar’Adua government has attempted to spearhead talks between the government of Niger and the political opposition. But, he has met with failure, principally, because Mr. Tandja has so far refused to shift his position on any of the key issues.

The understanding seems to be, this time around, that negotiations will work, if backed by sanctions. That probably explains why ECOWAS has set the ball rolling, so to speak, by suspending Niger from its ranks. Mr. Tandja can be made to climb down from the high tree he’s flown onto, if a degree of those sanctions is economic. A travel ban on members of his government, plus an asset freeze may also help to cow the president and his supporters.

But, the efforts must be concerted, if they are to bear fruit. On their own, neither ECOWAS nor the A.U. can make much happen, without wholehearted commitment from both the E.U. and the U.N. They are the ones with the real political and economic muscle.

Also, Niger’s military has to be brought into the equation, because, to a large extent, the military leadership hold the key to a solution. If every kind of military aid to Niger was cut off, the backers of the 72-year-old president in the armed forces would begin to think twice.

The opposition themselves need to close ranks by acting as one. But, most importantly, it would seed that the best option on the table should be to encourage both sides to settle for a government of national unity, ahead of elections that are fair, credible and transparent. Before that, political reform must happen.

In terms of bilateral Niger-Nigeria relations, it’s not clear how big of a stick Yar’Adua will wield against his neighbor. A recent border closure between the two countries hinted at a stiffer Nigerian policy toward Niger, but the reasons for the closure were not made explicit, so perhaps I’m reading too much into it.

The other country in the region with a potentially significant role in the crisis is Liberia. Xinhua reports that Tandja asked President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf for help in finding a resolution. What that request means I’m not sure. If nothing else, I think we can say that Tandja wants good relations with other countries in the region, which opens the possibility that regional pressure will lead to a resolution. On the other hand, Tandja has fought hard to remain in power and will be unlikely to step down. Does resolving the crisis therefore mean other demands will take center stage – some kind of power-sharing agreement, perhaps, rather than a total political alternation? We’ll see where these talks in Abuja go.

SOMALILAND’S SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION

I’m not much of a humorist, but I’ll point out that the title of this post is a (weak, I admit) pun, for it refers both to the current state of affairs in the autonomous republic of Somaliland and to Somaliland’s quest for international recognition. Both stories have made headlines recently.

Berbera, Somaliland

Al Jazeera asks, as many others have, whether Somaliland is heading toward collapse. A crisis over presidential elections, originally scheduled for late September but now delayed indefinitely, has made observers in and outside the country uneasy since this summer. But now, Al Jazeera writes, “Recent violence, particularly in the capital Hargeysa, has shown that the crisis in Somaliland has changed from being political to one of security and stability.”

When Al Jazeera speaks of violence, they are referring partly to the explosion that killed a senior military official in the town of Las Anod earlier this month. It’s unclear who bears responsibility for the bombing, but theories are circulating, including one that pins responsibility on al Shabab. It’s also worth noting that this attack occurred in a context of tension between Somaliland and its neighbor, the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, over borders.

A massive flow of immigrants from Ethiopia into Somaliland constitutes another major source of pressure on the region.

Al Jazeera’s pessimism may be warranted, but there are other sides to the story. The dispute between President Dahir Riyale and opposition groups over elections, which turned ugly when Riyale postponed the elections, appeared to reach a breakthrough once parliament approved a new electoral commission in late October. The commission includes the president as well as opposition representatives. ReliefWeb went so far as to call this step a “beacon of hope.”

Finally, a measure of economic growth, at least compared to Somalia’s other regions, may act as a stabilizing force in Somaliland. Saudi Arabia’s recent resumption of livestock trade with Somalia may benefit the whole country, but so far its biggest impact appears to be in Somaliland, where sales have already increased tenfold. The boost for livestock traders is also a boost to Somaliland’s ports and other sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, the New York Times informs us that remittances from Somalis abroad are a crucial source of cash for many Somalis, but have a particular impact in Somaliland, where “the Somali diaspora has contributed money for education, health and other social programs.”

I’m not saying that Somaliland is a capitalist paradise and therefore freedom and democracy will sprout like wildflowers, but it does seem that the measure of political stability that exists is allowing the potential, at least, for economic growth. If those two factors work in tandem, that gives elites a huge incentive to work together to resolve the electoral crisis before it disrupts not only political stability, but economic interests as well.

On the international front, Somaliland has shown, as one writer observers, remarkable persistence in its efforts to attract recognition from other countries. Much seems to hinge on the African Union’s backing, which may come at some point but not, it appears, any time soon.

However, this month’s visit of a Pakistani delegation to Somaliland may open a new door.

Mr. Abdirasak, Somaliland’s newly appointed representative to Pakistan told local media that the two sides have discussed the opening of a Somaliland representation office in Pakistan, to stregthen bilateral relationship and requested Pakistan to throw its weight behind Somaliland’s bid for international recognition.

Somaliland also appealed to Pakistan to help them gain membership in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which is the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations with 57 member states spread over four continents.

Local media also reported that Pakistan would assist Somaliland to combat piracy in the region and train it’s small fleet of coastguards.

It is the first visit of such by Pakistani officials to Somaliland since restoring its nationhood in 1991. Many Somalilanders see the arrival of the Pakistani delegation as a firm step forward in a new relationship between the two nations that will open new doors for Somaliland in the Asian region.

Membership in the OIC sounds like a big deal to me. I wonder if they’ll get it. In the meantime, it looks like more persistence on Somaliland’s part will be needed – and, I imagine, the successful conclusion of the now much-anticipated elections – before a serious change in their international relations occurs.

Alle at Maghreb Politics Review takes note of yesterday’s post on slavery in Mauritania and offers some thoughts of his own on the cultural context in which slavery exists. Alle also makes the important observation that slavery in the region is not limited to Mauritania, but occurs in other Saharan and Sahelian countries. Check out the whole post.

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In other Mauritania news, I’ve been asking myself whether recent diplomatic talks between Middle Eastern countries and Mauritania have any special significance. This week, Mauritania and Yemen discussed expanding their diplomatic ties, and the UAE and Mauritania are seeking ways to increase cooperation. At the Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Turkey this week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reaffirmed his country’s interest in Mauritania. Maybe all these meetings are run of the mill diplomatic business, or maybe all these incidents indicate that now that the elections are over, other countries are more interested in improving their relations with President Abdel Aziz.

Ethiopia will hold parliamentary elections in 2010, and though official campaigning begins in December the participants are already jockeying for position. Most observers bet on a win by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and its leader, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, but it’s worth watching what the opposition does as it fights to remain relevant.

Harar, Ethiopia

Earlier this month, the EPRDF and three opposition parties signed an electoral code of conduct that laid out ground rules – binding for signatories and non-signatories – for the contest. A group of eight parties called Medrek or the Forum refused to participate in the talks. Now Medrek/Forum is denouncing the code, saying the EPRDF is “using its control of the government to systematically crush opponents ahead of next year’s national elections” and that “negotiations between the [EPRDF] and other opposition parties are ignoring the most important issues.

The head of one of the Forum members, Beyene Petros, says they want to engage the EPRDF in bilateral talks about what he calls “breaking the ruling party’s stranglehold on the electoral machinery.” “These are our specific issues – desist from the illicit use of EPRDF membership as a pre-condition for job opportunities; respect for the rule of law by the EPRDF and its government, for example, put an immediate end to all extra legal imprisonment. Free all political prisoners. Make EPRDF officials and cadres accountable for the breach of the law of the land, prevent interference in the election process, separate government and ruling party functions,” Petros said.

Last week, opposition parties issued a list of 450 of their members who have been jailed to keep them from running as candidates in parliamentary elections set for May.

More on the story of the opposition arrests here.

Will tough talk from opposition groups put them in a strong electoral position? Reuters says Medrek is “seen as the most significant threat to Meles,” but also writes that Ethiopia’s opposition is weak overall. The three most prominent opposition figures from the last elections in 2005, Reuters says, have been effectively silenced.

Reuters also suggests that Western powers will quietly support Meles’ continued tenure in office.

Despite accusations of a crackdown on dissent, diplomats in the capital say the West would be comfortable with Meles staying on — as long as he remains a loyal ally in the volatile Horn of Africa and liberalises his potentially huge economy.

Secular Ethiopia is Washington’s key supporter in the region and sent troops into neighbouring Somalia in 2006 to oust an Islamist group which had seized the capital.

“Most Western governments want Meles to continue because there is no alternative in the opposition,” said one diplomat in Addis Ababa who did not want to be named.

“As long as the elections are semi-democratic, they’ll probably stay quiet, keep giving aid, hope for liberalisation of the economy and leave full democracy for later,” he said.

Foreign investors, who are showing interest in exporting commodities and exploring Ethiopia for probable oil and gas deposits, want stability, analysts say. If the opposition takes power, the future would be uncertain and investments delayed as foreign governments and lenders jostle for influence.

These remarks speak to some questions I raised last week about the role of outside forces in the elections.

I will be interested to see whether the Medrek coalition ultimately signs the electoral code. The regime is clearly operating from a position of strength; they are keen to avoid a repeat of 2005’s violence, I imagine, but unlikely to look with kindness on aggressive rhetoric from the opposition.

Mauritania made headlines last week when a UN investigator announced that slavery continues there.

A 2007 law criminalising slavery in the west African desert state is not being properly enforced and victims are not encouraged to come forward, U.N. rapporteur Gulnara Shahinian told a news conference.

“There are all forms of slavery in Mauritania. There is child labour, domestic labour, child marriages and human trafficking,” Shahinian said.

“Legislation is simply a statement on paper if it is not enforced,” she added, urging authorities to bolster the legislation with specific laws relating to labour practices, citizenship and immigration.

Local human rights groups estimate that 18 per cent of Mauritania’s population of about 3 million still live in slavery that has historical roots in the ownership by a ruling Arab-Berber elite of the indigenous black population.

Reports of slavery in Mauritania surface regularly, though as Wikipedia notes the 2007 ban was preceded by major anti-slavery decrees in 1905 and 1981, as well as other initiatives. The BBC wrote of continuing slavery in 2002 and 2004, and in 2007 noted criticisms that the new anti-slavery law did not “include contemporary aspects of slavery – such as forced marriage, indentured labour or debt bondage.”

Two major figures stand out when I look at the politics of slavery in Mauritania. The first is Boubacar Messaoud, founder of SOS Slaves and himself a son of slaves, who has been recognized around the world – and jailed inside Mauritania – for his activism.

The second is Messaoud Boulkheir, also born to slave parents, who made a strong showing in the presidential elections in 2007 and was elected President of the National Assembly afterwards. Prior to the elections this summer, the Telegraph said that Boulkheir’s candidacy had put “half a million African slaves…at the heart of Mauritania’s presidential election.”

Though Boulkheir’s flawed campaign proved unsuccessful, and Kal at The Moor Next Door warned that his supporters were unlikely to constitute a long-lasting political movement, perhaps between the campaign and the UN’s recent statements the slavery issue has become one Mauritania’s leadership cannot afford to ignore. But maybe I’m naive. I guess we’ll have to see how the regime in Nouakchott responds to the UN.

Readers have likely heard about the ongoing military conflict between Saudi Arabia and rebels in Yemen. But did you know that Eritrea stands accused of aiding the Yemeni rebels?

Iran is using Eritrea as a base to provide weapons to Shi’ite insurgents in Yemen, an Eritrean opposition leader alleged on Sunday.

“They (rebels) are receiving their arms from Iran through Eritrea,” Bashir Eshaq, head of external relations for the opposition Eritrean Democratic Alliance, told AFP in an interview.

“The weapons arrive in Eritrea’s coastal towns – mainly Assab, and from then onwards, Huthi rebels smuggle the arms to Yemen at night,” he added.

Eritrea lies just across the Red Sea to the west of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The Horn of Africa nation has frosty relations with the West, but has recently fostered close economic ties with Iran.

I cannot judge the truth of Eshaq’s claims, but this remind us that we can’t neatly separate the political world of the Horn of Africa and the political world of the Gulf. It’s all interrelated. Here are just a few of the important connections:

• Refugees from Somalia and other East African countries are pouring into Yemen. Boatloads arrive – or are stopped – regularly. Yemeni officials estimate the total at over 800,000 Somalis, though UN sources put the total at 160,000. Whatever the figure, the influx of refugees strengthens the cultural bond between Yemen and its African neighbors while potentially destabilizing Yemen even further.
• Trade and aid connect Somalia and the Gulf, as illustrated by Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to reopen its livestock trade with Somalia. As the authors in Alex de Waal’s volume Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa discuss, Gulf Arab NGOs began to operate on a broad scale in Somalia after the collapse of the state in 1991, further connecting the Horn to the Gulf religiously, culturally, and politically.
• Accusations that Eritrea is meddling in Yemen echo accusations by Eritrea’s neighbors that it supports al Shabab in Somalia and aids the Ogaden National Liberation Front in Ethiopia. These charges have contributed to Eritrea’s regional and international pariah status.

Despite the human, economic, and military ties between East Africa and the Gulf, we’re not getting the nuanced media coverage of this region that we need. It’s hard to find a sophisticated public discussion in the American media of how the relationships between these countries and the domestic situations in each one are affecting conflicts that are too often depicted as self-contained, like the Somali civil war, or as bilateral, like the fighting near the Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border.

Asmara, Eritrea

If we’re not getting the coverage we need, is Washington formulating nuanced and effective policies toward the region?

Clearly, the administration is aware that problems have regional dimensions. US policymakers who are concerned about terrorism and instability in Yemen and Somalia recognize that these problems are connected. Speaking in August in Nairobi with Somali President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Secretary Hillary Clinton displayed an impressive knowledge of the effects of the Somali refugee crisis on its neighbors, and took questions about the possibility of the Somali civil war destabilizing Kenya. The US has taken a hard line on Eritrea for alleged involvement in Somalia. I am still concerned, though, that policies toward different players in the region are at odds with one another. Is close friendship with Ethiopia conducive to promoting stability in Somalia? Can we pressure Kenya’s leadership to reform (a move that has already evoked backlash) while still demanding their cooperation on Somalia? If accusations of Eritrean intervention in Yemen turn out to be true, I hope that the Obama administration will carefully examine all the strands in this tangled web.

On a related note, here’s a video from NTV Kenya about recent arrests of terrorist suspects:

Shashank Bengali discusses his trip to Eritrea and his experience interviewing President Isaias Afwerki.

Reuters’ Africa Blog wonders about the likelihood of independence for South Sudan. Bec Hamilton fields questions on that issue and other Sudan-related topics. Alex de Waal weighs in on Southern Sudanese independence as well.

Steve Bloomfield has a hilarious rundown of how western media sources are gullible when it comes to who speaks for Somali pirates:

No story about Somali pirates is complete without a suitably bloodcurdling quote from a cutlass-wielding Jack Sparrow wannabe. Luckily for journalists there are plenty of Somalis willing to pretend to be pirates spokesmen for us to choose from.

Following the kidnapping of Paul and Rachel Chandler, a British couple sailing from Seychelles to Tanzania, the pirate PRs have been out in force. By my count 11 people has so far claimed to be spokesmen for the pirates and had their quotes faithfully recorded in the western media.

Here’s your rundown of pirate spokesmen. Must rush, I’m waiting on a call from a pirate spokesman who goes by the name Abu Sharati.

Read the whole piece, it’s worth it.

Lousia Lombard talks about the “magical” state in the Central African Republic, prompting a response from Texas in Africa, who talks about what happens when African states become “twilight institutions,” and why people still sometimes hope that a mostly absent state will one day function better. Lombard responds here.

Foreign Policy looks at Egypt and USAID.

And, in honor of the China-Africa summit in Egypt today, check out the China in Africa blog I discovered this week.

Finally, check out this video from Al Jazeera on recruitment of Somali Kenyans to fight in Somalia:

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has been invited to the Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Istanbul on Monday, and the EU is not happy with Turkey.

The one-day summit will add to growing concerns in some Western capitals that Turkey, an important regional ally of Washington, is shifting away from its pro-Western foreign policy and embracing countries such as Iran and Syria, while distancing itself from friend Israel.

“I think this summit will put Turkey again on the frontline, both in regards with Iran and Bashir,” said Hugh Pope, a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group.

That concern was laid bare open on Friday after President Abdullah Gul, asked about a request from Brussels that Turkey drop Bashir from the guest list, said: “What are they interfering for? This is a meeting being held in the framework of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. It is not a bilateral meeting.”

Meanwhile, the EU has frozen development aid to Niger and given the African nation a one-month ultimatum to “start democracy talks.” Reports about a border closing between Nigeria and Niger have also surfaced, though it’s hard to tell what exactly is going on.

In other Niger news, will the Tuareg peace deal spur tourism?

In Morocco this week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told leaders that the Obama administration will continue George Bush’s policy of supporting UN mediation for the Western Sahara dispute.

Political observers here say Rabat generally believes that U.S. administrations led by the Democratic Party are more sympathetic to the separatist POLISARIO movement and are therefore more likely to push for a vote on self-determination within U.N. mediation efforts.

But Secretary Clinton made clear that President Obama is pursuing the same track as President George W. Bush in setting no preconditions about how U.N. mediation might best resolve the issue.

And, last but not least, a spate of Somalia news:

• Saudi Arabia will reopen its livestock trade with Somalia after an eleven-year ban;
• al Shabab continues to impose harsh punishments;
• Flooding endangers Somali refugees in Kenya;
• and the UN says US restrictions on aid to Somalia have left many without food.

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